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Metacognition enhances students’ efforts to effectively self-regulate their
learning. It is a multifaceted construct that includes metacognitive knowledge,
metacognitive regulation, and metacognitive experiences. Metacognition theory clearly
indicates that metacognitive regulation should be impacted by the context in which the
learning takes place, but little empirical research has attempted to show this effect of
context on metacognitive regulation. The purpose dissertation of this was to investigate
how context influences undergraduate students’ use of metacognitive regulation. To this
end, an instrument (the Metacognition Inventory for Post-Secondary Students; MIPSS)
that assesses metacognitive knowledge globally and metacognitive regulation as a
context-dependent construct was created and evaluated through item analysis and factor
analysis. Then, within-person differences in metacognitive regulation were examined,
measures of metacognition and self-regulated learning (SRL) were associated with each
other and used to predict academic achievement. Results indicated the MIPSS has a bifactor structure, metacognitive regulation is influenced by the course and activity
associated with the regulation, and associations among metacognition and SRL scales and
achievement tend to follow theoretical predictions. Limitations and future directions for
research are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Students’ ability to monitor and regulate their own learning has a substantial
impact on their academic success at the post-secondary level. Relative to high school,
most post-secondary educational environments put greater responsibility on the student to
keep track of deadlines, study and complete coursework outside of the classroom, and
identify what has been learned sufficiently and what has not. Said differently, academic
success in higher education requires greater self-regulated learning (SRL). Students who
self-regulate their learning are metacognitive, motivated, and behaviorally engaged in the
learning process (Zimmerman, 2008). Metacognition is the term given to cognition about
cognitive products and processes and includes knowledge about cognition (metacognitive
knowledge), regulation of cognition (metacognitive regulation), and experiences related
to the awareness of one’s own cognition (metacognitive experiences; Tarricone, 2011).
Metacognition, specifically, and SRL, more broadly, have been the subject of much
educational research for more than thirty years. Metacognition and SRL research
originated from different literatures, but the two areas have grown together and now
overlap considerably. Although metacognition is only one part of SRL, the focus of this
dissertation is on metacognition and not other, equally important aspects of SRL. More
specifically, the focus of this dissertation is on within-person (intra-individual) variability
in metacognitive regulation.
For the most part, existing research on SRL and metacognition has focused on
either isolating and teasing apart the various sub-processes that unfold as one completes a
learning task or relating individual differences in metacognition to differences in
performance outcomes or other educationally-relevant variables (e.g., motivation). The
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latter has involved examining differences in metacognition in a single class or activity or
on average across all classes and activities. Though it is recognized that a person’s
metacognitive regulation is likely to vary across contexts, little is known about such
within-person variability. Further, a practically useful yet understudied area is how
student characteristics (e.g., motivation, prior knowledge) and various aspects of the
learning context (e.g., instruction, learning activities, peer interaction) contribute to
within- and between-person differences in SRL. Identifying characteristics of students
and learning contexts that support and encourage SRL as well as those that discourage
and inhibit SRL will facilitate efforts to increase the likelihood that students will engage
in SRL while in class or learning independently.
Studying within-person variability in metacognition might also help determine
whether students who fail to metacognitively regulate their learning are exhibiting an
availability deficiency or a production deficiency (Veenman, 2013b; Veenman, Van
Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006). Students exhibiting an availability deficiency do not
have the metacognitive knowledge that underlies the ability to apply metacognition to a
specific task. In contrast, students exhibiting a production deficiency have the ability to
metacognitively regulate, and likely do in other situations, but for some reason are failing
to do so at a given time. This distinction is important because the type of intervention or
assistance needed depends on whether the individual is experiencing an availability or
production deficiency. If it can be determined that a student regulates in one situation but
not in another, that student is most likely exhibiting a production deficiency when failing
to fully make use of her metacognitive capabilities. However, if a student rarely regulates
his cognition, regardless of the situation, he is likely exhibiting an availability deficiency.
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An inescapable obstacle currently inhibiting research on within-person differences
in metacognition is the inability to measure such differences in a way that is not overly
burdensome to either participants or researchers. Existing methods such as think-aloud
protocols could be used to study within-person differences but would require substantial
time from participants and resources from researchers. Existing self-report methods
would require substantial reconfiguring in order to tease apart the possible sources of
within-person differences in metacognition. Therefore, the first step in completing this
dissertation was to develop a new instrument that made it possible to efficiently measure
and study within-person differences in metacognition. This instrument was named the
Metacognition Inventory for Post-Secondary Students (MIPSS).
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate how context (as distinguished by
course and activity) influences undergraduate students’ use of metacognitive regulation.
The overarching research question being investigated is: how is undergraduate students’
(self-reported) metacognitive regulation influenced by the course and academic activity
in which one is engaged? In addressing this larger question, the factor structure of the
MIPSS was investigated, within-person differences in metacognitive regulation were
examined, measures of metacognition and SRL were used to predict academic
achievement, and context-specific measures of metacognition were compared with
course-specific and context-general measures of metacognition and SRL.
Results of bi-factor analyses indicate a bi-factor model approximates the MIPSS
data well. This bi-factor structure includes a general metacognition factor that was
associated with all the items and group factors made up of subsets of items that
correspond to declarative, procedural, and conditional metacognitive knowledge, and
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metacognitive regulation during four different academic activities that most
undergraduate students encounter regularly. This structure suggests that there is a broad
level of metacognition that varies across individuals and additional sources of variation in
metacognition among individuals that are not associated with their general level of
metacognition.
Results of the repeated-measures analyses of variance revealed within-person
differences in regulation associated with participants’ favorite and least favorite courses.
Participants reported using metacognitive regulation and SRL in their favorite courses
more frequently than in their least favorite courses. The difference between courses
varied across different academic activities, suggesting that the activity in which one is
engaged might also influence metacognitive regulation.
Self-report measures of metacognition and SRL were weak to moderate predictors
of academic achievement. Associations among the various instruments’ scales generally
followed expectations and suggest that (a) metacognitive knowledge is separate but
related to metacognitive regulation, (b) multiple course-specific scales are able to capture
differences in regulation across courses, and (c) students’ metacognitive regulation
during a given activity can vary considerably depending on the course for which the
activity is done.
The next chapter presents a review of the literature relevant to this dissertation.
Then, Chapter 3 outlines the method used to create the MIPSS and for the two studies.
Chapter 4 contains results of the analyses that were conducted to test the three research
questions. And, Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the results, limitations and future
directions for research, and conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews the literature related to metacognition and its measurement.
First, early theories of metacognition and the intersection of metacognition and selfregulated learning (SRL) are reviewed. Second, contemporary perspectives on
metacognition are discussed, with special attention given to the influence of context on
metacognition. Third, seven common methods of measuring metacognition are described.
Fourth, seven existing self-report instruments are presented along with information about
their structure, reliability, and validity. Finally, gaps in the literature that are addressed by
this dissertation are presented.
Classic Perspectives
This section reviews early theories of metacognition that have been influential in
educational psychology, followed by a discussion of the intersection of metacognition
and SRL. This discussion is limited to theories most related to metacognition in academic
contexts, and does not cover other aspects of metacognition such as theory of mind,
perspective taking, and epistemic cognition (see Moshman, 2015 for an excellent
discussion of metacognition beyond academic contexts). The four theories of
metacognition presented here are those created by Flavell (1976, 1979), Brown,
Bransford, Ferrara, and Campione (1983), Jacobs and Paris (1987), and Nelson and
Narens (1990). Because Flavell’s framework is widely considered to be the original
conceptualization of metacognition, it is discussed in the greatest detail.
Early Theories of Metacognition
Flavell’s work on metacognition began with his work on another similar
construct: metamemory. The term metamemory was coined by Flavell (1971), and he
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conceptualized it as including knowledge, monitoring, and regulation of memory
processes. Memory monitoring and the selection and use of memory strategies were of
particular interest in the early study of metamemory (Tarricone, 2011), and they have
remained a prominent part of metacognition theories. A few years later Flavell introduced
the term metacognition to describe cognitive processes and knowledge related to more
than just memory. Flavell’s (1976) original description was brief and rather broad. He
defined metacognition as,
one’s knowledge concerning one’s own cognitive processes and products or
anything related to them. … Metacognition refers, among other things, to the
active monitoring and consequent regulation and orchestration of these processes
in relation to the cognitive objects or data on which they bear, usually in the
service of some concrete goal or objective. (Flavell, 1976, p. 232)
This paints metacognition as encompassing nearly any knowledge or cognitive
process that takes a cognitive process or product as its object. Later Flavell (1979)
pointed out that he believed it is only the content and function of metacognitions that
distinguish them from other cognitions: metacognitions are not “better” or “greater” than
other cognitions in terms of form or quality.
Metacognition’s origins in metamemory can be seen throughout Flavell’s original
discussion, particularly in the special attention he gave to the knowledge and regulation
of storage and retrieval processes. Flavell also proposed that metacognition is learned:
over time children acquire the ability to execute metacognitive processes and they
construct metacognitive knowledge. He went on to argue that children’s (lack of)
knowledge related to storage and retrieval processes and their knowledge of strategies
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that can be used to maximize these processes was related to their problem-solving ability.
From the very beginning, metacognition was conceptualized as being connected to
cognitive processes that are crucial to learning.
Flavell’s (1979) formal model of cognitive monitoring expanded on his earlier
work (Flavell, 1976) by including more detail about metacognitive knowledge and
introducing metacognitive experiences. In this model, cognitive monitoring (a
metacognitive process) arises from the interactions of metacognitive knowledge,
metacognitive experiences, tasks, and strategies. Flavell’s definition of metacognitive
knowledge includes knowledge or beliefs about people as cognitive beings and of
cognitive tasks, goals, experiences, and actions. He divides metacognitive knowledge into
knowledge related to person, task, and strategy variables. Knowledge of person variables
includes within-person differences (e.g., personal cognitive strengths and weakness,
factors that influence one’s own cognition), interindividual differences (e.g., differences
between peers, comparison of one’s ability to others), and universals of cognition (e.g.,
knowledge of human cognition in general). Knowledge of task variables involves
knowing how the features of a task influence the difficulty of the task and the approach
needed to successfully complete the task. Task variables are divided into the two groups,
available information (e.g., generally having more information makes a task easier) and
task demands and goals (e.g., verbatim recall is more difficult than gist recall).
Knowledge of strategy variables consists of all knowledge related to strategies, including
how and when to use particular strategies. Flavell also points out that metacognitive
knowledge cannot, in practice, be divided cleanly into these categories. Most stored
metacognitive knowledge combines these categories. For example, a student might know

8
that he needs to take reading notes while reading for his geography class when the
reading assignment is more than ten pages, but he does not need to take reading notes if it
is a short reading assignment (i.e., a within-person difference related to strategy
knowledge and task demands). He might also know his friend can learn a great deal from
any reading assignment without taking notes (i.e., an interindividual difference).
Flavell (1979) defines metacognitive experiences as conscious cognitive or
affective experiences that relate to or result from any cognitive endeavor. Metacognitive
experiences come in a variety of forms. They make take place before, during, or after the
focal cognitive activity, and they may be brief or enduring. To illustrate, a student
receives an assignment and feels that she does not understand the content well enough to
complete it successfully. Another student is reading for his psychology course when he
senses that he did not understand the previous section correctly. A professor reflects on a
previous conversation with a colleague and begins to think she did not fully understand
what he meant. Each of these examples involves a metacognitive experience that takes
place at a different time in relationship to the cognitive activity at the center of the
experience. Metacognitive experiences play an important role in the learning process
because a person may respond to a metacognitive experience by changing a goal or
strategy, constructing new metacognitive knowledge, or activating additional strategies to
achieve a goal.
In their extensive review of metacognition research, Brown and colleagues (1983)
define metacognition as “the knowledge and control of the domain of cognition” (p.86).
They divide metacognition into two main components: metacognitive knowledge and
metacognitive regulation. They state that metacognitive knowledge consists of
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knowledge of one’s own cognitive processes and others’ cognitive processes.
Metacognitive regulation includes planning, monitoring, and checking outcomes. Brown
and colleagues (1983) mention that planning, monitoring, and regulation may be directed
at strategies, but they do not discuss the classification of the strategies themselves or
knowledge related to strategies. They also do not include metacognitive experiences or
any similar affective dimension in their conceptualization of metacognition. They do,
however, identify four main characteristics of metacognitive knowledge: stability, stateability, fallibility, and age relatedness. That is, metacognitive knowledge is relatively
stable over time (though it can be increased and revised), can be communicated verbally,
is subject to error, and increases with age. In contrast, metacognitive regulation is
described as less stable, sometimes unstate-able, and related to the task and situation
rather than age. Brown and colleagues point out that because of differences in these
characteristics, different aspects of metacognition are expected to vary in stability, the
extent to which they are influenced by task and context, and their ability to be verbalized.
It is therefore necessary to specify which aspect of metacognition is being referred to
when discussing, for example, the degree to which metacognition is stable across tasks
and contexts.
Jacobs and Paris (1987) provide a slightly different definition of metacognition.
They define metacognition as, “any knowledge about cognitive states or processes that
can be shared between individuals.... demonstrated, communicated, examined, and
discussed” (p. 258). That is, automatic or implicit cognitions that cannot be reported are
not considered metacognition, a perspective that opposes that of Brown and colleagues
(1983). They also identify the primary components of metacognitive knowledge and
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metacognitive regulation but refer to them as “self-appraisal of cognition” and “selfmanagement of thinking” respectively (p. 258). As such, the framework presented by
Jacobs and Paris is more similar to that of Brown and colleagues (1983) than that of
Flavell (1979).
According to Jacobs and Paris (1987), metacognitive knowledge contains three
sub-components: declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge. Declarative
knowledge is knowing that, procedural knowledge is knowing how, and conditional
knowledge is knowing why and when. For example, knowing that learning is easier when
new information is related to what is already known is declarative knowledge. Knowing
how to activate prior knowledge and make connections to it is procedural knowledge.
And, knowing it is helpful to activate related prior knowledge when a new topic is
introduced in lecture because it will facilitate making connections is conditional
knowledge. They divide metacognitive regulation into three types of processes: planning,
evaluation, and regulation. Similar to Brown and colleagues (1983), Jacobs and Paris
(1987) do not include metacognitive experiences in their definition of metacognition.
This conceptualization of metacognition was reiterated by Schraw and Moshman
(1995) in their summary of “standard accounts of metacognition” (p. 352), though
Schraw and Moshman use the labels knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition
for the two primary components. The perspective of metacognition as consisting of
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation (and not metacognitive
experiences) is currently the most common conceptualization used in research.
Finally, the metacognitive model of cognition introduced by Nelson and Narens
(1990) has also been influential, though it is considerably different from the three
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previously discussed models. This is a model of metacognitive regulation and does not
include metacognitive knowledge. Though referenced with some regularity in variety of
fields, this model has not been as popular in educational psychology as the models that
incorporate both metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation. However, it is
present in the educational psychology literature, and it is notable because it is a
considerably different view of metacognition.
Nelson and Narens’s model attempts to solve Comte’s paradox, which contends
the mind cannot both think and observe itself thinking at the same time. Their solution to
the paradox is to distinguish between two levels of processing that happen in parallel:
object-level processing and meta-level processing. The meta-level contains a model of its
goals and ideas of how the object-level can be used to accomplish those goals. The levels
“communicate” through the processes of monitoring and control. Information moving
from the object-level to the meta-level is a result of monitoring, and information moving
from the meta-level to the object-level is how the meta-level controls what the objectlevel does. Processing can take place at both levels simultaneously, putting this
perspective in the same realm as dual-processing theories of cognition. Dual-processing
theories, of which there are many, posit the existence of two separate classes of cognitive
processes. Most dual-processing theories make a distinction between automatic, fast, and
intuitive “System 1” processing and deliberative, slow, and analytical “System 2”
processing (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). The two
components of Nelson and Narens’s (1990) model are not separated in this way.
Furthermore, the System 1/System 2 distinction used in most dual-processing theories
does not connect cleanly with most metacognition theories, largely because processes that
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have been labeled “metacognitive” do not all fall under the same system. For example,
monitoring generally considered an automatic process (System 1), whereas planning
requires the intentional application of cognitive resources (System 2). That being said,
theories of metacognition (including Nelson and Narens’s) assume that the individual can
be cognitively engaged in a task while simultaneously regulating cognitive engagement
with that task, thus adopting a kind of dual-processing perspective even though dual
processing is not explicitly incorporated into most theories of metacognition.
The Intersection of Metacognition and SRL
Metacognition has been part of SRL theories from the beginning, and it is difficult
to discuss one without the other. SRL developed from the overlap of research on learning
strategies, academic studying behaviors, and motivation, among other topics. A group of
researchers working on these topics gathered at the 1986 American Educational Research
Association meeting and created a broad definition of SRL that was intended to guide
future research. SRL was defined as, “the degree to which students are metacognitively,
motivationally, and behaviorally active participants in their own learning process”
(Zimmerman, 2008, p. 167). Clearly, metacognition was viewed as an important
component of SRL from the start.
Originally, the clearest intersection between metacognition and SRL was
strategies. Flavell (1979) presented knowledge of strategies as a type of metacognitive
knowledge, and other early theories of metacognition (e.g., Brown et al., 1983; Jacobs &
Paris, 1987) also identified planning, monitoring, and evaluation as strategies that belong
to the category of metacognitive regulation. Thus, at least some strategies were place at
the “meta” level. SRL theories, however, did not generally specify knowledge of
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strategies as metacognitive knowledge, and processes such as planning and monitoring
were dubbed metacognitive processes in some theories (e.g., Pintrich & De Groot, 1990;
Zimmerman, 1989) but not others (e.g., Butler & Winne, 1995). Furthermore, some SRL
theories (e.g., Butler & Winne, 1995) included the non-strategy aspects of metacognitive
knowledge (e.g., knowledge of task variables; Flavell, 1979), while others did not (e.g.,
Pintrich & De Groot, 1990). Regardless, early theories of metacognition and SRL were
generally overlapping in their inclusion of strategies, especially domain-general strategies
like planning and monitoring.
The clear overlap between metacognition and SRL led to attempts to draw
boundaries between the two constructs. Some SRL researchers argued that metacognition
plays a limited role in SRL. For example, in an issue of Educational Psychologist from
1995, Winne (1995) discussed the importance of metacognitive knowledge in successful
SRL, and he called for more research on how instruction can increase students’
metacognitive knowledge. Schunk (1995) wrote a response to the article that appeared in
the same issue, and one of his main points was that metacognition cannot fully explain
the dynamic interplay of SRL processes. Winne suggested that the role of metacognition
in SRL should be more thoroughly researched, and Schunk’s response was to remind
readers that metacognition is a small part of SRL.
In contrast, some researchers deliberately attempted to integrate components of
metacognition and SRL theories into a single perspective of how learners can be aware of
and in control of their learning. Notable examples of this centrist approach include the
work of Pressley and Borkowski and of Winne.
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Pressley and Borkowski both began studying memory and memory strategies
before extending their work to metamemory and metacognition. During the late 1980s,
they worked to integrate cognitive, metacognitive, and motivational aspects of learning
into a single theory. In various publications, they employ the terms, “self-regulated
cognition” (Borkowski, Carr, Rellinger, & Pressley, 1990), “spontaneous strategy use”
(Borkowski, Carr, & Pressley, 1987), and “good information processor” (Pressley,
Borkowski, & Schneider, 1989). Regardless of the term being used, they described selfregulated learning (though not using the term) as the outcome of the interactions between
domain knowledge, metacognition, and motivation. The role of metacognitive knowledge
is emphasized, primarily in the forms of declarative, procedural, and conditional
knowledge related to strategies. The role of motivation is described primarily in terms of
attributions, but also self-esteem, locus of control, self-efficacy, and goals. Borkowski
and colleagues (1990) group these motivation constructs with the label self-system and
posit that the self-system underlies metacognition. Adaptive motivation patterns at the
level of the self-system are believed to support and enrich further growth of
metacognition. At the same time, they identify metacognitive knowledge as a potential
source of motivation for multiple reasons (Borkowski et al., 1987). First, knowing how
and why a strategy can be effective provides the individual a reason to apply the strategy.
Second, understanding the role of strategies in the learning process influences the
individual’s locus of control and the types of attributions made in instances of success
and failure. Thus, metacognition and motivation are described as having reciprocal
influences on each other.
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Winne (1996) explicitly discussed the role of metacognition in SRL. He identified
various ways individual differences can influence the role of metacognition within an
episode of SRL. First, differences in domain knowledge influences the role of
metacognition because (a) individuals with more expertise in a topic are likely to rely less
on metacognition, and (b) individuals’ task-related metacognitive judgments (i.e.,
judgments of task difficulty and the extent to which information has been stored in
memory) are influenced by prior knowledge of similar tasks and topics. Second,
differences in knowledge of strategies lead to differences in strategy use, metacognitive
monitoring, and metacognitive control. Third, differences in the degree to which a
strategy is automated lead to differences in how effectively a strategy is executed. One’s
proficiency in executing a strategy has a direct effect on the need to metacognitively
monitor and regulate the use of that strategy. Fourth, there are individual differences in
metacognitive decision-making processes related to strategy selection. Finally, various
dispositional differences are related to metacognition. For example, metacognitive
monitoring and reflection are part of deep processing (Biggs, 1987), and therefore a
tendency toward deep processing rather than shallow processing implies a tendency to be
metacognitive while engaged in the learning task.
In sum, the overlap and connections between metacognition and SRL have been
apparent and recognized by researchers for decades. Metacognition was formally
introduced as a construct first, and early theories encompassed a broad range of cognitive
products and processes that took cognitive products and processes as their objects. SRL
emerged from diverse topics of education research that all pertained to active, selfdirected learning. Aspects of metacognitive theories were incorporated into SRL theories,

16
but there was considerable variability in the extent to which metacognition was allowed
to permeate conceptualizations of SRL. Regardless, both metacognition and SRL have
enjoyed an ongoing presence in the research literature.
An important note about the ongoing debates about the distinctions between
metacognition and SRL, is that both metacognition and SRL are umbrella-terms that
cover numerous other constructs that overlap and interact in a variety of ways. Attempts
to completely distinguish between the two are unlikely to be successful as long as the two
continue to be conceptualized as such broad, overarching constructs. The debate is further
complicated by the fact that metacognition is used at times to mean either metacognitive
knowledge or both metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation, and what
seems to be a perceived need to distinguish between which strategies or processes operate
at the “meta” level and which do not (Meijer et al., 2013).
Contemporary Perspectives
This section reviews more recently published conceptualizations of
metacognition. This includes a discussion of how some researchers have attempted to
explicitly address the ways in which the learning context can influence metacognition.
Modern Conceptualizations of Metacognition
Broad theoretical conceptualizations of metacognition have changed little in the
years following the early work described above. This might be due to the development of
measures of metacognition that are based on specific conceptualizations. Available
instruments led researchers to conduct studies that aligned with the conceptualization
underpinning a specific instrument. It might also be due to the movement away from
conducting research on metacognition as a whole, multifaceted construct, and instead
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conducting research on individual components of metacognition, such as monitoring
accuracy (e.g., Huff & Nietfeld, 2009; Koriat & Bjork, 2005), independent strategy use
(e.g., Karpicke, Butler, & Roediger, 2009), and confidence judgments (e.g., Krebs &
Roebers, 2010). Three conceptualizations of metacognition that have been put forth in the
past 25 years are described below, including that of Schraw and Dennison (1994),
Efklides (2008, 2011), and Tarricone (2011).
The highly influential framework proposed by Schraw and Dennison (1994) is
similar to the previously described frameworks put forth by Brown and colleagues (1983)
and Jacobs and Paris (1987). At least some of the popularity of Schraw and Dennison’s
conceptualization of metacognition is due to the popularity of the Metacognitive
Awareness Inventory (MAI), the self-report measure of metacognition that was created
and published along with the framework.
In contrast to earlier definitions of metacognition, Schraw and Dennison’s
definition was clearly oriented toward learning environments. They defined
metacognition as “the ability to reflect on, understand, and control one’s learning”
(Schraw & Dennison, 1994, p. 460). Though the “ability” part of the definition suggests a
conceptualization based only on processes, the elaborated framework consists of both
metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation. In this conceptualization,
metacognitive knowledge consists of declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge.
Metacognitive regulation involves a variety of skills, five of which were identified as
being particularly prevalent in the literature: planning, information management
strategies, comprehension monitoring, debugging strategies, and evaluation. Notably,
Schraw and Dennison’s (1994) conceptualization of metacognition only deviates from
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that of Jacobs and Paris (1987) when it comes to the way metacognitive regulation is
divided into its component processes. A slight variation of this two-component
framework also has served as the basis for the many studies conducted by Veenman and
colleagues (van der Stel & Veenman, 2010; Veenman, 2011, 2013a; Veenman & Spaans,
2005).
Efklides (2008) presented a three-component conceptualization of metacognition.
In her framework, metacognition is divided into metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive
experiences, and metacognitive skills. Early theories (e.g., Brown et al., 1983; Flavell,
1979; Jacobs & Paris, 1987) had generally incorporated two of the three components, but
did not explicitly include all three components. Efklides was not the first to suggest a
three-component model (e.g., Pintrich, Wolters, & Baxter, 2000), but it is her model that
is described here because of her contributions to SRL theory (described next) as well as
metacognition theory.
According to Efklides (2008) metacognitive knowledge is declarative knowledge
and includes models of cognitive processes, knowledge of persons (the self and others),
knowledge of tasks, knowledge of strategies (including conditional knowledge),
knowledge of goals, and epistemological beliefs. Epistemological beliefs relate to the
nature of knowledge and the justifiability of beliefs (Moshman, 2015). Metacognitive
experiences “are what the person is aware of and what she or he feels when coming
across a task and processing the information related to it” (Efklides, 2008, p. 279). They
arise from self-awareness during task engagement, and may be feelings, judgments,
estimates, and on-line task-specific knowledge. On-line task-specific knowledge is
metacognitive knowledge that is retrieved and applied to the present task along with
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awareness of thoughts and specific task elements. Metacognitive skills are deliberately
used strategies that aid in the control of cognition. Procedural knowledge of strategies is
placed within this component of metacognition, rather than within metacognitive
knowledge (as is the case in many conceptualizations of metacognition). Efklides
identifies five processes that are metacognitive skills: orientation, planning, regulation,
monitoring, and evaluation. In this model, the three components of metacognition are
assumed to influence each other during task completion. For example, metacognitive
skills and metacognitive knowledge are activated by metacognitive experiences, and
metacognitive knowledge is used in strategy selection. The reciprocal influences of the
three components in this model echoes the reciprocity that is a prominent feature of her
broader theory of SRL.
Efklides (2011) theory of SRL reflects a deliberate attempt to reconcile the
differences between previous theories of SRL and metacognition and represent the ways
metacognition, motivation, and affect interact during an SRL episode. In the
Metacognitive and Affective model of Self-Regulated Learning (MASRL model),
metacognition, motivation, and affect operate at two reciprocally related levels of
functioning: the person level and the person x task level. The person level includes traitlike, global dispositions, knowledge, and characteristics relating to cognition,
metacognition, motivation, affect, and volition. Person-level characteristics are assumed
to be relatively stable and influence SRL in a top-down manner. The person x task level
consists of the individual’s task-related processing and any subjective experiences that
relate to the task. Person x task interactions are dynamic and influence SRL in a bottom-
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up manner. The top-down/bottom-up reciprocity means that each level has the potential
to inform and change the other.
The inclusion of person x task interactions in the MASRL model provides a clear
point at which the learning context might influence one’s metacognition and SRL. Much
regulation that takes place during a task is done in response to one’s ongoing progress
with the task. This can be clearly seen through the process of evaluation: a judgment of
one’s work on a task is directly connected to the task and context in which it is
completed. For example, a student might not take time to evaluate the quality of her
response to an essay prompt if the task is a low-stakes in-class assignment for a teacher
with relatively low grading standards. However, she might put considerable time into
evaluating the quality of the essay if it is a final paper for a teacher with higher grading
standards. Even though the actual task is the same, the context is different, and as a result,
the student’s use of metacognition is different.
Finally, Tarricone (2011) conducted a comprehensive review and analysis of the
literature related to metacognition and proposed a taxonomy of metacognition that
organizes and synthesizes existing theories of metacognition. Her taxonomy is extensive
and detailed to the point that the complete figure is available only on an interactive
website (Tarricone, 2014). In her taxonomy, Tarricone (2011) retains the primary
distinction between metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation. What
follows is a brief overview of the taxonomy.
Metacognitive knowledge is divided into declarative, procedural, and conditional
knowledge. Each type of knowledge can relate to person, task, and strategy variables.
First, declarative knowledge includes knowledge of intra-individual (i.e., within-person)
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and interindividual differences; universals of human cognition; task information and
demands; and strategy attributes, applicability, and effectiveness. Tarricone also states
that declarative knowledge is “stable, familiar, constant, established long-term
knowledge” (Tarricone, 2011, p. 156). Second, procedural knowledge is knowledge of
how to carry out processes and actions that can be used to achieve a desired outcome.
Third, conditional knowledge involves knowing and recognizing the conditions that
influence learning. It includes knowing when and why specific strategies are or are not
appropriate, and it makes strategy transfer possible.
Metacognitive regulation is divided into (a) regulation of cognition and executive
functioning and (b) metacognitive experiences. Regulation of cognition and executive
functioning is further divided into (a) monitoring and control and (b) self-regulation.
Both monitoring/control and self-regulation can relate to person, task, and strategy
variables. However, it is not clear if monitoring/control and self-regulation should be
considered as separate, as many related terms and processes (e.g., monitoring, planning)
are used in the descriptions of both components. Metacognitive experiences are products
of on-line monitoring and awareness of cognition. They serve as feedback that can inform
self-regulation. In the taxonomy, metacognitive experiences are divided into
metacognitive feelings and metacognitive judgments, both of which can relate to person,
task, and strategy variables. Metacognitive feelings may relate to task or information
familiarity, task difficulty, confidence, feelings of knowing, or satisfaction with
performance. Metacognitive judgments include estimates of learning, memory accuracy,
solution correctness, effort expenditure, and strategy effectiveness.
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Clearly, Tarricone’s (2011) taxonomy integrates aspects of all the previously
described conceptualizations of metacognition. The primary critique of the taxonomy
offered here is that because it is a synthesis of all previous conceptualizations, it has not
necessarily clarified nuances or resolved logical inconsistencies within and between the
various conceptualizations. A source of considerable confusion is the overlap in
monitoring and control with self-regulation within the category of metacognitive
regulation. This is probably a product of the general ambiguity surrounding the
intersection of metacognition and SRL.
Consistent with most contemporary perspectives of metacognition and SRL
(especially that of Efklides, 2011), metacognition is conceptualized as being an integral
component of SRL in this dissertation. That is, metacognition encapsulates metacognitive
knowledge, regulation, and experiences, and it is bidirectionally related to other aspects
of SRL such as motivation and behavior, which altogether make up SRL. As such,
metacognitive knowledge is seen as most useful to learning when being used to inform
decisions made while self-regulating, and metacognitive regulation is conceptualized as
metacognitive processes used during SRL. Further, in this dissertation, the knowledge
and regulation/experiences aspects of metacognition are understood to have different
basic characteristics. Most fundamentally, knowledge is relatively stable across
contexts—one’s knowledge does not change just because the task at hand has changed,
but regulatory processes and experiences, in contrast, are quite unstable and are
influenced by the learning context because metacognitive regulation and experiences
involve responding to one’s environment or the outcome of an action. The different
characteristics of metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive regulation and experiences
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were described by Brown and colleagues (Brown et al., 1983) and are at least partially
captured in the two levels of the MASRL model (Efklides, 2011), where the person level
consists of more stable constructs whereas the person x task level is more dynamic, and
actions are dependent on both the person and the task. Empirical work by other
researchers that relates to the unstable, context-sensitive nature of metacognitive
regulation is reviewed in the next section.
The Influence of Context on Metacognition
The two main components of metacognition—knowledge and regulation—are
theorized as being influenced by context differently. Namely, metacognitive knowledge
is generally viewed as stable and influenced little by context whereas metacognitive
regulation is viewed as dynamic and influenced considerably by the environment in
which it takes place. As McCardle and Hadwin explain, “regulation is sensitive to
context. Learners adjust what they do and how they study depending upon task, self, and
context conditions” (McCardle & Hadwin, 2015 p. 45). The dynamic and variable nature
of self-regulation, including metacognitive regulation, has been emphasized in theory
(Efklides, 2008, 2011; Pintrich, 2004; Winne, 1997; Zimmerman, 1989), and is reflected
in the recent trend toward studying SRL and metacognition as a context-bound event. For
example, in their programs of research, Azevedo (e.g., Azevedo & Cromley, 2004;
Azevedo, Guthrie, & Seibert, 2004; Azevedo, Johnson, Chauncey, & Burkett, 2010) and
Veenman (Veenman, 2013a; Veenman, Bavelaar, De Wolf, & Van Haaren, 2014) collect
digital trace data as participants complete learning tasks on computers. Actions within the
computerized learning environment are then interpreted as indicators of various kinds of
regulation. A primary idea underlying all research that acknowledges the role of context
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on regulation is that SRL is not algorithmic and will not proceed in the same way during
different tasks or in different environments. Stated differently, the ways in which SRL
and metacognitive regulation unfold as a student completes a task are directly influenced
by the characteristics of the task and context.
Regulatory processes are embedded within a given context and are best
understood as part of that context. Researchers often turn to “on-line” measures (such as
the computer-based tasks described above) in order to study metacognitive regulation in
connection with the context in which it is used. More rarely and recently, researchers
have begun to study individuals’ metacognitive regulation across multiple contexts to
determine how changes in context might contribute to shifts in metacognitive regulation.
These within-person shifts further support the notion that SRL and metacognitive
regulation are influenced by context. Empirical studies of within-person differences in
metacognitive regulation are reviewed next.
In one study, Ben-Eliyahu and Linnenbrink-Garcia (2015) investigated
differences in high school and college students’ SRL in favorite and least favorite
courses. Specifically, they examined the influence of self-reported cognitive,
metacognitive, affective, and behavioral regulation on the use of learning strategies and
academic achievement. The participants reported more metacognition, self-regulation,
and strategy use in favorite courses than in least favorite courses. The pattern of
relationships among components of SRL, learning strategies, and achievement also
differed across favorite and least favorite courses and between the high school and
college samples, further indicating an influence of the learning context on metacognition
and more broadly, SRL. Furthermore, the zero-order correlations between the individual
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components of SRL in favorite and least favorite courses (e.g., planning in favorite
course vs. planning in least favorite course) ranged from .38 to .73 for the high school
sample and from .19 to .62 for the college sample. This suggests that some components
of SRL might be more stable while others are more variable across contexts.
One shortcoming of Ben-Eliyahu and Linnenbrink-Garcia’s study (2015) is that
they simply asked students to identify a favorite and least favorite course, so in essence,
each student’s survey was asking about different courses. This makes it difficult to make
generalizations from their study. A course might be identified as a (least) favorite because
of the topic, the instructor, the level of difficulty, or any number of other reasons. No
auxiliary information about the courses was reported, so it is not possible to determine
whether characteristics of specific courses that made them more or less preferable (e.g.,
level of challenge, student-centeredness) contributed to differences in SRL or the
relationships between SRL and achievement. Regardless, this study suggests there are
differences in SRL, including metacognition, across contexts that can be detected
empirically.
Additional research on the influence of context on metacognition comes from
outside the core metacognition and SRL literature. Research from the Student
Approaches to Learning tradition and the Latent State-Trait theory framework provides
evidence that students’ use of metacognition and SRL might differ across learning
contexts. For example, Vermetten, Lodewijks, and Vermunt (1999) adopted a Student
Approaches to Learning framework while examining the consistency and variability in
Dutch law students’ use of learning strategies in four different courses during a single
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1

semester . Students were asked to report their strategy use in four different classes.
Strategies were grouped by type (e.g., memorizing, critical processing, self-regulation).
Consistency of strategy use was gauged through correlations and variability across
classes was analyzed with repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The
researchers concluded that students’ use of learning strategies relative to other students
was somewhat consistent, and the frequency at which students used some, but not all,
types of strategies varied across classes. Coertjens, Vanthournout, Lindblom-Ylänne, and
Postereff (2016) similarly found that theology students varied in their approaches to
learning in different theology courses, but students’ general approaches to learning were
predictive of their course-specific approaches.
The Latent State-Trait theory framework is also consistent with research that has
examined differences in metacognition across contexts. Constructs that are
conceptualized as either states or traits can be found in many branches of psychology.
States are temporary and subject to situational influences, whereas traits are stable,
enduring, and relatively immune to situational influences. Constructs exhibiting both
state-like and trait-like characteristics (e.g., anxiety) have been discussed by scholars
studying personality for decades (e.g., Gaudry, Vagg, & Spielberger, 1975; Kendall,
Finch, Auerbach, Hooke, & Mikulka, 1976). Rarely has this type of duality been
explicitly incorporated into the metacognition and SRL literature despite the theoretical
support and the (admittedly limited) empirical evidence that suggests metacognition and
SRL have both state-like and trait-like characteristics. Theoretical frameworks such as the
MASRL model (Efklides, 2011) and some research in the Student Approaches to
Learning tradition (e.g., Coertjens et al., 2016; Vermetten et al., 1999) suggest
1

Despite being in law school, these students were the age of traditional US undergraduate students.
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simultaneous trait-like and state-like aspects of SRL and metacognition. Latent StateTrait theory has been applied successfully to the study of SRL by a small number of
researchers.
Latent State-Trait theory is based on classical test theory (CTT) and originated in
personality research. The basic model derived from CTT specifies that an observed score
is composed of true score and measurement error. In Latent State-Trait theory, an
observed score reflects a latent state and measurement error (Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid,
1999). The latent state is a combination of the individual’s latent trait and the effect of the
specific situation on the individual. For example, consider the combination of stability
and variability in an individual’s extraversion. An individual may exhibit moderate
extraversion in most situations (latent trait) but show little extraversion when at a
reception full of superiors (a situation-specific effect). If that individual’s extraversion
was measured under “normal” conditions and again in the exceptional situation, a
stability coefficient would suggest that the measure was heavily influenced by
measurement error. Rather than classifying the deviation from what is typical as
measurement error, Latent State-Trait theory makes it possible to account for deviations
due to variability in contexts.
There are few instances of Latent State-Trait theory being applied to
metacognition research. In one such study, Mujagić and Buško (2013) used a Latent
State-Trait theory approach to examine students’ use of five different types of learning
strategies, including metacognitive strategies, while preparing for two different tests.
They compared the fit of structural equation models that either contained a latent trait
factor or latent trait and state factors. For all five types of learning strategies, models that
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contained both latent trait and state factors had better fit. Consistency and occasionspecificity coefficients also indicated that some types of learning strategies were more
stable across situations than others. Though promising, these results must be interpreted
cautiously as they are based on a sample that is small for the structural equation models
that were tested (N = 155).
Other research not anchored in Latent State-Trait theory has also examined state
and trait components of metacognitive regulation. Hong (1998) used structural equation
modeling to compare the stability of state and trait components of college students’
metacognitive regulation during a single semester. Metacognitive regulation was
measured twice in a single semester by two different self-report instruments. The traitmetacognition instrument asked how frequently general metacognitive regulation
strategies were used, and the state-metacognition instrument (given one week later) asked
about students’ metacognitive regulation during a test that had just been completed. As
predicted, trait-metacognition was more stable than state-metacognition, but the stability
of state metacognition was different for two different classes of students. Traitmetacognition was also a significant predictor of state metacognition at both time points
for both classes. The studies by Hong (1998) and Mujagić and Buško (2013) both provide
preliminary evidence for a trait component of metacognitive regulation that is related but
separate from a state component of metacognitive regulation.
These studies all provide evidence that at least some part of metacognition can
vary over time or context. Variability over time (Mujagić & Buško, 2013), over time and
at different levels of specificity (Hong, 1998), or across classes (Ben-Eliyahu &
Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2015; Coertjens et al., 2016; Vermetten et al., 1999) have been
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found, and suggest that within-person differences in metacognition can be detected and
studied. An important potential source of within-person differences in SRL and
metacognition that is not accounted for in the studies reviewed here is different types of
activities that occur within a single course (e.g., completing a homework assignment vs.
taking a test). SRL theory emphasizes that SRL is situated within tasks and can be
influenced by the task (Efklides, 2011; Veenman, 2011; Zimmerman, 2000) as well as the
broader context (e.g., the course) surrounding the learning task (Ben-Eliyahu & Bernacki,
2015; Efklides, 2011). Therefore, when measuring and studying SRL and metacognition,
it is important to consider how the nature of an activity might influence one’s SRL and
metacognition. And, studying within-person differences in metacognition along with how
different characteristics of the task or learning environment contribute to those withinperson differences will provide insight into the ways educators can design learning
environments so as to better support students’ metacognition.
Common Methods of Measuring Metacognition
Researchers have attempted to measure metacognition from multiple perspectives
and with a variety of methods. The most popular approaches are questionnaires,
interviews, think-aloud protocols, and behavior trace methods such as electronic logfiles.
Within this group of methods, measures are often categorized as either on-line or off-line
measures (Schellings, van Hout-Wolters, Veenman, & Meijer, 2013; Veenman et al.,
2006). On-line measures are obtained while the participant engages in a task and
generally measure regulatory processes, whereas off-line measures are obtained away
from a target task or context and are used to measure both knowledge and regulatory
processes. On-line measures are, by definition, always connected to a specific task, but
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off-line measures may be connected to a specific task, or they may involve generalizing
across multiple tasks.
Another way to categorize measures of metacognition is by considering whether
the measure is reflective of the view of metacognition as more state-like or trait-like. The
view of metacognition as a state-like phenomenon that is influenced by the specific
context and activity can be seen in both on-line and off-line measures that are connected
to a specific task. Because these measures usually provide detailed information on
various components of metacognition, they are considered fine-grained (also referred to
as “microanalytic”) measures (Paris & Paris, 2001; Pintrich, 2004; Schraw, 2000). The
view of metacognition as a trait-like phenomenon that is relatively stable over contexts
and activities can be seen in off-line measures that are not connected to specific tasks.
These measures are considered coarse-grained (also referred to as “macroanalytic”)
measures because the information they provide is comparatively general. A prototypical
coarse-grained measure is a questionnaire that asks respondents to report what they
“usually” do.
As is generally the case in social sciences, the method used to measure
metacognition influences which aspects of metacognition are captured in the resulting
data. For example, behavior trace methods can be used to measure some regulatory
processes, but they are not as well suited for measuring knowledge. In contrast, interview
methods can be used to measure knowledge and beliefs, but they are limited to processes
the interviewee is aware of and can recall. The various components of metacognition are
such that researchers must consider tradeoffs when deciding which method(s) to use.
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Common methods of measuring metacognition are presented next along with their
advantages and disadvantages.
Think-Aloud Protocols
The think-aloud protocol is a fine-grained measure that is used to access an
individual’s thoughts as they complete a task (Schellings et al., 2013). The individual is
asked to verbally report all thoughts they have while completing the target task, hence the
name think-aloud. The think-aloud protocol can be used as an on-line measure (i.e.,
concurrent think-aloud) or an off-line measure (i.e., retrospective think-aloud), but
concurrent think-alouds are considered more reliable than retrospective think-alouds
(Schellings et al., 2013) and are used more frequently. Generally, the individual’s
statements are recorded, transcribed, and then coded by means of a coding scheme that is
intended to connect verbalizations to specific cognitive activities (Schellings et al., 2013).
Historically, think-aloud protocols have been used frequently in reading research
(Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995), and they are one of the most commonly used on-line
measures (Thillmann, Gößling, Marschner, Wirth, & Leutner, 2013).
Of all measures used, concurrent think-aloud protocols provide the most direct
means of assessing what participants are thinking as they complete a task, potentially
providing detailed insight into metacognitive regulation as it unfolds. Think-alouds also
make it possible to examine in detail the connection between metacognition and a
specific context and task (Pintrich et al., 2000). However, there are a number of
disadvantages associated with think-aloud protocols. First, there is a great deal of time
involved in conducting and analyzing even a single think-aloud (Pintrich et al., 2000;
Thillmann et al., 2013; Veenman et al., 2014, 2006). When using think-aloud protocols in
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research, a researcher meets individually with participants, sessions are recorded and
transcribed, and transcriptions and artifacts (if applicable) from the session are coded.
The time-intensive nature of think-aloud protocols results in a practical limitation on the
number of participants that can be included in a study, thereby restricting power and the
statistical analyses that can be considered by the researcher. As a result, large-scale
studies relying on think-alouds are rarely feasible. Second, it is likely, though
unconfirmed, that the demand of completing a task and overtly reporting thoughts that
are usually covert may contribute to cognitive load to a point that performance on the
task is impaired (Baker & Cerro, 2000; Schellings et al., 2013). Third, participants may
not be able or willing to report all thoughts they have while completing the task (Baker &
Cerro, 2000). What participants do report will be constrained by their verbal ability, thus
making think-alouds less valid for children and individuals with limited verbal ability
(Whitebread et al., 2010). Finally, think-alouds confound metacognition, verbal ability,
and the degree to which metacognition and task performance influence each other
(Pintrich et al., 2000).
Observations
Observations are used as fine-grained, on-line measures of metacognition. Similar
to think-aloud protocols, participants’ behavior is recorded and coded, and inferences
about metacognition are made based on behaviors. Though in general observations are
used less often than other on-line approaches, they are used most frequently in research
on children’s metacognition. Observation instruments and coding schemes have been
developed for children as young as 3 years old (Whitebread et al., 2010), and they have
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been utilized in quantitative (e.g., Perry, 1998) and qualitative (e.g., Perry, VandeKamp,
Mercer, & Nordby, 2002) research.
One advantage of using observations is that they separate metacognition from
reading skills or general language abilities, thereby making observations a more
appropriate method for measuring metacognition when studying children or populations
with low verbal ability (Whitebread et al., 2010). Additionally, as an on-line measure,
observations are not subject to the fallibility of participants’ memories. It is possible for
researchers to access what actually happens while a task is completed, not just what is
remembered or reported (Whitebread et al., 2010; Winne & Perry, 2000). Additionally,
observations make it possible to examine both verbal and nonverbal indicators of
metacognition. However, when coding observations, the researcher must make inferences
about how metacognition is being used, and that it is being used at all. The high degree of
inference in coding can lead to interrater reliabilities that are lower than what is
conventionally accepted (Whitebread et al., 2010). Because observations rely only on
overt behavior, they are limited to measuring metacognitive regulation because
metacognitive knowledge is unlikely to be captured in the data. Another disadvantage of
observations is that they can be costly and time consuming to conduct and code
(Veenman et al., 2014).
Monitoring Judgments
Researchers have created a number of similar monitoring judgment tasks that are
fine-grained, on-line measures of metacognition (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982;
Pintrich et al., 2000). The three most commonly used monitoring judgments are ease-oflearning judgments (referred to as EOLs), judgments of learning (referred to as JOLs),
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and feeling-of-knowing judgments (referred to as FOKs), all three of which are often
labeled as metacognitive experiences in theoretical discussions (Tarricone, 2011). Easeof-learning judgments involve presenting a participant with information that she will
learn and having her rate how easily she will be able to learn it. The participant then
learns the information and is tested over it. Test performance is then compared with the
initial ease-of-learning judgment. Judgments of learning are similar, but rather than
predicting how easily the information will be learned, the participant rates how well she
has learned it before taking a test. Test performance is then compared with the judgment
of learning. When providing feeling-of-knowing judgments, the participant learns
information and is later given a recall test. After the test, the participant is asked to
identify any information she did not recall but believes she knows and could recognize.
The indication that something is known but not presently recalled is a feeling of knowing,
and it can be compared to performance on a recognition test that follows the recall test.
Two primary advantages to monitoring judgments are that they can be easily
added to most types of learning tasks, and they present only a minor interruption to the
task. The primary disadvantage is that monitoring judgments only measure limited
aspects of monitoring and metacognitive experiences and do not measure metacognitive
knowledge or regulation at all. An additional disadvantage is that asking participants to
provide monitoring judgments does not necessarily reflect what they do during a task
where monitoring is not prompted externally. That is, the method of measurement
influences the participants’ metacognition in such a way that reported metacognition
might not reflect naturally occurring metacognition. If a researcher’s goal is to assess
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what students typically do while learning, monitoring judgments like the ones described
here are not appropriate.
Error-Detection Tasks
Error-detection tasks are on-line, fine-grained measures that have been used
primarily in the study of reading comprehension and monitoring, but they have been used
with listening tasks and problem-solving tasks as well (Baker & Cerro, 2000). In reading
comprehension error-detection tasks, the participant is given a text that contains several
kinds of errors (e.g., syntactical errors, inconsistencies, etc.). After reading the text, the
participant is asked to identify any errors or problems with the text. A larger number of
reported errors is thought to be indicative of better metacognitive monitoring (Pintrich et
al., 2000). Error-detection tasks make it possible to measure monitoring more directly
than off-line self-report methods. However, there are multiple disadvantages associated
with error-detection tasks. First, they have been criticized for not being ecologically
valid: readers do not typically encounter texts that contain multiple errors that interfere
with comprehension (Pintrich et al. 2000). Second, error-detection tasks only assess
monitoring and not metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences, or other
components of metacognitive regulation. Finally, when used in reading tasks, error
detection tasks confound monitoring and other aspects of reading ability.
Computer Logfiles
The most recently developed method of measuring metacognition on-line has
been made possible through advances in technology. Computers can be used to
unobtrusively record participants’ activities in a logfile as they complete a computerized
learning or problem-solving task. Participants’ activities are automatically coded by the
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computer according to a coding scheme created by the researcher. Computer logfiles do
not require researchers to spend time one-on-one with participants, making the process of
collecting data more efficient than it is with other on-line methods (Thillmann et al.,
2013). Additionally, computer logfiles make it possible to keep track of everything a
person does during the task, making it the finest-grained of measures, and the data
collection method does not interfere with or interrupt the task (as is the case with thinkaloud protocols). However, as is the case with observations, the use of metacognition
must be inferred by the researcher from observable behaviors, and it is possible for some
activities to be coded as metacognitive without metacognition actually being used
(Veenman et al., 2014). Another similarity between computer logfiles and observations is
the reliance on overt behaviors that makes it unlikely metacognitive knowledge will be
captured in the data. Another disadvantage of computer logfiles is the skillset necessary
to create a program that will present a user-friendly learning task while recording and
coding participants’ activities. It is likely that computer logfiles are not yet used as
commonly as think aloud protocols and off-line self-report measures like questionnaires
because of the skills, time, and resources needed to create such a program.
Interviews
Interviews of varying levels of formality have been used to assess metacognition
off-line for many years, particularly in research on children (e.g., Cross & Paris, 1988;
Myers & Paris, 1978; Paris & Jacobs, 1984; Swanson, 1990). Most interviews used in
metacognition research are structured or semi-structured, and both open-ended questions
(e.g., Paris & Jacobs, 1984) and a combination of open- and close-ended questions (e.g.,
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Cross & Paris, 1988; Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1988) have been used. Many
different interviews have been developed and used in individual studies.
Two major advantages of using an open-ended, structured interview to assess
metacognition are that (a) participants are able to use their own words to describe their
thought processes and understanding (Pintrich et al., 2000) and (b) interviewers can probe
participants for more elaborate responses or for clarification of responses (Groves et al.,
2009). The latter helps ensure that the participant understands questions as the researcher
intends them and that the researcher understands the participant’s responses. An
advantage of both open- and close-ended interviews that is particularly important when
the participants are children is that it eliminates reading ability as a confounding variable.
Interviews have some of the same disadvantages as on-line measures that depend
on verbal reporting (e.g., think alouds). First, interviews must be conducted individually
and are time consuming to administer and analyze (Pintrich et al., 2000). Second, because
of their dependence on verbal ability, interviews may underestimate children’s
metacognition (Whitebread et al., 2010). Third, interviews are generally conducted
separate from any relevant context or specific event (i.e., a task that requires
metacognition), making it more likely that participants’ reports will be incomplete.
Interviews rely on participants’ ability to remember and report various metacognitions
and will therefore be impacted by the extent to which metacognition can be encoded and
retrieved (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982). Based on the assumption that knowledge of
cognition is stored as part of stable, long-term knowledge and regulation of cognition is
more unstable and dynamic (Brown et al., 1983), one would expect that interviews would
yield more reliable data related to knowledge of cognition than regulation of cognition.
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Finally, the presence of an interviewer increases the likelihood that social desirability
bias will become a factor (Groves et al., 2009).
Self-Report Questionnaires
Self-report questionnaires are common in metacognition research, and they are
the primary off-line method used to assess metacognitive knowledge and regulation
together (Baker & Cerro, 2000; Veenman et al., 2014). Most self-report questionnaires
use rating-scale items and have at least two subscales. Some questionnaires are designed
to assess metacognition within a specific context (e.g., a specific course), whereas other
questionnaires are context-general, meaning they are designed to measure one’s
“average” or “typical” metacognition across a large range of contexts. A small group of
questionnaires has been widely used to measure metacognition (described in the next
section).
The primary advantages of self-report questionnaires are the economy and
efficiency of the instruments (Pintrich et al., 2000; Veenman et al., 2014; Veenman et al.,
2006). Paper-based questionnaires can be administered by one or a few individuals and
completed by an entire room full of participants simultaneously. Responses to paperbased questionnaires are easily scored and transferred into an electronic dataset for
analysis. Web-based survey platforms simplify the process even further. Questionnaires
can be administered automatically to a practically unlimited number of participants. With
most platforms, participants can access a survey anywhere on any Internet-capable
device, and the survey platform transfers responses into a single dataset (Tourangeau,
Conrad, & Couper, 2013) . Another advantage of self-report questionnaires is that the
researcher can ensure the desired aspects of metacognition are assessed. The
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disadvantages of self-report questionnaires include the following: (a) participants are
limited in how they can respond to items, (b) participants may not understand items as the
researcher intends them, (c) many existing questionnaires have been found to correlate
poorly with task performance, (d) questionnaires require participants to read the items
and response options and therefore confound metacognition and reading ability, and (e)
as an off-line measure, responses are limited by what the participants remember about
previous metacognitions.
Table 2.1 presents the advantages and disadvantages of the seven major methods
discussed above. Although fine-grained, on-line measures are usually better predictors of
performance on specific tasks (Veenman et al., 2006), coarse-grained, off-line measures
(primarily self-report surveys) tend to be more efficient and cost-effective. The efficiency
and economy of off-line measures make them more feasible for studies using repeatedmeasures designs and for collecting large amounts of data that are required for complex
analyses. Coarse-grained, off-line measures have been criticized for not predicting actual
use of metacognition on specific tasks (Veenman et al., 2006), for being based on theory
with a complex structure when only simple structures are empirically supported (Pintrich
et al., 2000), and for not isolating metacognition or measuring it appropriately (Pintrich et
al., 2000).
It is widely recognized that each method of measuring metacognition has its own
strengths and weaknesses, and researchers ought to carefully choose a method to align
with the questions that are being asked (e.g., Schraw, 2000; Thillmann et al., 2013;
Veenman et al., 2006). The prevalence of questionnaires in metacognition research
speaks to their perceived value as an efficient and economical method, especially given
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Table 2.1
Advantages and disadvantages of common methods used to measure metacognition
Advantages
• can actually access what
participants are thinking
about
• allows for connection
between metacognition
and a specific context

Disadvantages
• time-consuming to administer and analyze due to
one-on-one administration
• may contribute to cognitive load (but some research
indicates it may not, Schellings et al 2013)
• participants may not be able to report all thoughts
• may underestimate young children’s metacognition
• confounds metacognition and verbal ability

Observation

• see what actually happens
during task performance
rather than what is
remembered
• captures verbal and
nonverbal behavior

• time-consuming to train observers and conduct
observations
• metacognition must be inferred
• coding is based on individuals’ inferences, and may
lead to low interrater reliability

Monitoring
judgments

• easily added to existing
learning tasks
• only minor interruptions
to the task itself

• only assesses monitoring
• may activate monitoring in students who would not
normally monitor with such vigilance

Error detection
tasks

• more direct than off-line
self-report methods

•
•
•
•

Computer logfile

• data recorded by computer
• unobtrusive
• on-line measure that does
not require one-on-one
administration

• data can be overwhelming and hard to analyze
• metacognition must be inferred
• researcher must be capable of setting up the
computer program

Interview

• participants can use their
own words
• interviewer can probe for
more information to
ensure understanding
• eliminates reading ability
as a possible confound

•
•
•
•
•

Self-report
questionnaire

• efficient and economical
• can ensure construct
coverage

• limits participants’ ability to communicate responses
• participants may not understand item
• existing measures correlate poorly with task
performance
• confounds metacognition and reading ability
• limited to what participants remember

Think-aloud

only assess monitoring
not ecologically valid
limited in the types of tasks that can be used
confounds monitoring and reading ability

time-consuming to administer and score
participants may not be able to verbalize everything
may underestimate children’s metacognition
limited to what participants remember
social desirability increased by interviewer presence

the abundant criticisms of existing questionnaires. In the next section, I describe seven of
the most widely used questionnaires, including available reliability and validity evidence.
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Existing Self-Report Questionnaires
Researchers have created and used numerous questionnaires to measure
metacognition. Many have been created for use in a single study or adapted from the
measures described below. Of those that have been made available to the research
community, some are context-general, and some are situated within a specific domain or
context. Seven instruments for measuring metacognition that are prominent in the
literature are discussed next. The domain or context of the measure, construct(s)
measured, response format, and intended population for these instruments are presented
in Table 2.2. Because the focus of this dissertation is on metacognition across a variety of
activities and contexts, measures that apply to specific activities or skills (e.g., reading)
are discussed briefly.
Reading Questionnaires
Two widely used questionnaires that address metacognition in reading are the
Metacognitive Awareness of Reading Strategies Inventory (MARSI) and the Index of
Reading Awareness (IRA). The MARSI (Mokhtari & Reichard, 2002) is a self-report
instrument that assesses adolescents’ metacognitive awareness during reading and
perceived use of reading strategies. It consists of 30 rating-scale items and has three
subscales: (a) global reading strategies (13 items), (b) problem-solving strategies (8
items), and (c) support reading strategies (9 items). Students use a five-point scale
ranging from “I never or almost never do this” to “I always or almost always do this” to
indicate how frequently they do what is described in the item stem (e.g., “I take notes
while reading to help me understand what I read.”). Mokhtari and Reichard (2002)
provide some reliability and validity evidence for their scale, and it has since been used
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Table 2.2
Comparison of the reviewed questionnaires
Name

Domain/
Context

Intended to
measure…

Response
format

Intended
population

MARSI

Reading

Metacognitive
monitoring and
strategy use

5-point scale

Adolescents

IRA

Reading

Metacognitive
knowledge of
strategies

3-option
multiple
choice

Children

LASSI

General

Study strategy use

5-point scale

College students

MSLQ

Coursespecific

Motivation and
strategy use

7-point scale

College students

After a test

Metacognitive
regulation

4-point scale

High school and
college students

MAI

General

Knowledge and
regulation of
cognition

Marking a
point on a
100mm line or
5-point scale

College students

AILI

General

State
Metacognitive
Inventory

Metacognitive
7-point scale
College students
knowledge,
regulation, and
responsiveness
Note. MARSI = Metacognitive Awareness of Reading Strategies Inventory, IRA = Index of Reading
Awareness, LASSI = Learning and Study Strategies Inventory, MSLQ = Motivated Strategies for Learning
Questionnaire, MAI = Metacognitive Awareness Inventory, and AILI = Awareness of Independent
Learning Inventory.

extensively in research related to adolescents’ reading proficiency. The MARSI was
intended to be used in research and by classroom teachers as a supplementary assessment
of students’ use of reading strategies.
The IRA (Jacobs & Paris, 1987) is an objective multiple-choice test that assesses
third- through fifth-grade students’ knowledge of reading strategies. It was created to
measure differences between children and changes in students’ metacognitive knowledge
as a result of a specialized reading curriculum that involved metacognitive instruction. It
contains 20 items that target knowledge of planning, evaluation, and regulation as well as
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conditional knowledge related to strategy use. Each item has three response options, and
children are awarded 2, 1, or 0 points for selecting the option that is strategic, partially
appropriate, or inappropriate, respectively. Item response scores are summed to produce a
total score that can range from 0 to 40. Jacobs and Paris (1987) did not provide and
validity evidence or information internal consistency, and a later study found the IRA to
have “questionable reliability and validity” (McLain, Gridley, & McIntosh, 1991, p. 84).
Despite the lack of validity and reliability evidence, the IRA continues to be widely used
in research on children’s reading abilities.
Learning and Study Strategies Inventory
The Learning and Study Strategies Inventory (LASSI; Weinstein, Schulte, &
Palmer, 1987) is a copyrighted instrument that was created as a diagnostic and evaluative
instrument that measures college students’ use of a variety of covert and overt behaviors
that facilitate learning—referred to as “strategic learning” (Weinstein, Zimmerman, &
Palmer, 1988). The creators claim that that LASSI can be used in a variety of ways,
ranging from screening, counseling, and advising to program evaluation. As it pertains to
the framework behind the LASSI, strategic learning includes skill, will, and selfregulation, but the description of this conceptualization in the manual is not explicitly
tied to any published research. Three versions of the LASSI have been published: the first
in 1987, the second in 2002, and the third in 2016.
The LASSI is a context-general, paper-and-pencil measure and is not intended to
be connected to any specific activity or context. In the original version, college students
use a 5-point scale ranging from “not at all typical of me” to “very much typical of me”
to respond to 77 items that are grouped into 10 subscales. The Information Processing,
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Selecting Main Ideas, and Test Strategies subscales make up the Skill component of
strategic learning. The Attitude, Anxiety, and Motivation subscales make up the Will
component of strategic learning. And, the Concentration, Self-Testing, Study Aids, and
Time Management subscales make up the Self-Regulation component of strategic
learning. The scales were created by a group of experts who identified items that centered
on different themes. However, subsequent research using confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) to validate the use of these subscales has not reflected the intended 10-factor
structure (Obiekwe, 2000). Weinstein (1988) reported coefficient alphas for the subscales
that ranged from .60 to .89. Test-retest reliability was also reported: Ninety-six first year
college students took the LASSI twice with a delay of between three and four weeks.
Test-retest correlation coefficients for the subscales ranged from .64 to .81.
The second edition of the LASSI (LASSI 2; Weinstein & Palmer, 2002) contains
80 items that are distributed evenly across the same 10 subscales. College students use
the same 5-point scale for the LASSI 2, and it is available both on paper and on-line.
Coefficient alphas for the subscales increased, and the lowest reported alpha for the
second edition is .73. No test-retest reliability was reported for the LASSI 2. The LASSI
2 was field tested with 1,092 students across 12 different higher-education institutions
(Weinstein & Palmer, 2002). This sample was used to generate normative information for
the LASSI 2. The manual for the LASSI 2 (Weinstein & Palmer, 2002) does not provide
empirical validity evidence related to any of its purported uses, a criticism that has been
made by others (Carty, 2007; Wright, 2007).
The third edition of the LASSI (LASSI 3; Weinstein, Palmer, & Acee, 2016) is
shorter than the previous version and contains 60 items. The Study Aids scale was
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replaced by a Using Academic Resources scale, and minor wording changes were made
to a small number of items. The reported internal consistency coefficients for the scales
are slightly higher than they were for the LASSI 2. Additionally, the manual provides
norms that are based on a sample of 1,386 undergraduate students enrolled at universities,
4-year and 2-year colleges, and adult education programs around the United States in
2014. The LASSI 3 manual also does not included any validity evidence related to its
purported uses.
Although some of the items (across multiple subscales) in the various versions of
the LASSI overlap with other measures of metacognition, it is not intended to measure
metacognition and does not have a metacognition subscale. Regardless, the LASSI has
been used as a measure of metacognition in many studies. And even though the LASSI is
used as a proxy for metacognition in several studies, it is inappropriate to use the LASSI
as a measure of metacognition unless it can be empirically established that the LASSI
does, in fact, measure metacognition.
Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire
The Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MSLQ; Pintrich, Smith,
Garcia, & McKeachie, 1991) is similar to the LASSI in that it is frequently used to
measure metacognition even though that is not its intended purpose. The MSLQ is a
course-specific, paper-and-pencil questionnaire, though some researchers have modified
the MSLQ to make it course-general (Kitsantas, Winsler, & Huie, 2008). The instrument
has two main sections: motivation and learning strategies. In total, the instrument has 81
items that are grouped into 15 scales. Students respond using a 7-point scale that ranges
from “not at all true of me” to “very true of me”. The six motivation scales are: (a)
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Intrinsic Goal Orientation, (b) Extrinsic Goal Orientation, (c) Task Value, (d) Control of
Learning Beliefs, (e) Self-Efficacy for Learning and Performance, and (f) Test Anxiety.
The nine learning strategies scales are: (a) Rehearsal, (b) Elaboration, (c) Organization,
(d) Critical Thinking, (e) Metacognitive Self-regulation, (f) Time and Study Environment
Management, (g) Effort Regulation, (h) Peer Learning, and (i) Help Seeking. Coefficient
alpha estimates for the scales ranged from .52 to .93, and the Metacognitive Selfregulation scale (12 items) had an estimated alpha of .79. The MSLQ was created to be
used by both researchers and educators, and the user can administer all or a subset of the
15 scales as desired (Duncan & McKeachie, 2005). When used by researchers to measure
metacognition, the Metacognitive Self-regulation scale is often used on its own.
The initial reliability and validity evidence in the test manual (Pintrich et al.,
1991) is based on a sample of 380 students that attended two Midwestern colleges during
the Spring semester of 1990. Correlations between each scale and students’ final grades
are provided, as well as all scale correlations and results of a CFA. As the authors
acknowledge, the results of the CFA are not exemplary, but they consider them
acceptable. The factor loading estimates for the items on the Metacognitive Selfregulation scale range from .35 to .61; the authors point out that values of .8 or higher
indicate “well-defined latent constructs” (Pintrich et al., 1991, p. 79). In the test manual,
it is pointed out that the Metacognitive Self-regulation scale of the MSLQ focuses on
control and regulation aspects of metacognition and does not include metacognitive
knowledge. If a researcher’s goal is to comprehensively assess metacognition (i.e.,
including metacognitive knowledge, regulation, and experiences), the MSLQ cannot be
used to achieve that goal.
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State Metacognitive Inventory
The State Metacognitive Inventory (O’Neil & Abedi, 1996) has not been used
nearly as widely as the other measures described in this section. It is a paper-and-pencil
questionnaire that measures metacognitive regulation as an unstable, state-like construct,
rather than a stable, trait-like construct. It is based on the assumptions that metacognition
is domain-independent and context-dependent. The creators define metacognition as,
“consisting of planning, monitoring, cognitive strategies, and awareness” (O’Neil &
Abedi, 1996, p. 234), and consequently the State Metacognitive Inventory does not
measure metacognitive knowledge. The inventory’s four subscales reflect the four
components of metacognition in the given definition. The State Metacognitive Inventory
is designed to be administered immediately following a test, and respondents indicate the
degree to which a variety of statements describe what they did during the test. In total, the
inventory has 20 items (five per scale), and responses are given on a 4-point scale ranging
from “not at all” to “very much so”. Responses are summed to produce a total score for
each subscale and an overall total.
O’Neil and Abedi (1996) report coefficient alphas for the scales between .73 and
.78. No other reliability information was provided, and the authors argue that other forms
of reliability evidence, such as stability coefficients, are not appropriate for a state
construct that is expected to be unstable. During the instrument development process,
samples of middle school, high school, and community college students were given the
State Metacognitive Inventory, and some studies included incentives for participants to
provide correct answers on the test that was paired with the inventory. Available validity
evidence for the State Metacognition Inventory almost entirely comes from correlations
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between inventory scores and scores from the tests that immediately preceded the
inventory. O’Neil and Abedi (1996) reported correlation coefficients with test scores
ranging from .03 to .36 across all subscales and from .18 to .46 for total metacognition
scores. Similarly, O’Neil and colleagues (1995) reported correlation coefficients of about
.15 for a sample of eighth grade students and about .20 for a sample of twelfth grade
students. In a separate study that used a modified form of the State Metacognition
Inventory, O’Neil and Brown (1998) reported that a CFA yielded an acceptable fit of the
proposed factor structure. However, the factor analysis included items from only two of
the State Metacognitive Inventory subscales and items from additional Effort and Worry
scales, so it is unclear whether the intended four-factor structure of the State
Metacognitive Inventory is reflected by responses. O’Neil and Abedi (1996) also
reference other unpublished studies that are said to provide validity evidence, but as they
are unpublished, the quality of the validity evidence cannot be judged.
The State Metacognitive Inventory is unique in that it was designed to be used in
conjunction with a specific task (i.e., a test), but this feature limits its usefulness for
researchers who are interested in metacognition outside of testing situations.
Furthermore, it does not measure metacognitive knowledge, making it less desirable for
researchers who want to measure the knowledge and regulation aspects of metacognition.
Finally, the lack of published validity evidence for the State Metacognitive Inventory
makes it difficult to evaluate instrument.
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory
The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI; Schraw & Dennison, 1994) is the
most widely used measure of metacognition that was created to comprehensively
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measure metacognition and only metacognition. It is a context-general, paper-and-pencil
questionnaire that contains 52 items. It was designed to assess both knowledge of
cognition and regulation of cognition in college students. The theoretical framework from
which it was created (Schraw & Dennison, 1994; described above) identified declarative,
procedural, and conditional knowledge as subcomponents of knowledge of cognition, and
it identified planning, information management strategies, comprehension monitoring,
debugging strategies, and evaluation as subcomponents of regulation of cognition. Each
subcomponent has between 4 and 10 items relating to it. When taking the MAI,
respondents mark a 100mm line that has end points labeled “true” and “false” to indicate
the extent to which each statement is true for them. An individual’s score for an item is
equal to the distance in millimeters between the “false” endpoint (i.e., zero) and the mark
created by the respondent. Subscale scores are the mean of all item scores for that
subscale. Many researchers (e.g., Hammann, 2005; Hargrove & Nietfeld, 2015; Sperling,
Howard, Staley, & Du Bois, 2004; Young & Fry, 2008) have simplified the scoring
process by using a 5-point scale in place of the original 100mm line for item scores and
sums in place of means for subscale scores.
Schraw and Dennison (1994) reported the results of two studies conducted during
the development of the MAI. In the first study, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA)
returned a six-factor structure rather than the hypothesized eight-factor structure. The six
factors did not reflect the theoretical foundation and did not have acceptable internal
consistency. However, a restricted two-factor solution with oblique rotation did reflect
the distinction between knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition. The twofactor solution accounted for 65% of the sample variance and both factors had high
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internal consistency. As predicted, the two factors were moderately correlated, with r =
.54. The two-factor solution was replicated in the second study: coefficient alphas were
.88 for each of the two factors and .93 for the entire instrument. The two factors
accounted for 58% of the sample variance, and they were again moderately correlated,
with r = .45. The two factors were then treated as two subscales that measured knowledge
of cognition and regulation of cognition. Mean scores from items on the two subscales
were calculated and used in additional analyses to provide validity evidence. In general,
students who reported higher pre-test judgments of monitoring skills and had higher test
scores also scored higher on the knowledge of cognition subscale. Monitoring accuracy
was not associated with knowledge or regulation of cognition, and neither pre-test
judgments of monitoring skills nor test scores were associated with regulation of
cognition.
Subsequent research on the psychometric properties of the MAI has provided
additional reliability and validity evidence. Hargrove and Nietfield (2015) reported testretest reliability correlation coefficients for total MAI scores ranging from .66 to .81, with
delays of either 17 or 20 weeks between test administrations. Young and Fry (2008)
reported modest correlations between the two subscales of the MAI, course grades, and
overall GPA. They also reported that graduate students scored significantly higher on
regulation of cognition than undergraduate students, but there was no difference between
the groups on knowledge of cognition. Sperling and colleagues (2004) reported a
negative relationship between MAI subscale scores and the number of credits college
students dropped during a semester. They suggest that this might indicate college
students that are more metacognitively aware are better able to manage the workload of
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college courses. However, Sperling and colleagues (2004) did not find evidence of the
expected relationship between the MAI subscales and measures of monitoring accuracy.
Somewhat inconsistent with Schraw and Dennison’s (1994) findings, Hammann
and Stevens (1998) attempted to replicate the two-factor solution through CFA and
derived a two-factor solution that included only 26 of the 52 items and accounted for less
than 25% of the sample variance. Additionally, Hammann (2005) and Sperling and
colleagues (2004) reported correlations between the MAI’s two subscales of at least .68,
which is much higher than the correlations originally reported by Schraw & Dennison
(1994). These discrepancies between studies may be due to their use of a 5-point scale
rather than the original 100mm scale. It is unknown how the use of the 5-point scale
influences the factor structure of the MAI. Regardless, the MAI assesses metacognition in
a way that is more consistent with prominent conceptions of metacognition than does any
other self-report questionnaire reviewed thus far.
Awareness of Independent Learning Inventory
The Awareness of Independent Learning Inventory (AILI; Meijer et al., 2013) is
designed to measure college students’ metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive
regulation, and responsiveness to metacognitive experiences. All three components were
measured as trait-like constructs, and the instrument was not connected to a specific
course or context. The AILI has been used mostly with European samples. The original
version was constructed in Dutch, but it has been translated to English, French, German,
Spanish, and Italian. There are two parallel forms that both consist of 45 items. Each item
is phrased positively in one form and negatively in the other so that in each form half of
the items are worded positively and half are worded negatively. All responses are given
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on a 7-point scale ranging from “not true at all” to “completely true,” with a midpoint of
“neutral, don’t know.”
The three scales of the AILI are metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive
regulation, and metacognitive responsiveness. Reported coefficient alphas for the scales
were .79, .84, and .77, respectively (Meijer et al., 2013). Test-retest correlation
coefficients based on a subsample of 34 participants were .46, .39, and .25, respectively,
with a delay of two years between test administrations. The test-retest correlation for
metacognitive responsiveness was non-significant. Reported correlations between scales
were above .60. Correlations between the AILI and the MSLQ were provided for validity
evidence. The AILI scales were highly correlated (rs > .50) with several of MSLQ’s
motivation scales as well as some of the cognitive and metacognitive scales. The
correlations between the AILI scales and the MSLQ motivation scales were comparable
in size to the correlations between the AILI scales and the MSLQ cognitive and
metacognitive scales, but the authors did not address this part of their results. Nonsignificant correlations between the AILI scales and the MSLQ Test Anxiety scale were
offered as evidence of discriminant validity. Meijer and colleagues (2013) did not
provide any evidence for equivalence of the two forms. They also did not provide the
results of the CFA that is mentioned in their report or any other evidence of construct
validity. The AILI has been used in only a small number of published studies, and though
it is the only instrument that has scales for metacognitive knowledge, regulation, and
experiences, little reliability and validity evidence has been published.
Gaps in the Literature Addressed by this Dissertation
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The gap in the empirical literature on metacognition that is primarily addressed by
this dissertation is that of within-person differences in metacognitive regulation. As
pointed out above, little research has examined within-person differences in
metacognitive regulation that are predicted by theory. Of the research that has focused on
within-person differences, I am unaware of any research that has simultaneously
considered differences that might be due to the academic activity being completed and
the course for which the activity is being done. Advancing our understanding of how
differences in activity and course contribute to within-person differences in
metacognitive regulation will make it possible to offer educators more nuanced
recommendations for supporting students’ metacognitive regulation.
A second gap in the literature that is addressed by this dissertation pertains to the
factor structure of metacognition, as measured by self-report questionnaires given to postsecondary students. Previously reported factor analyses of multiple instruments have
failed to extract the factor structures expected from both theory and the instrument
creation process. In most cases, theory suggests more factors than what are found
empirically. In addition to the factor analysis findings reported above (Hammann &
Stevens, 1998; Obiekwe, 2000; O’Neil & Brown, 1998; Pintrich et al., 1991; Schraw &
Dennison, 1994), other researchers have reported factor analyses of some of the previous
described metacognition scales and failed to find the expected factor structures that
reflect the distinction between subcomponents such as declarative and conditional
knowledge or monitoring and planning. The findings from a collection of studies that
have involved factor analysis of data from some of the previously reviewed
metacognition scales are summarized next.
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Cano (2006) examined the factor structure of the LASSI through an oblique
exploratory principal components analysis followed by a CFA. Both analyses were
performed on the ten LASSI subscale scores, and therefore the derived factors represent
higher-order factors. The analysis returned a three-factor solution, with factors labeled as
affective strategies, goal strategies, and comprehension monitoring. Others (e.g., Everson,
Weinstein, & Laitsus, 2000) have used this approach and factor analyzed LASSI
subscales and found that subscales can be grouped onto higher-order factors. In contrast,
Melancon (2002) reported the results of an orthogonal EFA conducted on the LASSI
items. Because the LASSI has ten subscales, ten factors were extracted. Factor loadings
were reported for the ten factors and overall did not reflect the LASSI subscales.
Tock and Moxley (2017) examined the factor structure of the Metacognitive Selfregulation subscale of the MSLQ and found that it was not unidimensional. They used a
cross-validation approach by splitting their sample in half and performing an EFA
followed by a CFA. One-, two-, and three-factor solutions were tested, though none of
the solutions fit the data well (i.e., largest CFI = .83, smallest SRMR = .08). For the onefactor solution, standardized loadings ranged from -.02 to .69; for the two-factor solution,
they ranged from .37 to .81; and for the three-factor solution, they ranged from .31 to .75.
The second and third factors did not correspond to any theory of metacognition, though
the two reverse worded items loaded on the second factor. McClendon (1996) and Hilpert
and colleagues (Hilpert, Stempien, van der Hoeven Kraft, & Husman, 2013) examined
the structure of the entire MSLQ, and in both studies, results did not correspond to the 15
subscales that are derived from the intended scoring procedure.

55
Several researchers have reported factor analyses of the MAI. Schraw and
colleagues (Schraw, Horn, Thorndike-Christ, & Bruning, 1995) conducted an oblique
EFA that was restricted to a two-factor solution, and found that only 46 of the 52 items
loaded on one of the two factors. The knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition
factors were correlated at r = .56. Sperling, Howard, Miller, and Murphy (2002)
developed and analyzed a children’s version of the MAI (Jr. MAI) that was derived from
items from the MAI . Their orthogonal principal components analysis returned a fivefactor solution that did not directly correspond to any theoretical framework, and a forced
two-factor solution only somewhat corresponded to the distinction between knowledge
and regulation of cognition.
More recently, Harrison and Vallin (2017) used CFA and multidimensional
random coefficients multinomial logit (MRCML) item-response modeling to evaluate the
MAI. A unidimensional model, two 2-factor models, and an eight-factor model were
compared. The eight-factor model, which did not converge, corresponded to the eight
subcomponents of metacognition that were proposed by Schraw and Dennison (1994).
Harrison and Vallin concluded that their results support the use of two factor scores, but
they pointed out that the full 52-item scale had poor model-data fit. A theoretically
representative subset of 19 items was found to have acceptable fit with a two-factor
solution and also showed invariance between men and women, across questionnaire
formats (i.e., electronic or paper-based), and over a three-week delay. The knowledge of
cognition and regulation of cognition factors were strongly correlated, r = .84.
In contrast to many studies of the factor structure of metacognition, Hong (1995)
successfully modeled the expected factor structure using the State Metacognition

56
Inventory, an instrument that measures metacognitive regulation. She used CFA and
invariance testing to determine whether the original version of the State Metacognition
Inventory and a modified, trait-oriented version had the same factor structure. In the
modified version, items were reworded to ask respondents about typical behavior, rather
than their behavior during the preceding test. Results indicated the expected four
factors—awareness, cognitive strategies, self-checking, and planning—were part of a
higher-order metacognition factor, and this hierarchical structure held for both versions of
the instrument. State and trait scores for the four factors were moderately to highly
correlated (rs ranging from .53 to .69), and coefficient alpha estimates for the subscales
ranged from .64 to .85.
In two cases, researchers have attempted to fit bi-factor models to metacognition
inventory data. Bi-factor models provide an alternative to hierarchical factor analysis
models when modeling multidimensionality. As Reise (2012) explained, the bi-factor
model “…appears best suited for the psychometric analysis of those assessment
instruments where the researcher expects a response to primarily reflect a strong common
trait, but there is multidimensionality caused by well-defined clusters of items from
diverse subdomains” (p. 692). Whereas hierarchical models reflect constructs whose
dimensions are correlated because they are subcomponents of the construct, the specific
dimensions in bi-factor models (called group or specific factors) are not correlated with
the general construct. That is, with bi-factor models, a portion of the variability in the
observed variables is attributed to the general factor, and groups of items share some of
the variability remaining after accounting for the general factor. An example of a bifactor model is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1. Example confirmatory bi-factor model. Estimated residuals/disturbances for
observed and latent variables are not shown.

Using an item response theory (IRT) approach, Immekus and Imbrie (2008)
compared unidimensional and bi-factor (confirmatory) models in testing the structure of
the State Metacognition Inventory. Though the bi-factor model fit the data better,
Immekus and Imbrie concluded the scale should be treated as unidimensional. They
recommended against the use of subscales because in the bi-factor model, all items
loaded strongly on the general factor and no more than two of five items loaded strongly
on each group factor. Ning (2017) also used a bi-factor model when examining the
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structure of the Jr. MAI. Participants in this study were elementary-aged children in
Singapore. The bi-factor model was compared with three other models: a model with one
factor, a model with two correlated factors, and a hierarchical model. The bi-factor model
fit the data best, but the factor loadings did not fully correspond to the two expected
group factors. Four of six items loaded on the knowledge of cognition group factor with
only one item loading above 0.4, and none of the six items loaded on the regulation of
cognition group factor.
In these two studies, the bi-factor model exhibited better model-data fit even
though the group factors did not clearly support the use of subscales. That is, in these
studies, the differences among the subcomponents of metacognition were not distinct
enough to create clear group factors after accounting for a general metacognition factor.
However, a bi-factor model might be useful in separating unique variance that is due to
context differences in items (e.g., items related to studying vs. taking a test). In addition
to guiding decisions about the use of subscales, a well-fitting bi-factor model that yields a
general metacognition factor and group factors that reflect different contexts would
support the hypothesis that there is a relatively stable, trait-like component of
metacognition as well as a more variable, state-like component that is influenced by
context.
A third and final gap in the literature that is addressed by this dissertation relates
to the prevalent critiques of off-line measures of metacognition, especially self-report
questionnaires (Berger & Karabenick, 2016; Veenman, 2013a; Veenman et al., 2014). In
addition to the critiques that can be made of all questionnaires (e.g., social desirability
bias), self-report questionnaires designed to measure metacognition have been criticized
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for only weakly correlating with achievement, if at all, and for not correlating with online measures of metacognition. For example, Veenman and colleagues (2014) provided
the following interpretation of studies comparing on-line and off-line methods:
There is accumulating evidence that students’ off-line self-reports do not
converge with their actual metacognitive strategy use during task performance….
Apparently, learners do not do what they previously said they would do, nor do
they accurately recollect what they have recently done. Moreover, correlations
among off-line measures are often low to moderate, whereas correlations among
on-line measures are moderate to high. (p. 124)
However, most of the studies (Cromley & Azevedo, 2006; Hadwin, Nesbit, JamiesonNoel, Code, & Winne, 2007; Veenman, Prins, & Verheij, 2003) Veenman and colleagues
(2014) point to as evidence for this argument were comparing responses on context- or
domain-general questionnaires and performance on specific tasks2. As was pointed out by
Schellings & Van Hout-Wolters (2011), low correspondence between these questionnaire
responses and records of behavior might be due to differences in the specificity of the
measures. For example, the ability of the “average” context-general measure to correlate
with specific measures will be influenced by how consistently one behaves across
contexts (i.e., within-person variability). The correlation will also be influenced by how

2

The study that Veenman and colleagues (2014) referred to that compared on-line and off-line task-specific
measures (Winne & Jamieson-Noel, 2002) provides some evidence that these types of measures do not
provide convergent information. The authors compared retrospective reports of behaviors during a task to
trace data collected electronically as participants completed a learning task. However, the alignment
between inferences made from some traces and specific self-report items was questionable. For example,
the highest discrepancy between self-report item responses and behavior was on an item that asked whether
participants “set objectives for yourself.” In the computer-based learning environment, objectives were
provided by the program and participants who viewed the objectives were counted as setting objectives for
themselves. It is likely that at least some of the discrepancy between the self-reports and recorded traces
was due to participants interpreting the item “set objectives for yourself” as a reference to self-generated
objectives, not the use of objectives that were provided.
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closely the research task mirrors the “typical” tasks that one is mentally referring to when
responding to context-general questionnaires. In fact, Schellings and colleagues (2013)
compared responses on a task-specific questionnaire to think-aloud protocols and found
much higher correspondence (r = .63) between the measures. The instrument created as
part of this dissertation (the MIPSS, described in the next chapter) is a context-specific
questionnaire that could serve as a more appropriate comparison for on-line measures,
making it possible to examine whether previously found discrepancies between various
off-line measures and between on-line and off-line measures are due to differences in the
instruments’ specificity.
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD
This chapter reviews the instrument development work and pilot study that was
done in preparation for this dissertation and presents the methodology used in Studies 1
and 2. The primary purpose of the studies was to investigate how context (course and
activity) influences undergraduate students’ use of metacognitive regulation. The
secondary purpose of the studies was to investigate the relationship between contextspecific measures of metacognitive regulation and achievement, as well as general and
course-specific measures of metacognition and SRL.
The overarching research question guiding this study is: how is undergraduate
students’ (self-reported) metacognitive regulation influenced by the course and learning
activity in which one is engaged? Specific research questions include the following:
1. What is the factor structure of an instrument that assesses metacognitive
knowledge globally and metacognitive regulation as a context-dependent
construct?
2. Does students’ report of metacognitive regulation vary across activities and
courses?
3. How do context-specific metacognitive regulation scale scores relate to
achievement and to scores from context-general and course-specific measures of
metacognition and SRL?
Regarding Question 1 (the Factor Structure Question), it was expected that the instrument
developed for this study (the MIPSS) would have a bi-factor structure and would
demonstrate satisfactory psychometric properties. Specifically, it was expected that all
MIPSS items would load on a general metacognition factor, and that groups of items
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would load on secondary factors that are specific to the activity or the knowledge type
represented in the item. Regarding Question 2 (the Variability Question), it was expected
that students would report different levels of metacognitive regulation across activities
and courses, and that more metacognitive regulation would be reported in favorite
courses than least favorite courses.
Regarding Question 3 (the Association Question), it was hypothesized that
course- and activity-specific scale scores would be unrelated or weakly related to general
measures of academic achievement (e.g., GPA) and weakly or moderately related to
individual course grades. Course-specific measures of metacognitive regulation and SRL
were expected to have stronger associations with course specific achievement outcomes
than context-general measures of metacognitive regulation and SRL. It was also
hypothesized that course- and activity-specific scale scores would be strongly related to
other course-specific measures of metacognition and SRL, weakly or moderately related
to context-general measures of metacognition and SRL, and weakly related or unrelated
to measures of other constructs (e.g., implicit theories of intelligence).
Figure 3.1 shows a theoretical framework of the constructs and measures that
were used to address Question 3. The component structure of SRL reflects the generic
framework of SRL as involving metacognitive, motivational, and behavioral engagement
with the learning process (Zimmerman, 2008) and is therefore compatible with most
conceptualizations of SRL. The theoretical framework provides an outline of the
expected relationships between the measures used in this dissertation. In the figure,
constructs are represented by ovals and observed measures are represented by rectangles
(for readability, MIPSS subscales are not shown individually). Solid lines between ovals
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Figure 3.1. Theoretical framework of constructs (ovals) and measures (rectangles).
Solid lines between constructs indicate a component – sub-component relationship. Dashed lines between
constructs indicate one construct influences another. Dashed lines with arrows connect constructs and the
instruments used to measure them. The arrowless dotted line between “Behavior” and “Metacognitive
regulation” shows overlap between instruments used to measure them. The small dotted lines connecting
“Activity” to “Behavior” and “Metacognition” represent an expected unique influence of the activity.
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indicate the construct more to the right is a component of the connected construct to the
left. The dashed lines between constructs indicate that one construct influences the other,
with the arrow pointing to the construct that is being affected. For example, one’s
motivation influences behavior, and motivation is influenced by the context in which a
person is situated. Dashed lines between constructs and observed measures indicate the
construct the instrument is intended to measure. The arrowless dotted line between
“Behavior” and “Metacognitive regulation” represents the overlap between instruments
used to measure metacognitive regulation and instruments used to measure other, often
behavioral, regulatory aspects of SRL (e.g., strategy use). And, the small dotted lines
connecting “Activity” to “Behavior” and “Metacognition” represent an expected unique
influence of the academic activity on behavior and metacognition, that is separate from
the indirect relationship of context via motivation. Metacognitive regulation might occur
more readily during some activities because of their unique features. For example,
unstructured, student-directed activities such as studying might require and therefore
elicit more regulation than a structured, teacher-directed activity such as traditional
lecture-based instruction. In general, it was expected that relationships would be stronger
for observed measures that are “closer” to each other (i.e., have fewer paths and
constructs connecting them) and are connected to the same context.
Initial Instrument Development and Pilot Study
Instrument development efforts started during the summer of 2015 and a pilot
study was conducted during the fall 2015. The instrument development and revision
process is reviewed in this section. University IRB approval was obtained prior to any
data collection.
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First, several existing measures of metacognition that are used with college
students were reviewed, with particular attention given to (a) item content, (b) construct
representation relative to prominent theories of metacognition, (c) level of contextspecificity (e.g., specific to a single course, context-general, etc.), and (d) psychometric
properties, as available. Then, a test blueprint was created based on Tarricone’s (2011)
taxonomy. The blueprint had two major sections: metacognitive knowledge and
metacognitive regulation and experiences (here referred to only as metacognitive
regulation for readability). The metacognitive knowledge section crossed the three types
of metacognitive knowledge (e.g., declarative knowledge) and the three knowledge
categories (i.e., persons, tasks, and strategies) to create a nine-celled matrix. The
metacognitive regulation section crossed four aspects of regulation (i.e., planning,
monitoring, controlling, evaluating) and two types of experiences (i.e., judgments and
feelings) with six academic contexts to create a 36-celled matrix. The six academic
contexts were chosen to represent a variety of tasks and contexts that undergraduate
students in the United States encounter regularly. The six contexts were (a) studying, (b)
completing an assignment, (c) preparing for a test, (d), taking a test, (e) a favorite course,
and (f) a least favorite course.
In total, 133 items were written to align with the cells of the blueprint’s two
matrices. Metacognitive knowledge items had a four-point agree/disagree response scale
(“strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” “strongly agree”), and metacognitive regulation
items had a four-point frequency response scale (“almost never,” “sometimes,” “often,”
“almost always”) with an additional “I’m not sure if I do this” option that was scored as
zero. Most items were written so that stronger agreement or a higher reported frequency
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was indicative of more metacognition. Thirty-five items were written with the opposite
interpretation and were reverse coded for scoring. The “I’m not sure if I do this option” is
unique to the MIPSS and is intended to differentiate between those who are aware of
their regulatory practices but do not use a given strategy and those who are unaware of
how or whether they regulate their learning. In the former case, the student is
demonstrating some metacognitive awareness despite reporting low regulation, but in the
latter case, the student is indicating there is not sufficient metacognitive awareness to
generate an accurate response.
Two experts on metacognition were contacted directly and asked to review the
test blueprint and item pool for content coverage and alignment. These two educational
psychologists both have studied metacognition and other related constructs for more than
10 years and have contributed to the metacognition literature by publishing articles and
books on metacognition. After reviewing the test blueprint and the item pool, both
experts indicated that items were in line with the intended dimensions and provided
sufficient coverage of metacognition in post-secondary academic settings. Then, all items
were administered to two individuals who thought aloud while reading and responding
two items. Evidence of confusion or misinterpretation of items led to minor revisions to
some items.
Fall 2015 Pilot Study
Following the minor revisions, a sample of undergraduate educational psychology
students (N = 307) at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL) participated in the pilot
study. Data collection took place during the second half of the fall 2015 semester.
Students were recruited from three different courses that were taught by seven different
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instructors. Participants earned research participation credit that was either mandatory or
worth extra credit points, depending on the course.
Participants accessed the survey on-line via the Qualtrics® survey platform
outside of class time and were asked to complete the survey in a single sitting and within
one week. Five participants who did not complete the entire survey and four participants
who took more than 12 hours to complete it were excluded from analyses, leaving 298
participants. See Table 3.1, column 2 for demographic information on the pilot sample.
The survey consisted of four major sections: metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive
regulation, metacognitive experiences, and demographic items. The metacognition
sections contained subsections for each of the types of metacognitive knowledge (e.g.,
declarative knowledge) or for each context (e.g., studying). Within each of the
subsections, item order was randomized.
In addition to the MIPSS items, participants also responded to three constructedresponse items that asked participants to justify their response to the previous item. The
Table 3.1
Demographic information for all samples
Sample
Pilot
Study 1
Study 2
Total
298
426
293
Gender
Male
76
122
91
Female
222
300
202
No report
0
4
0
Academic standing
First year
95
119
70
Second year
110
114
99
Third year
63
124
81
Fourth year
21
58
41
Other/No report
9
11
2
Ethnicity
White
252
362
247
Asian
12
26
21
Black
13
8
11
Latino/Latina
15
23
7
Other
10
12
11
Note. Participants could select multiple responses for ethnicity, so totals do not equal the total sample size.
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three items a given participant provided responses about were determined by the item
randomization within the survey, so that each participant’s constructed responses were
about a different combination of items. All items except one received a constructed
response. The constructed responses were used as an initial measure of validity because it
provided evidence that participants were able to interpret items as intended and provide
reasonable responses. These responses were then given a score of 1, indicating the
justification aligned with the response, or a score of 0, indicating the justification did not
align with the response. (Non-responses and incomplete or incomprehensible responses
were not given a score.) Most scored responses (89.6%) were judged as showing
alignment between the response and the justification, suggesting that participants were
generally able to provide valid responses to items.
Item analysis was used to identify poorly functioning items that were
subsequently dropped or revised. Additional items were dropped due to constructed
response results or targets for scale length. When metacognitive regulation and
experiences items were dropped from one of the course scales, they were dropped from
both the favorite and least favorite sections so that the sections remained completely
parallel. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarize the results of the item analyses that were
conducted. Because Tarricone’s (2011) taxonomy categorizes metacognitive experiences
as a subcomponent of metacognitive regulation, item analysis was conducted on the
regulation and experiences items separately and together. The three major scales,
reflecting metacognitive knowledge, regulation, and experiences, and the combined
regulation and experiences scale all had alphas well above the conventional threshold of
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Table 3.2
Summary of item analyses results from pilot study
Scale

Retained
Items
28

Final α

M

SD

Metacognitive knowledge

Initial
Items
46

.88

3.1

0.33

Declarative knowledge
Procedural knowledge
Conditional knowledge

15
14
17

9
12
7

.69
.81
.78

3.4
2.9
3.1

0.34
0.43
0.42

Metacognitive regulation

64

53

.93

2.7

0.43

Studying
Favorite course
Least favorite course
Completing assignment
Preparing for test
Taking a test

13
11
11
9
10
10

12
9
9
9
7
7

.75
.78
.85
.71
.79
.74

2.7
2.8
2.4
2.7
2.6
2.9

0.49
0.56
0.64
0.48
0.62
0.54

Metacognitive experiences

23

18

.88

3.0

0.45

Studying
Favorite course
Least favorite course
Completing assignment
Preparing for test
Taking a test

4
4
4
3
5
3

4
3
3
2
4
2

.72
.63
.66
.69
.73
.41

3.1
2.9
2.8
3.0
3.0
3.0

0.56
0.64
0.65
0.65
0.58
0.57

Metacognitive regulation &
experiences
Studying
Favorite course
Least favorite course
Completing assignment
Preparing for test
Taking a test

87

71

.95

2.8

.41

17
15
15
12
15
13

16
12
12
11
11
9

.80
.81
.85
.75
.84
.76

2.8
2.8
2.5
2.7
2.8
2.9

0.45
0.52
0.56
0.45
0.54
0.49

Note. Response scale is 1 to 4 for metacognitive knowledge and 0 to 4 for metacognitive regulation and
experiences.

.70. All but one of the edited subscales with more than 3 items (declarative knowledge)
had alphas above .70.
Revisions to the MIPSS
Following the pilot study, the MIPSS was revised and restructured. First, a small
number of items were revised because constructed responses indicated participants were
not interpreting items as intended. Second, 11 new items were written to replace some
that were dropped because item removal resulted in some portions of the test blueprint
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Table 3.3
Items dropped following analysis of pilot data
Scale/Item
Declarative knowledge
11
13
7
14
12
8
Procedural knowledge
3
Conditional knowledge
2
3
9
15
16
17
14
1
Favorite class
15
6
11

M

SD

Initial r

r at decision

3.1
2.5
2.4
2.7
3.4
3.2

0.76
0.82
0.75
0.77
0.67
0.65

0.02
0.05
0.13
0.12
0.23
0.32

0.02
0.07
0.11
0.15
0.20
0.33

3.1

0.79

0.18

0.18

2.5
2.5
2.8
3.0
2.3
2.6
3.2
3.1

0.77
0.79
0.81
0.84
0.79
0.85
0.74
0.72

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.24
0.15
0.24

0.05
0.05
0.11
0.10
0.08
0.09
0.15
0.24

2.9
2.7
3.0

0.97
0.98
0.93

0.12
0.20
0.30

0.12
0.16
0.22

Least favorite class
15
2.4
0.88
0.06
11
2.5
1.00
0.38
6
2.4
0.87
0.38
Taking a test
1
2.2
1.09
0.09
2
2.9
0.99
0.14
Note. Correlations (r) shown are corrected item-total correlations.

0.06
0.36
0.32
0.09
0.19

being underrepresented or unrepresented. Third, the response scale for metacognitive
knowledge items was changed from a 4-point scale to a 5-point scale with the goal of
improving response variability. Fourth, it was decided that metacognitive regulation and
metacognitive experiences items for each context would be represented by a single
metacognitive regulation scale. Corrected item-total correlations and EFA indicated there
was sufficient unidimensionality in each context to justify combining the subscales.
Finally, the metacognitive regulation scales were reorganized. Instead of including
separate scales for a favorite and least favorite course, subscales for specific activities—
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studying, completing an assignment, being in class, and taking a test—were presented in
the context of a favorite and least favorite course. So, items were introduced with a stem
that included the context and the activity (e.g., “while studying for the class I consider
one of my favorites…”). Figure 3.2 presents the conceptual structure of the revised
MIPSS. Most of the items from the former Favorite Course and Least Favorite Course
scales became part of the In Class scale. Other items from those scales were added to the
Studying and Assignment scales. And, the Test Preparation scale was combined with the
Studying scale because of the logical overlap between general studying and studying
specifically to prepare for a test.
After revisions were completed, two studies were planned and conducted. The
two-study design was employed primarily so that the factor structure of the MIPSS could
be cross-validated by conducting EFA and CFA on two different samples. And, the
survey in Study 2 included instruments other than the MIPSS so that scores form the

MIPSS

MK

Figure 3.2. The structure of the MIPSS. MK = metacognitive knowledge, MRE =
metacognitive regulation and experiences.
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context-specific scales of the MIPSS could be compared to other measures of
metacognitive regulation and to achievement outcomes.
Study 1
The participants, materials, and procedure for Study 1 are presented in this
section. Study 1 took place during the spring 2016 semester.
Participants
The Study 1 sample consisted of undergraduate students (N = 426) from the
University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Students were recruited from five different educational
psychology courses that were taught by ten different instructors. Participants earned
research participation credit that was either mandatory or worth extra credit points,
depending on the course. Demographic information for the sample is presented in Table
3.1, column 3. One participant did not complete any MIPSS items and was dropped from
all analyses. Two additional participants did not complete the entire survey. For these two
participants, responses to sections that were completed were used in analyses.
Materials
The survey in Study 1 consisted of a section that asked about students’
perceptions of favorite and least favorite courses, the revised version of the MIPSS
(described next), and a demographic section. Participants rated their favorite and least
favorite courses on seven different dimensions that might plausibly contribute to these
courses being labeled favorite and least favorite (“course rating items”). The dimensions
were (a) level of challenge, (b) engagement during class, (c) motivation to learn, (d)
teacher support of learning, (e) perceived effectiveness of learning activities, (f)
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Table 3.4
Descriptive statistics for course rating items

Level of challenge

Study 1
Favorite course
Least favorite
course
3.58
3.81
(0.91)
(1.17)

Study 2
Favorite course
Least favorite
course
3.58
3.90
(0.97)
(1.19)

Engagement during class

4.32
(0.69)

2.36
(1.05)

4.34
(0.75)

2.47
(1.03)

Motivation to learn

4.41
(0.61)

2.43
(1.05)

4.46
(0.68)

2.49
(0.96)

Teacher support of learning

4.48
(0.59)

3.10
(1.05)

4.63
(0.59)

3.14
(1.19)

Effectiveness of learning
activities

4.35
(0.69)

2.86
(1.07)

4.41
(0.74)

2.82
(1.10)

Perceived instrumentality of
content

4.44
(0.67)

2.83
(1.11)

4.45
(0.80)

2.86
(1.12)

Interest in course topics

4.51
(0.63)

2.48
(1.16)

4.51
(0.73)

2.68
(1.20)

Note. Response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree); the midpoint, 3, was neither
agree nor disagree.

perceived instrumentality of learned content, and (g) interest in course topics. Each of the
seven dimensions were represented by a single item. Descriptive statistics for these items
are shown in the first two columns of Table 3.4. The complete survey is given in
Appendix A.
Metacognition Inventory for Post-Secondary Students. As previously
indicated, the MIPSS measures metacognitive knowledge as a context-general construct
and metacognitive regulation as a context-specific construct. The version used in Study 1
contained a total of 141 items across three sections. The metacognitive knowledge
section contained 33 items and was paired with a 5-point agree/disagree scale (“strongly
disagree,” “disagree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “agree,” “strongly agree”). The two
metacognitive regulation sections each contained the same 54 items referencing either a
favorite or least favorite course. The metacognitive regulation items were presented with
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a 4-point frequency response scale (“almost never,” “sometimes,” “often,” “almost
always”) and a fifth option that read, “I don’t know if I do this.” Due to a computer error
one metacognitive knowledge item was not presented to any participants. As a result, this
item could not be included in Study 1 analyses and was not used in Study 2.
Procedure
Participants were recruited into the study from the educational psychology
courses in which they were enrolled. All recruitment visits took place during a single
week. All potential participants were given a URL address for the survey at the time of
recruitment and were asked to complete the survey in a single sitting and within one
week. Participants accessed the survey on-line via the Qualtrics® survey platform outside
of class time. The survey was closed two weeks after the final recruitment visit.
Item Analysis
Item analysis was again used to identify poorly functioning items that were
subsequently dropped. Additional items were dropped due to targets for scale length.
Once again, when metacognitive regulation and experiences items were dropped, they
were dropped from both the favorite and least favorite sections so that the sections
remained completely parallel. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 summarize the results of the item
analyses that were conducted.
Study 2
The participants, materials, and procedure for Study 2 are presented in this
subsection. Study 2 took place during the spring 2017 semester, starting during Week 1
and ending during Week 4.
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Table 3.5
Summary of item analyses results from Study 1
Initial Items

Retained
Items

Final α

M

SD

Metacognitive knowledge
Declarative
Procedural
Conditional

33
11
11
11

26
9
8
9

.87
.76
.79
.77

3.8
4.0
3.6
3.7

0.40
0.40
0.60
0.47

Metacognitive regulation
Favorite class
Studying
In class
Assignment
Taking a test

54
19
10
14
11

45
15
10
11
9

.93
.83
.80
.81
.78

2.7
2.6
2.6
2.7
2.9

0.42
0.48
0.52
0.48
0.53

Least favorite class
Studying
In class
Assignment
Taking a test

54
19
10
14
11

45
15
10
11
9

.94
.87
.82
.81
.84

2.4
2.4
2.2
2.3
2.6

0.45
0.51
0.54
0.48
0.61

Scale

Participants
Participants were again recruited from undergraduate educational psychology
courses at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (N = 303). Demographic information is
shown in Table 3.1, column 4. Participants earned research participation credit that was
either mandatory or worth extra credit points, depending on the course.
Materials
The survey used in Study 2 contained the course rating items described as part of
the Study 1 materials, the MIPSS, multiple other self-report instruments that have been
used in education research, and a small number of demographic and other items that were
created for this study. Descriptive statistics for the course rating items are shown in the
last two columns of Table 3.4. The MIPSS was the first scale presented, and after the
MIPSS, there was a branch within the survey that randomly directed participants to one
of two sections within survey (see Figure 3.3). Therefore, participants did not complete
all the instruments. The instruments within the sections of the survey were divided so that
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Table 3.6
Items dropped following analysis of Study 1 data
Scale/Item
Declarative knowledge
4
3
Procedural knowledge
3
8
Conditional knowledge
5
8
Studying
Favorite
6
2
7
19
Least favorite
6
2
7
19
Doing an assignment
Favorite
3
14
2
Least favorite
14
2
3
Taking a test
Favorite
11
5
Least favorite
5
11

M

SD

Initial r

r at decision

3.8
3.5

0.83
0.96

0.23
0.30

0.23
0.33

3.8
3.4

0.77
0.89

0.18
0.25

0.18
0.23

3.6
2.7

0.90
1.02

0.18
0.25

0.18
0.25

2.7
2.6
3.1
2.8

0.87
0.99
0.83
0.80

0.19
0.37
0.35
0.46

0.19
0.35
0.36
0.47

2.3
2.6
2.6
2.4

0.79
0.93
0.92
0.87

0.10
0.32
0.45
0.47

0.10
0.31
0.46
0.50

2.9
3.1
2.9

0.95
0.86
0.98

0.26
0.29
0.36

0.26
0.27
0.30

2.8
2.6
2.5

0.79
0.93
1.02

0.21
0.28
0.30

0.21
0.26
0.25

3.1
3.0

0.77
0.85

0.29
0.32

0.29
0.26

2.6
0.86
0.13
2.8
0.83
0.20
Note. Correlations (r) shown are corrected item-total correlations.

0.13
0.14

(1) all participants responded to both a context-general and a context-specific instrument
and (2) the total number of items were similar for the two groups. The full battery of
instruments is presented in the Appendix B. Headings identifying each instrument were
not shown to participants.
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Course identification and ratings

MIPSS

Metacognitive Awareness Inventory

Student Perceptions of Classroom
Knowledge building (x2)

MSLQ Metacognitive
Self-regulation scale (x2)

Implicit Theories of Intelligence scale

Digital distractions

Demographic items

Figure 3.3. Flowchart of the survey sections. Participants were randomly directed to
either the right or left branch.

Because data collection took place that the beginning of the semester, participants
were asked to refer to courses from the previous semester when responding to coursespecific instruments. Prior to seeing any of the instruments described below, participants
were asked to name a course from the previous semester (fall 2016) that they considered
a favorite and a course that they considered a least favorite. Participants again rated the
two courses on the seven different dimensions used in Study 1 that might plausibly
contribute to these courses being labeled favorite and least favorite.
Metacognition Inventory for Post-Secondary Students. The MIPSS was
changed slightly between the Study 1 administration and the Study 2 administration.
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First, the final version used in Study 2 contained a total of 116 items across the three
sections. The total number of items was reduced in order to reduce administration time.
Items were cut based on item analyses conducted on the Study 1 data. The metacognitive
knowledge section contained 26 items and was paired with the same 5-point scale
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The two metacognitive regulation
sections each contained 45 of the 54 items from Study 1. These items were again repeated
so that participants responded with respect to both a favorite and least favorite course.
The metacognitive regulation items were presented with the same 4-point response scale
ranging from “almost never” to “almost always.” Because participants in Study 2 were
reporting on courses from the previous semester, item wording was changed to the past
tense, and the fifth option in the metacognitive regulation sections was changed to “I
don’t know if I did this.”
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory. The Metacognitive Awareness Inventory
(MAI; Schraw & Dennison, 1994) is a context-general measure of metacognitive
knowledge and regulation. It contains 52 items that are divided into two sections (i.e.,
knowledge and regulation), and though many researchers have modified the scoring by
using a 5-point response scale, the original 100-point, true/false scale (appearing as a
slider scale) was used. The original scale was used because after an extensive search, no
published justification for altering the scale could be located and Schraw and Dennison’s
(1994) internal consistency and factor analysis results are based on the 100-point scale.
They reported a coefficient alpha of .88 for each of the two scales, and the scales were
correlated at r = .45. Some studies using a 5-point response scale have reported higher
correlations between scales. For example, Hammann (2005) and (Sperling et al., 2004)
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reported correlations between the knowledge and regulation scales of r = .79 and r = .75,
respectively.
Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire. The Metacognitive Selfregulation scale from the MSLQ (Pintrich et al., 1991) is frequently used by researchers
as a brief, course-specific measure of metacognition and has been used both
independently and as part of the full MSLQ. The Metacognitive Self-regulation scale is
made up of 12 items that have a 7-point response scale that ranges from “not at all true of
me” to “very true of me.” The authors of the MSLQ reported an alpha of .79 for the scale
in their original report. Because it is a course-specific measure, this scale was presented
twice so that participants provided responses with reference to each of the two courses
they identified.
Student Perceptions of Classroom Knowledge Building scale. The Student
Perceptions of Classroom Knowledge-Building scale (SPOCK; Shell et al., 2005) is a
course-specific instrument that measures students’ general self-regulation, use of
knowledge-building strategies, lack of self-regulation, question-asking behaviors (highand low-level), and perceptions of the classroom environment (cooperative learning and
teacher directedness). A shortened version of the SPOCK that has been used in other
studies (Flanigan, Peteranetz, Shell, & Soh, 2017; Shell, Patterson-Hazley, Soh,
Ingraham, & Ramsay, 2013) was used for this study. The shortened version contains 27
items that make up the same seven subscales as the full version. The Question Asking
scales were not used in this study, reducing the number of items administered to 21.
Items are paired with a 5-point response scale that ranges from “almost never” to “almost
always”. Each response category has a brief description (e.g., Often, occurred frequently:
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occurred about ¾ of the time) to assist respondents in interpreting the labels. In a study
that used the full version with a sample of college students (Shell & Soh, 2013),
coefficient alpha estimates were above .85 for all scales. Another study (Flanigan et al.,
2017) that used the shortened version reported coefficient alpha estimates above .70 for
the General Self-Regulation, Knowledge Building, and Lack of Regulation scales
(perception of the classroom environment scales were not reported). Because it is a
course-specific measure, the SPOCK was presented twice so that participants provided
responses with reference to each of the two courses they identified.
Implicit Theories of Intelligence scale. The Implicit Theories of Intelligence
scale (Dweck, 2000; Yeager & Dweck, 2012) is a measure of adults’ implicit beliefs
about the nature of intelligence. It consists of eight items that have a 6-point response
scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The eight items are
divided into two scales, one for entity beliefs (i.e., intelligence is a fixed trait) and one for
incremental beliefs (i.e., intelligence is changeable). Recent research on college students’
intelligence beliefs (Flanigan et al., 2017) indicates the scales have high internal
consistency, with alphas above .90.
Digital distraction items. Five items assessing students’ perceptions of the
impact of digital devices on their in-class behavior and learning were written by an expert
on digital distractions in post-secondary education environments. The items were coursespecific and assessed the extent to which digital devices were used for non-class purposes
(2 items), the extent to which the use of digital devices interfered with learning (1 item),
the types of devices used (1 item), and the nature of course policies that might have
impacted the use of digital devices (1 item). Because these items were course-specific,
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they were presented twice so that participants provided responses with reference to each
of the two courses they identified. These items were not used in the analyses reported in
this dissertation.
Engagement check items. A small number of items were used to detect
participant inattentiveness. Two of these items were presented within the survey and two
items were presented after the survey in a face-to-face debriefing. The items embedded in
the survey were intended to identify participants who provide responses without reading
the items or response options. The first embedded item was intended to “blend in” with
the surrounding items but was expected to yield the same response from all participants.
The second embedded item was an instructed response item that told participants which
response option to select for that item. In addition to the items, page-level response times
were collected and used as an indicator of inattentiveness. The two face-to-face items
provided an additional method of identifying participants who did not complete some or
all of the survey attentively or honestly.
Procedure
Participants were recruited and participated in January of 2017. Participants
signed up to attend data collection sessions in a computer lab on the University of
Nebraska–Lincoln campus. After checking in, participants completed the survey on a
computer in the computer lab. The survey took most participants less than 30 minutes to
complete (M = 24.9 min, SD = 7.8 min, median = 23.4 min), though a small number of
participants (n = 7) took between 45 and 65 minutes. Once the survey was completed,
participants reported back to the researcher and answered the two face-to-face items, after
which participants were dismissed from the lab.
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Analysis
Analyses for this dissertation included item analysis, exploratory and
confirmatory factor analysis, correlation, regression, and repeated-measures analysis of
variance. The rationale for the use of each analysis is described briefly. Prior to all
analyses, data were screened for normality, outliers, and aberrant response patterns (e.g.,
“straight-lining,” exceptionally fast responses).
Item Analysis
The scores from the MIPSS and all other instruments used in this study are based
on classical test theory (CTT), and classical item analysis was conducted to evaluate the
instruments’ psychometric properties. Even though factor analysis was performed on the
MIPSS data, factor scores were not used in any analyses. The decision to not use factor
scores was based on the likelihood that future research would be done using CTT-based
scores rather than factor scores, so it would be more beneficial to provide initial results
based on CTT scores.
Classical item analysis is a technique based on CTT, the traditional theory of
testing and measurement. According to CTT, there are three components of test scores:
the observed score, true score, and error (Hambleton & Jones, 1993; Kaplan & Saccuzzo,
2009). The most commonly used model representing the relationship between the three
components can be expressed as
𝑋 =𝑇+𝐸
where X represents an individual’s observed score, T represents the individual’s true
score, and E represents measurement error. The observed score is just that—the score
observed through the measurement process. The true score is defined as the mean of an
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infinite number of repeated, independent measurements. And, error is the difference
between the true score and the observed score. Within CTT, errors are assumed to be
random. This means (a) across the entire population, errors are unrelated to the true score,
(b) errors are independent of other errors, and (c) the average error across the population
is zero (Thorndike, 1982).
When evaluating the MIPSS through item analysis, the main statistics of interest
were coefficient alpha, corrected item-total correlations, and item means and standard
deviations. Coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) provides an index of internal consistency.
Corrected item-total correlations are an index of discrimination and indicate how well an
item differentiates between individuals whose total scores are high and those whose total
scores are low. And, item means and standard deviations are used to identify items that
are poorly distributed and have low variability or may have a restricted range due to
responses at the endpoints of the response scale (i.e., floor or ceiling effects). Item
analysis was conducted in SPSS® Versions 23 and 24.
Factor Analysis
Factor analysis was used to address the Factor Structure Question. Factor analysis
is a technique that is commonly used in instrument development because it uses the
covariances between individual variables to reduce a large group of variables to a smaller
number of factors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007a). Exploratory and confirmatory factor
analyses were conducted in Mplus® Versions 6 and 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010, 2012),
and bi-factor models were tested in both analyses. EFA can be used to guide model
specification when later testing confirmatory models (Gerbing & Hamilton, 1996). Crossvalidation using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis is common practice in
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psychological and educational research. It should be noted, however, that less is known
about the suitability of exploratory bi-factor analysis in guiding specification of
confirmatory bi-factor models.
A bi-factor model is an appropriate factor-analytic model for the MIPSS because,
though metacognition is defined as having many components, it is viewed overall as a
singular construct, and therefore should yield a general factor through factor analysis.
And, because the MIPSS items refer to specific academic activities, the current
instrument is expected to have item clusters that share variability that is independent of
the variability that is attributable to the general metacognition factor. In this dissertation,
the primary purpose of the exploratory bi-factor analysis was to determine whether it was
more appropriate to cluster items for the group factors in the confirmatory bi-factor
analysis according to the components of metacognition (e.g., monitoring), as has been
done in previous studies, or according to the different activities (e.g., studying) built into
the instrument, as was hypothesized to better correspond to a bi-factor structure.
Bi-factor models have a general factor on which all items load as well as multiple
group factors on which sets of items load. Confirmatory bi-factor models were first
introduced in the 1930s (Holzinger & Harman, 1938; Holzinger & Swineford, 1937), and
have seen a resurgence in the literature in recent years. The renewed interest is due
largely to advances in statistical software packages that have made it more feasible for
researchers to fit bi-factor models to data. The exploratory bi-factor model was
introduced by Jennrich and Bentler (2011, 2012), making it possible to test a bi-factor
structure without specifying the exact bi-factor structure.
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Both confirmatory and exploratory bi-factor models specify a general latent
variable (general factor) on which all observed variables load and one or more specific
latent variables (group factors) on which subsets of observed variables load (Holzinger &
Swineford, 1937; Jennrich & Bentler, 2011, 2012; Reise, 2012; Reise, Moore, &
Haviland, 2010). Exploratory models do not specify which observed variables load on
which group factors, whereas confirmatory models do explicitly map observed variables
onto group factors. The general factor is not allowed to correlate with group factors.
Models that do not allow correlations among the group factors are orthogonal, and
models that allow correlations among the group factors are oblique.
Exploratory bi-factor analysis (EBFA) was performed on the Study 1 data, and
confirmatory bi-factor analysis (CBFA) was performed on the Study 2 data. Group
factors were expected to correlate, therefore oblique models were tested. Because
confirmatory bi-factor analysis was developed before the exploratory model and serves as
the conceptual foundation for its exploratory counterpart, CBFA is described in the next
subsection, followed by EBFA.
Confirmatory bi-factor analysis. CBFA (Holzinger & Harman, 1938; Holzinger
& Swineford, 1937) was introduced more than 70 years before EBFA. In a confirmatory
bi-factor model, it is assumed that all included variables share a common “general”
factor, and subgroups of variables share “group” factors (Reise et al., 2010). These
assumptions can be represented by the following loading matrix, where the first column
is the general factor and subsequent columns are group factors:
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∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
[ ∗

∗
∗
∗
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
∗
∗
∗
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
∗
∗
∗]

Unless otherwise specified, CBFA models also assume that no factors are correlated. It is
possible to specify correlations among group factors, but the general factor cannot
correlate with any group factors. If group factors are allowed to correlate, the model is
oblique, and if group factors are not allowed to correlate, the model is orthogonal. In
either case, group factors can only account for variability that is not accounted for by the
general factor. Any variability that is not accounted for by the general and group factors
is part of the observed variables’ residual terms. Figure 2.1 shows an example CBFA
model that corresponds to the matrix above (residual terms are not shown in Figure 2.1).
Bi-factor models can be evaluated with many different model fit statistics. Model
fit statistics index the discrepancy between the observed and estimated covariance (or
correlation) matrices. The model fit statistics used in this dissertation include chi-square
(χ2), Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Steiger-Lind Root Mean Squared Error of
Approximation (RMSEA), and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR).
Because all fit statistics have strengths and weaknesses, it is recommended that multiple
fit statistics are reported so that judgments of model-data fit can be made from multiple
fit statistics and careful inspection of model coefficients and residual terms (Kline, 2016).
Model chi-square is a commonly reported model fit statistic that is derived from
sample size and the overall fit between observed and estimated parameters. The chisquare statistic is compared to a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom
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corresponding to that of the model. Model degrees of freedom are determined by
subtracting the number of estimated parameters from the number of unique elements in
the observed covariance matrix. Chi-square values closer to zero indicate better modeldata fit, and the type I error rate is typically set at .05. Model-chi square can be affected
by non-normality, correlation size, large amounts of unique variance in observed
variables, and sample size (Kline, 2016).
The Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) is a comparative
goodness-of-fit statistic that can range from 0 to 1, with 1 reflecting the best model-data
fit. The CFI compares the tested model to a baseline model—typically a null model of
uncorrelated variables (Bentler, 1990)—and can be interpreted as the relative
improvement of the tested model over the baseline model (Kline, 2016). The CFI value of
.95 has been recommended as a cutoff for determining acceptable model fit (Hu &
Bentler, 1999). Though it is debated (Lance, Butts, & Michels, 2006), the more liberal
cutoff value of .90 is also sometimes used.
The Steiger-Lind Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger,
1990) is an absolute fit statistic that is typically presented along with a 90% confidence
interval for the statistic. Lower RMSEA values indicate better model-data fit, with a
value of zero indicating close, but not perfect, fit (Kline, 2016). Conventionally, an
RMSEA that is below .05 is interpreted as indicating close fit, and an RMSEA that is
above .10 is interpreted as indicating poor fit. Hu and Bentler (1999) recommended “a
cutoff value close to .06” (p. 27) and reported that cutoffs of either .05 or .06 could
effectively reject misspecified models when used in conjunction with other fit statistics,
namely SRMR. However, Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby, and Paxton (2008) have
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questioned the use of a universal cutoff, whether used alone or alongside the 90%
confidence interval.
The Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)is an absolute fit statistic
that gauges the mean difference between observed and estimated covariances. Similar to
the RMSEA, lower SRMR values indicate better model-data fit, with values less than .08
suggesting acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999) and values greater than or equal to .10
suggesting poor fit (Kline, 2016). SRMR is one of the few commonly used fit statistics
that does not include chi-square in its formula, and as characteristics of the data change
(e.g., sample size, nonnormality, etc.), SRMR behaves more uniquely than most common
fit statistics (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Additional statistics used in this dissertation are coefficients omega (ω;
McDonald, 1985), omega hierarchical (ωH; Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, & Li, 2005), and
omega hierarchical subscale (ωHS; Reise, Bonifay, & Haviland, 2013). These coefficients
index internal consistency and provides an alternative to coefficient alpha (Cronbach,
1951). This group of coefficients is based on a specified factor model. Rather than
assuming all items have an essentially identical relationship with the true score (i.e., tau
equivalence), as is the case with coefficient alpha, omega coefficients use estimated
factor loadings to account for possible differences in the relationships between items and
the true score (Rodriguez, Reise, & Haviland, 2016).
Coefficient omega estimates the proportion of variance in observed total scores
accounted for by all sources of variance included in the model (Rodriguez et al., 2016).
Like coefficient alpha, coefficient omega assumes data are unidimensional, but it has
been argued (Zinbarg et al., 2005) that a modified version of coefficient omega can be
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used with total scores derived from a bi-factor model. The modified coefficient omega is
expressed as
(Σ𝜆𝑔𝑒𝑛 )2 + (Σ𝜆𝑠1 )2 + (Σ𝜆𝑠2 )2 … +(Σ𝜆𝑠𝑛 )2
𝜔=
(Σ𝜆𝑔𝑒𝑛 )2 + (Σ𝜆𝑠1 )2 + (Σ𝜆𝑠2 )2 … +(Σ𝜆𝑠𝑛 )2 + 𝛴(1 − ℎ2 )
where (Σλgen)2 is the squared sum of the unstandardized factor loadings for the general
factor, (Σλsn)2 is the squared sum of the unstandardized factor loadings for a given group
factor, and Σ(1 - h2) is the sum of the error variances.
Coefficient omega hierarchical (ωH) is computationally identical, except that the
numerator does not contain the variance terms for the group factors (Gignac & Watkins,
2013). As a result, it estimates the proportion of variance in observed total scores
accounted for by the general factor. The square root of ωH is the correlation of raw total
scores with the general factor (Rodriguez et al., 2016). Similarly, ωHS estimates the
proportion of variance in observed total scores accounted for by a group factor, after
accounting for the variance that is due to the general factor. It is computed as
𝜔𝐻𝑆 =

(Σ𝜆𝑠1 )2
2

(Σ𝜆𝑔𝑒𝑛 ) + (Σ𝜆𝑠1 )2 + Σ(1 − ℎ2 )

with all components defined as above. Omega hierarchical subscale is calculated
separately for each group factor (Gignac & Watkins, 2013). The square root of ωHS is the
correlation between raw unit-weighted subscale scores with their corresponding group
factors (Rodriguez et al., 2016). In cases where items load strongly on the general factor,
ωHS is expected to be considerably lower than ωH because removing the variance due to
the general factor leaves little common variance that can be explained by the group
factors. Discrepancies between omega coefficients and coefficient alpha estimates for full
scales and subscales indicate the extent to which total score reliability is influenced by
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variance due to group factors and subscale score reliability is influenced by variance due
to the general factor (Reise et al., 2010).
Exploratory bi-factor analysis. EBFA was introduced by Jennrich and Bentler
(2011, 2012) and can be performed with both orthogonal and oblique rotations.
According to Jennrich and Bentler (2011), EBFA “is simply exploratory factor analysis
using a bi-factor rotation criterion” (p. 537). The bi-factor rotation criterion loads all
variables on the first factor and then attempts to create a perfect cluster structure (no
cross-loadings) with the remaining factors. Jennrich and Bentler (2012) presented two
different rotation criteria that can be adapted to bi-factor rotation, quartimin and geomin,
and note that the geomin criterion might be better for returning a perfect cluster structure.
As is the case with classic exploratory factor analysis, EBFA with orthogonal rotation
produces a factor pattern matrix, and EBFA with oblique rotation produces a factor
pattern matrix, a factor correlation matrix, and a factor structure matrix.
When calculated in Mplus® (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), EBFA model results
include the fit statistics described in the previous subsections. Additionally, residual
variances for each observed variable are calculated and can be used to evaluate the tested
factor structure.
Analysis of Variance
Addressing the Variability Question, multiple repeated-measures analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) were used to test for differences in metacognitive regulation due to
activity and course. Two-factor repeated measures ANOVA is an extension of repeatedmeasures ANOVA that makes it possible to test for differences associated with two
categorical factors as well as the interaction between those factors. The two-factor
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repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on MIPSS regulation subscales, and the two
within-subjects variables were activity (four levels) and course (two levels). If a factor in
a repeated measures ANOVA has more than two levels, the assumption of sphericity—
that all pairs of repeated-measures variable levels have equivalent correlations—has the
potential to be violated. If the assumption of sphericity is not met, an alternate
significance test, such as the Greenhouse-Geisser, is necessary to correct for the bias due
to a lack of sphericity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007b). The ANOVA was evaluated at the α
= .05 level. Other course-specific scales were compared with one-factor repeatedmeasures ANOVA. All repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted in SPSS® Version
24.
The F test statistic indicates whether observed differences between means are
significantly different from zero. The degree to which any mean differences are
practically meaningful was judged by effect sizes. The effect sizes calculated in
conjunction with the ANOVAs were partial eta squared (𝜂𝑝2 ) and Cohen’s d. Cohen’s d
indexes the difference between means in (pooled) standard deviation units. That is, if d =
1.0 the difference between means is equal to one full standard deviation. Cohen’s (1988)
conventions for interpreting d are that d = 0.2 indicates a small effect, d = 0.5 indicates a
medium effect, and d = 0.8 indicates a large effect. In contrast, 𝜂𝑝2 indicates the
proportion of variability in the dependent variable that is accounted for by the
independent variable. Following Cohen’s (1988; Richardson, 2011) guidelines for
interpreting eta2 (𝜂2 ), 𝜂𝑝2 = .01 was interpreted as a small effect, 𝜂𝑝2 = .06 was interpreted
as a medium effect, and 𝜂𝑝2 = .14 was interpreted as a large effect. Practically
meaningfully differences, as judged by effect sizes, across activities and courses would
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indicate that individuals’ (self-reported) metacognitive regulation is influenced by the
course and activity with which one is engaging.
Correlation and Regression
Correlation and multiple regression were used to address the Association
Question. Correlations were calculated between the MIPSS subscales and the other scales
in order to reveal the patterns of association with both general and course-specific
measures of metacognition and other constructs. Multiple regression was used to predict
indicators of academic achievement (e.g., GPA, course grades) from the various
metacognition and self-regulation scale scores. Correlation and multiple regression are
related ways to index the covariance between continuous variables, and as such, were the
appropriate techniques to address the Association Question. For both correlation and
multiple regression analyses, r2 (or R2) provided an index of the amount of shared
variance among variables. Cohen’s (1988) conventions are commonly used in the social
sciences to interpret correlation coefficients (r). Cohen suggested a correlation coefficient
of .10 be considered weak, .30 be considered moderate, and .50 be considered strong.
These guidelines were used to interpret and describe correlations from this study. The
corresponding R2 values were used to interpret the proportion of variance accounted for
by multiple regression models as small (R2 = 0.01), medium (R2 = 0.09), and large (R2 =
0.25). For regression analyses, models were evaluated with the F statistic, and
standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients and the associated t statistics
were used to evaluate the usefulness of individual predictors for predicting outcomes.
The conventional alpha level of .05 was used to judge the significance of F and t
statistics. Because of the large number of correlations that were calculated and the sample
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size, the alpha level .01 was used to judge the significance level of correlations and
reduce the probability of making a Type I error. Also, the sample size used for these
analyses was large enough that an alpha of .05 would result in significant correlations
that were not practically meaningful. All correlation and regression analyses were
conducted in SPSS® Versions 24 and 25.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
This chapter presents the results of the analyses that tested the three research
questions. First, the data screening and preparation process is explained. Second, results
of exploratory and confirmatory bi-factor analyses that address the Factor Structure
Question are presented. The third section shows the results of repeated-measures analyses
of variance that tested the Variability Question. And finally, results of correlation and
regression analyses that address the Association Question are given.
Data Screening and Preparation
Prior to any analyses, data were inspected for errors, missingness, normality,
outliers, and aberrant response patterns (e.g., “straight-lining,” exceptionally fast
responses). Inspection of response patterns in the Study 1 dataset led to the removal of
the following participants: 12 participants who exhibited excessive straight-lining, 16
participants who completed the survey in less than nine minutes, and seven participants
who took more than 12 hours to complete the survey. Excessive straight-lining was
determined by examining standard deviations for each survey subsection for each
participant. Participants who had a subsection standard deviation of zero (i.e., chose the
same response for every item) for more than three subsections were eliminated from
further analysis. A completion time of nine minutes corresponds to an average of about
3.5 seconds per item, without taking webpage-loading time into account. After removing
these participants, there were 390 cases eligible for Study 1 analysis. Inspection of
response patterns in the Study 2 dataset led to the removal of five participants who
completed the survey in less than 15 minutes and three participants who were outliers in
terms of age (> 40 years). A completion time of 15 minutes corresponds to an average of
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about 5 seconds or less per item (depending on the version of the survey), without taking
webpage-loading time into account. An additional two participants were excluded from
analysis because at the time of the survey, they informed the researcher that they had not
taken any courses during the previous semester and instead provided responses about the
semester before that (i.e., one year prior). After removing these participants, there were
293 cases eligible for Study 2 analysis.
After data screening was completed, all items with reverse-wording were reversescored. For the established scales used in Study 2, scale scores were calculated as the
average of responses to items on the scale.
Question 1: The Factor Structure Question
EBFA was conducted using the Study 1 dataset and CBFA was conducted using
the Study 2 dataset. Prior to conducting either factor analysis, a subset of the MIPSS
items were selected to be used in the factor analyses. Only items that were used in both
Studies 1 and 2 were considered. Items were selected so as to maintain construct
representation, according to the MIPSS blueprint, and interitem correlations calculated
from the Study 1 dataset. Items from each section of the blueprint with the highest
interitem correlations were selected so that construct representation was maintained, and
items were positively correlated.
Exploratory Bi-Factor Analysis
The primary purpose of the EBFA was to determine whether it was more
appropriate to cluster items for the group factors in the CBFA according to the
components of metacognition (e.g., monitoring), as has been hypothesized in previous
factor analyses of other instruments, or according to the different activities (e.g.,
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studying) built into the instrument. The latter was expected to better correspond to a bifactor structure. EBFA was conducted in Mplus® Version 7, and oblique quartimax
rotation was used. In using oblique rotation, the group factors were allowed to correlate
with each other, but the correlations between the general factor and all group factors was
constrained to be 0 (see Figure 4.1). Oblique rotation was used because of the anticipated
correlations between the subcomponents of metacognitive knowledge and the possibility
of correlations between activities that shared salient characteristics (e.g., taking a test and
completing an assignment both having a direct impact on one’s grade). Because the same
metacognitive regulation items were presented for the favorite course context and the
least favorite course context, two sets of EBFAs were conducted: one with the
metacognitive knowledge and favorite course metacognitive regulation items and the
other with the metacognitive knowledge and least favorite course metacognitive
regulation items.
In order to fully consider possible factor structures that are theoretically plausible,
results of extracting three, six, eight, and nine factors were considered for both the
Knowledge + Favorite Course analysis and the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course
analysis (see Tables 4.1 – 4.12). Model fit statistics for all EBFAs are provided in Table
4.13. The numbers of factors extracted correspond to the following factor structures that
were seen as plausible, theory-based alternatives: (a) three factors would reflect a general
factor, a metacognitive knowledge factor, and a metacognitive regulation factor; (b) six
factors would reflect a general factor, a metacognitive knowledge factor, and one factor
for each of the four activities; (c) eight factors would reflect a general factor, one factor
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Declarative
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knowledge

Procedural
knowledge items
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Conditional
knowledge items

Conditional
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Studying items
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In Class items
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items
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Taking a Test
items

Taking a
Test

Figure 4.1. Hypothesized oblique bi-factor model of the MIPSS.

for each of the three metacognitive knowledge components, and one factor for each of the
four activities; and (d) nine factors would reflect a general factor, one factor for each of
the three metacognitive knowledge components, and one factor for each of the five
processes (i.e., planning, controlling, monitoring, evaluating, metacognitive experiences)
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that are represented in the MIPSS metacognitive regulation section. It was expected that
the eight-factor solution would most closely match the expected item groupings.
In Tables 4.1 through 4.12, factor coefficients below the absolute value 0.2 are
not shown, to aid in visually detecting item groupings. The critical value for significance
when N = 400 and α = .01 is 0.13, so all shown coefficients are statistically significant.
The cutoff of 0.3 has been recommended for determining practical significance in classic
Table 4.1
Factor pattern matrix for the three-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA
Factor
1
2
3
DK1
0.612
0.201
DK2
0.596
0.220
DK3
0.650
DK4
0.617
0.244
DK5
0.454
PK1
0.426
0.413
PK2
0.520
0.245
PK3
0.568
0.309
PK4
0.414
0.444
PK5
0.524
0.541
CK1
0.317
0.464
CK2
0.369
0.475
CK3
0.472
0.328
CK4
0.493
0.34
CK5
0.332
0.542
S1
0.538
0.331
S2
0.361
0.526
S3
0.459
0.246
S4
0.406
0.436
S5
0.631
C1
0.610
-0.288
C2
0.534
-0.263
C3
0.606
-0.321
C4
0.632
-0.249
C5
0.571
-0.214
A1
0.593
-0.214
A2
0.524
A3
0.425
0.279
A4
0.594
A5
0.611
T1
0.643
T2
0.453
T3
0.679
T4
0.491
T5
0.686
-0.217
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
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Table 4.2
Factor pattern matrix for the three-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA
Factor
1
2
3
DK1
0.518
0.431
DK2
0.476
0.541
DK3
0.509
0.471
DK4
0.605
0.394
DK5
0.464
0.252
PK1
0.513
-0.205
PK2
0.565
PK3
0.575
0.202
PK4
0.461
-0.201
PK5
0.582
-0.238
CK1
0.446
CK2
0.482
-0.207
CK3
0.512
CK4
0.593
CK5
0.499
-0.282
S1
0.562
0.230
S2
0.517
-0.476
S3
0.514
-0.327
S4
0.500
-0.498
S5
0.526
0.298
C1
0.564
0.307
C2
0.426
0.238
C3
0.496
0.393
C4
0.473
0.202
C5
0.534
0.254
A1
0.474
0.279
A2
0.374
0.364
A3
0.522
-0.287
A4
0.588
-0.253
A5
0.479
0.311
T1
0.580
0.526
T2
0.334
0.352
T3
0.490
0.496
T4
0.379
0.511
T5
0.478
0.528
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.

factor analysis (Stevens, 2012; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007a), but the appropriateness of
this cutoff for bi-factor analysis has not been established. As can be seen from Tables 4.1
and 4.2, group factors in the three-factor solutions did not reflect the distinction between
metacognitive knowledge and regulation. And, as can be seen from Tables 4.3 and 4.4,
group factors in the six-factor solutions generally corresponded to the three components
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of metacognitive knowledge, with some of the metacognitive regulation items grouping
as expected. The eight-factor solutions (Tables 4.5 through 4.10) most closely match
what was expected, but for neither the Knowledge + Favorite Course nor the Knowledge
+ Least Favorite Course EBFA did the Assignment group factor emerge clearly. The
nine-factor solutions (Tables 4.11 and 4.12) yielded group factors that correspond to
Table 4.3
Factor pattern matrix for the six-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA
Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
DK1
0.535
0.442
DK2
0.503
0.582
DK3
0.566
0.474
DK4
0.575
0.491
DK5
0.442
0.300
PK1
0.391
0.589
PK2
0.500
0.324
PK3
0.525
0.341
0.241
PK4
0.354
0.535
PK5
0.448
0.655
CK1
0.399
0.513
CK2
0.452
0.549
CK3
0.537
0.273
CK4
0.542
0.211
CK5
0.451
-0.207
0.354
S1
0.610
S2
0.499
-0.203
0.213
-0.228
S3
0.514
S4
0.498
-0.309
S5
0.663
C1
0.634
-0.289
C2
0.518
-0.396
C3
0.597
-0.252
C4
0.614
-0.374
C5
0.597
-0.218
-0.314
A1
0.589
0.219
A2
0.514
0.281
A3
0.481
0.367
A4
0.596
0.282
A5
0.560
0.334
T1
0.602
0.410
T2
0.435
0.247
T3
0.595
0.523
T4
0.429
0.393
T5
0.599
0.449
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.

101
some of the same group factors as the eight-factor model, and therefore the factors did
not reflect the subcomponents of metacognitive regulation (i.e., monitoring, evaluating)
that were hypothesized to correspond to a nine-factor solution.
Based on the results of the EBFAs, it was decided that the eight-factor solution
would be the model tested in the CBFAs. In addition to most closely matching the
Table 4.4
Factor pattern matrix for the six-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA
Factor
2
3
4
5
6
DK1
0.408
DK2
0.329
DK3
0.425
DK4
0.514
DK5
0.373
PK1
0.381
0.585
PK2
0.418
0.379
PK3
0.405
0.447
PK4
0.296
0.614
PK5
0.397
0.644
CK1
0.349
0.535
CK2
0.343
0.621
CK3
0.468
0.434
CK4
0.468
0.254
0.261
CK5
0.412
0.380
0.276
S1
0.585
0.233
S2
0.524
0.522
S3
0.482
0.444
S4
0.508
0.512
S5
0.569
0.315
C1
0.606
0.426
C2
0.479
0.221
C3
0.559
0.448
C4
0.515
0.538
C5
0.512
A1
0.563
A2
-0.230
0.508
-0.214
A3
0.589
0.226
A4
0.615
0.269
A5
0.556
T1
0.772
-0.247
T2
0.476
-0.264
T3
0.666
-0.240
T4
0.582
-0.249
-0.266
T5
0.647
-0.328
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
1
0.527
0.703
0.607
0.525
0.370
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hypothesized factor structure and being the most interpretable, the eight-factor solutions
fit the data well, with little improvements in fit statistics between the eight- and ninefactor solutions (see Table 4.13). The eight-factor solution indicates there is common
variance among all MIPSS items that correspond to a general metacognition factor, and
after accounting for the general factor, there remains common variance among groups of
items. These item groups mostly correspond to the three components of metacognitive
Table 4.5
Factor pattern matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA
Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
DK1
0.607
-0.234
DK2
0.605
0.238
-0.331
DK3
0.635
0.271
-0.214
DK4
0.607
0.615
DK5
0.491
-0.349
PK1
0.374
0.623
PK2
0.532
0.311
-0.232
PK3
0.596
0.293
PK4
0.388
0.510
PK5
0.490
0.606
CK1
0.353
0.652
CK2
0.414
0.592
CK3
0.528
0.303
CK4
0.530
CK5
0.400
0.212
0.389
S1
0.555
0.281
S2
0.410
0.555
S3
0.451
0.339
S4
0.449
0.417
S5
0.618
C1
0.580
0.383
C2
0.493
0.360
C3
0.555
0.410
C4
0.595
-0.205
0.339
C5
0.522
0.532
A1
0.589
0.319
A2
0.547
-0.296
A3
0.490
-0.207
A4
0.627
A5
0.613
0.318
T1
0.585
0.407
T2
0.444
-0.226
0.239
T3
0.614
0.447
T4
0.469
0.424
T5
0.620
0.459
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
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Table 4.6
Factor correlation matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2

3

1
.063
.061
-.089
.013
-.145
-.110

1
.020
.003
-.130*
.024
.018

4

5

1
.239*
1
-.116
-.038
-.043
-.029
-.137*
-.159*
Note. * p < .05

6

7

8

1
.103
.090

1
.062

1

Table 4.7
Factor structure matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA
Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
DK1
0.607
0.249
-0.247
DK2
0.605
0.301
-0.327
-0.207
DK3
0.635
0.284
-0.248
DK4
0.607
0.618
DK5
0.491
0.207
-0.382
PK1
0.374
0.611
PK2
0.532
0.300
-0.203
PK3
0.596
0.302
PK4
0.388
0.511
PK5
0.490
0.623
CK1
0.353
0.652
CK2
0.414
0.604
CK3
0.528
0.313
CK4
0.530
0.229
CK5
0.400
0.318
0.463
S1
0.555
0.296
S2
0.410
0.567
S3
0.451
0.308
S4
0.449
0.427
-0.223
S5
0.618
C1
0.580
0.397
C2
0.493
-0.246
0.380
C3
0.555
0.434
C4
0.595
-0.209
-0.225
0.354
C5
0.522
0.522
A1
0.589
0.333
A2
0.547
-0.300
A3
0.490
-0.222
A4
0.627
A5
0.613
0.317
T1
0.585
0.407
T2
0.444
-0.247
0.255
T3
0.614
0.469
T4
0.469
0.428
T5
0.620
0.461
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
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knowledge and the different activities referred to in the metacognitive regulation items.
Factor correlation matrices for the eight-factor solutions are shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.9,
and factor structure coefficients for the eight-factor solutions are shown in Tables 4.7 and
4.10. The factor structure matrix is the product of the factor pattern matrix and the factor
Table 4.8
Factor pattern matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA
Factor
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
DK1
0.386
DK2
0.297
DK3
0.392
DK4
0.502
DK5
0.364
PK1
0.425
0.508
PK2
0.450
0.321
PK3
0.409
0.459
PK4
0.310
0.606
PK5
0.406
0.656
CK1
0.353
0.621
CK2
0.365
0.629
CK3
0.471
0.353
CK4
0.477
0.285
0.244
CK5
0.456
0.308
0.293
S1
0.618
0.296
S2
0.563
0.461
S3
0.527
0.374
S4
0.550
0.464
S5
0.559
0.342
C1
0.624
0.385
C2
0.476
0.228
-0.363
C3
0.554
0.454
C4
0.544
C5
0.519
0.543
A1
0.587
-0.277
A2
0.512
-0.321
A3
0.614
A4
0.608
0.245
0.272
A5
0.573
0.215
T1
0.724
-0.252
0.270
T2
0.399
0.484
T3
0.629
-0.235
0.205
T4
0.490
0.563
T5
0.617
-0.316
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
1
0.555
0.709
0.630
0.579
0.394
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Table 4.9
Factor correlation matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

1
1
0
.273
.194
-.095
.084*
.066
.054*

2

3

1
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
.088
.019
-.069
-.026
-.115

4

5

1
.061
1
.055
-.106
.080
-.046
-.169
-.088
Note. * p < .05

6

7

8

1
.005
.037

1
-.054

1

Table 4.10
Factor structure matrix for the eight-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA
Factor
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
DK1
0.386
0.252
DK2
0.297
0.214
DK3
0.392
DK4
0.502
DK5
0.364
0.212
PK1
0.425
0.523
-0.218
PK2
0.216
0.450
0.375
PK3
0.286
0.409
0.501
0.207
PK4
0.310
0.599
PK5
0.230
0.406
0.664
CK1
0.353
0.607
CK2
0.365
0.646
CK3
0.471
0.385
0.240
CK4
0.477
0.304
0.289
CK5
0.456
0.328
0.324
S1
0.618
0.296
S2
0.563
0.468
S3
0.527
0.375
S4
-0.211
0.550
0.487
-0.207
S5
0.559
0.334
C1
0.624
0.375
C2
0.476
0.222
-0.370
C3
0.554
0.456
C4
0.544
C5
0.519
0.553
A1
0.587
-0.244
A2
0.512
-0.292
A3
0.614
A4
0.608
0.247
0.222
A5
0.573
0.222
T1
0.724
-0.266
0.291
T2
0.399
0.489
T3
0.629
-0.252
0.235
T4
0.490
0.589
T5
0.618
-0.341
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
1
0.582
0.721
0.620
0.574
0.413
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correlation matrix, so factor structure coefficients describe the relationship between items
and factors in light of the correlations between factors.
Confirmatory Bi-Factor Analysis
CBFA was conducted in Mplus® Version 6. The tested models (see Figure 4.1)
were specified so as to mirror the hypothesized eight-factor models that were tested in the
EBFAs. Specifically, the group factors were allowed to correlate with each other, but the
Table 4.11
Factor pattern matrix for the nine-factor Knowledge + Favorite Course EBFA
Factor
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
DK1
0.593
0.213
-0.230
DK2
0.580
0.262
-0.330
DK3
0.621
0.298
-0.237
DK4
0.604
0.606
DK5
0.489
-0.391
PK1
0.430
0.751
PK2
0.552
-0.231
PK3
0.612
0.213
PK4
0.420
0.269
0.299
PK5
0.527
0.240
0.500
CK1
0.362
0.656
CK2
0.424
0.579
CK3
0.525
0.288
CK4
0.546
0.323
CK5
0.412
0.219
0.381
S1
0.565
0.252
S2
0.421
0.533
S3
0.477
0.236
0.258
-0.225
0.344
S4
0.469
0.375
S5
0.616
0.217
C1
0.575
0.371
C2
0.484
0.367
C3
0.539
0.422
C4
0.591
0.320
C5
0.512
0.566
A1
0.582
0.305
A2
0.546
-0.265
-0.254
A3
0.490
-0.272
A4
0.630
A5
0.606
0.308
T1
0.583
0.407
T2
0.440
0.252
T3
0.622
0.464
T4
0.456
0.432
T5
0.616
0.461
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
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correlations between the general factor and all group factors were fixed to 0. And, once
again, two separate models were tested: a Knowledge + Favorite Course model and a
Knowledge + Least Favorite Course model.
The Knowledge + Favorite Course model fit the data well (χ2 [503] = 656.24, p <
.001, CFI = .968, RMSEA = .032, CI90% .025 to .039). Standardized loadings for the
Table 4.12
Factor pattern matrix for the nine-factor Knowledge + Least Favorite Course EBFA
Factor
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
DK1
0.432
DK2
0.337
DK3
0.418
DK4
0.497
0.229
DK5
0.372
PK1
0.441
0.494
PK2
0.496
-0.269
PK3
0.475
0.336
-0.302
PK4
0.343
0.573
PK5
0.430
0.684
CK1
0.368
0.641
CK2
0.379
0.646
CK3
0.502
0.239
0.301
CK4
0.499
0.238
0.216
CK5
0.439
0.226
0.293
0.298
S1
0.606
0.215
0.333
S2
0.501
0.533
S3
0.471
0.490
S4
0.490
0.543
S5
0.548
0.352
C1
0.606
0.393
C2
0.470
0.212
-0.384
C3
0.573
0.431
C4
0.545
C5
0.542
0.520
A1
0.588
0.214
A2
0.565
-0.214
-0.288
A3
0.589
0.236
A4
0.599
0.258
0.252
A5
0.561
0.255
T1
0.716
0.322
0.287
T2
0.416
0.490
T3
0.619
0.251
0.214
T4
0.478
0.559
T5
0.623
-0.218
0.217
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
1
0.543
0.693
0.603
0.578
0.391
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Table 4.13
EBFA model fit statistics
Model
Knowledge + Favorite Course
3
6
8
9
Knowledge + Least Favorite
Course
3
6
8
9

χ2

df

p

CFI

SRMR

RMSEA [CI]

1086.06
618.22
481.04
429.28

493
400
343
316

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

.927
.973
.983
.986

.055
.036
.029
.027

.056 [.051, .060]
.037 [.032, .043]
.032 [.025, .039]
.030 [.023, .037]

1282.33
715.35
568.34
494.41

493
400
343
316

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

.894
.957
.970
.976

.061
.038
.031
.028

.064 [.060, .068]
.045 [.040, .050]
.041 [.035, .047]
.038 [.031, .044]

model are shown in Table 4.14 and correlations between group factors are shown in
Table 4.15. Most items had moderate to strong loadings on both of their factors, and all
items had moderate or strong loadings on at least one factor. All loadings on the group
factors were moderate or strong, except for the Studying factor, which had two weak item
loadings. The correlations between group factors were generally higher than they were in
the EBFA, especially among the components of metacognitive knowledge.
The Knowledge + Least Favorite Course model also fit the data well (χ2 [503] =
747.54, p < .001, CFI = .947, RMSEA = .041, CI90% .034 to .047). Standardized
loadings for the model are shown in Table 4.16 and correlations between group factors
are shown in Table 4.17. The general factor was much less well defined in this model: of
the 35 items, 19 had loadings on the general factor below 0.30. The group factors,
however, were more clearly defined: only 4 items had group-factor loadings below. 0.30.
Consistent with the Knowledge + Favorite Course model, correlations between group
factors were generally higher than they were in the EBFA.
All omega (ω) coefficients are shown in Table 4.18. As is indicated by the two ω
estimates, both models account for a large portion of the variability in the data.
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Table 4.14
Standardized results for the Knowledge + Favorite Course CBFA
Factor
General
DK
PK
CK
S
C
A
T
DK1
.319
.600
DK2
.254
.633
DK3
.405
.588
DK4
.288
.606
DK5
.307
.422
PK1
.148
.539
PK2
.168
.489
PK3
.212
.556
PK4
.233
.438
PK5
.275
.734
CK1
.320
.431
CK2
.278
.475
CK3
.328
.515
CK4
.288
.707
CK5
.313
.515
S1
.523
.181
S2
.343
.838
S3
.368
.303
S4
.345
.401
S5
.702
.041
C1
.451
.408
C2
.384
.452
C3
.578
.587
C4
.525
.270
C5
.702
.205
A1
.430
.582
A2
.441
.427
A3
.396
.447
A4
.447
.368
A5
.389
.735
T1
.577
.571
T2
.474
.622
T3
.349
.754
T4
.565
.550
T5
.200
.419
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.

Table 4.15
Factor correlation matrix for the Knowledge + Favorite Course CBFA
DK
PK
CK
S
C
A
T
DK
1
PK
.661*
1
CK
.665*
.779*
1
S
.260*
.330*
.474*
1
C
.259*
.110
.134
-.023
1
A
.280*
.403*
.155
.081
.265*
1
T
-.019
.147
-.080
.153
-.151
-.045
1
Note. * p < .05. All correlations with the general factor were fixed at 0. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK
= Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T =
Taking a Test.
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Table 4.16
Standardized results for the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course CBFA
Factor
General
DK
PK
CK
S
C
A
T
DK1
.193
.654
DK2
.042
.686
DK3
.142
.706
DK4
.315
.605
DK5
.159
.495
PK1
.339
.439
PK2
.246
.453
PK3
.279
.517
PK4
.169
.472
PK5
.408
.671
CK1
.071
.559
CK2
.067
.582
CK3
.202
.577
CK4
.106
.753
CK5
.374
.493
S1
.286
.590
S2
.474
.351
S3
.555
.197
S4
.572
.275
S5
.214
.589
C1
.273
.621
C2
.607
.189
C3
.236
.747
C4
.322
.413
C5
.328
.658
A1
.683
.274
A2
.239
.613
A3
-.097
.837
A4
.482
.393
A5
-.001
.711
T1
.300
.730
T2
.408
.629
T3
.339
.557
T4
.542
.529
T5
.206
.491
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.

Table 4.17
Factor correlation matrix for the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course CBFA
DK
PK
CK
S
C
A
T
DK
1
PK
.713*
1
CK
.722*
.806*
1
S
.226*
-.019
.113
1
C
.321*
.173
.212*
.801*
1
A
.266*
.317*
.202*
.442*
.539*
1
T
.248*
.055
.130
.401*
.441*
.502*
1
Note. * p < .05. Note. * p < .05. All correlations with the general factor were fixed at 0.
DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S = Studying,
C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
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Table 4.18
Omega coefficients for CBFA Models
Knowledge + favorite model
Knowledge + least favorite model
ω
ωH
ωHS
ω
ωH
ωHS
.919
.886
General
.734
.584
DK
.040
.075
PK
.037
.051
CK
.034
.067
S
.016
.032
C
.018
.054
A
.032
.062
T
.041
.066
Note. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, S =
Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
Factor

Consistent with the interpretations of the factor loadings, the general factor of the
Knowledge + Favorite Course model had a much higher ωH than the Knowledge + Least
Favorite Course model. The ωHS estimates for both models indicate all the subscales have
low reliability separate from the general factor. However, ωHS is a function of the relative
sizes of the general factor and the subscale: Subscales that are a small portion of the full
scale will have small ωHS estimates unless all loadings on the general factor are very weak
(in which case a bi-factor model is unlikely to be used). To illustrate, if item loadings are
held constant, a 10-item subscale from a 20-item scale will have a higher ωHS than a 5item subscale from a 20-item scale because the 10-item subscale is a larger proportion of
the 20-item scale than the 5-item scale. Therefore, the relative size of the subscale should
be considered when interpreting ωHS.
Because of the high correlations among the knowledge group factors (all rs > .65
for the Knowledge + Favorite Course model, all rs > .70 for the Knowledge + Least
Favorite Course model), a pair of alternative CBFA models was tested. The alternative
models specified the four activity group factors and one knowledge group factor instead
of three separate knowledge group factors.

112
The Knowledge + Favorite Course alternative model fit the data well (χ [514] =
2

738.757, p < .001, CFI = .953, RMSEA = .039, CI90% .032 to .045). Standardized
loadings for the model are shown in Table 4.19 and correlations between group factors
are shown in Table 4.20. Loadings on the general factor were comparable to the generalfactor loadings for the hypothesized Knowledge + Favorite Course model. As can be seen
in Table 4.19, most of the group factors were comparable to their group-factor
Table 4.19
Standardized results for the Knowledge + Favorite Course Alternative CBFA
Factor
General
K
S
C
A
T
DK1
.346
.514
DK2
.297
.521
DK3
.414
.505
DK4
.297
.515
DK5
.309
.372
PK1
.164
.478
PK2
.155
.470
PK3
.215
.512
PK4
.239
.402
PK5
.273
.673
CK1
.284
.417
CK2
.253
.435
CK3
.301
.478
CK4
.260
.639
CK5
.257
.507
S1
.461
.286
S2
.273
.763
S3
.315
.367
S4
.262
.486
S5
.628
.192
C1
.568
.231
C2
.518
.241
C3
.739
.191
C4
.607
.003
C5
.775
-.171
A1
.403
.629
A2
.433
.432
A3
.382
.461
A4
.414
.417
A5
.394
.690
T1
.494
.548
T2
.390
.678
T3
.258
.779
T4
.485
.624
T5
.149
.440
Note. K = Knowledge, S = Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
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Table 4.20
Factor correlation matrix for the Knowledge + Favorite Course Alternative CBFA
K
S
C
A
T
K
1
S
.454*
1
C
.086
-.232
1
A
.331*
.204*
.329
1
T
.100
.298*
-.469*
.071
1
Note. * p < .05. K = Knowledge, S = Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.

counterparts in the hypothesized Knowledge + Favorite Course model, with the exception
of the In Class group factor.
The Knowledge + Least Favorite Course alternative model fit the data well (χ2
[514] = 810.006, p < .001, CFI = .936, RMSEA = .044, CI90% .038 to .050).
Standardized loadings for the model are shown in Table 4.21 and correlations between
group factors are shown in Table 4.22. Again, the general factor was less well defined,
and the group factors were more clearly defined than they were for the Knowledge +
Favorite Course alternative model. Overall, fit indices suggest the alternative models fit
slightly worse than the hypothesized model, but they are plausible alternatives. Because
fit was comparable between the hypothesized and alternate models and the patterns of
factor loadings were similar, the hypothesized models were retained as the basis for scale
scores used in subsequent analyses.
Question 2: The Variability Question
The Variability Question was tested by comparing participants’ self-reported
metacognitive regulation and self-regulation across different courses and activities. The
results of three sets of analyses are reported next. First, MIPSS subscale scores were used
to test for within-person differences related to course and the interaction between course
and activity. Second, scores from the MSLQ Metacognitive Self-regulation scale were
used to test for within-person differences related to course. And third, SPOCK scale
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Table 4.21
Standardized results for the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course Alternative CBFA
Factor
General
K
S
C
A
T
DK1
0.235
.595
DK2
0.091
.625
DK3
0.172
.641
DK4
0.360
.528
DK5
0.189
.447
PK1
0.331
.389
PK2
0.236
.415
PK3
0.261
.473
PK4
0.149
.441
PK5
0.377
.610
CK1
0.054
.516
CK2
0.050
.536
CK3
0.188
.532
CK4
0.085
.692
CK5
0.356
.457
S1
0.269
.603
S2
0.471
.350
S3
0.546
.211
S4
0.563
.287
S5
0.197
.601
C1
0.272
.619
C2
0.609
.190
C3
0.224
.755
C4
0.311
.425
C5
0.327
.656
A1
0.703
.261
A2
0.245
.615
A3
0.080
.829
A4
0.492
.391
A5
0.009
.714
T1
0.286
.741
T2
0.401
.633
T3
0.336
.554
T4
0.540
.528
T5
0.192
.502
Note. K = Knowledge, S = Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.

Table 4.22
Factor correlation matrix for the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course Alternative CBFA
K
S
C
A
T
K
1
S
.133
1
C
.265*
.799*
1
A
.275*
.427*
.531*
1
T
.166*
.416*
.448*
.493*
1
Note. * p < .05. K = Knowledge, S = Studying, C = In Class, A = Assignment, T = Taking a Test.
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scores were used to test for within-person differences across courses in self-regulation,
use of knowledge building strategies, and lack of regulation. Descriptive statistics for all
scales are shown in Table 4.23.
Table 4.23
Descriptive statistics for all scales
Scale
MIPSS
DK
PK
CK
FS
FC
FA
FT
LS
LC
LA
LT
MAI Knowledge
MAI Regulation
MSLQ – favorite
course
MSLQ – least favorite
course
Incremental Theory of
Intelligence
Entity Theory of
Intelligence
SPOCK – favorite
course
Knowledge Building
Self-regulation
Lack of Regulation
Cooperative Learning
Teacher Directedness

N

Scale
length

M

SD

Skewness

Kurtosis

α

293
293
293
293
293
293
291
293
293
293
292

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

4.29
3.75
3.68
2.77
3.10
3.05
3.08
2.55
2.68
2.48
2.90

0.43
0.58
0.56
0.59
0.59
0.64
0.87
0.66
0.67
0.64
0.75

-0.04
-0.32
0.09
-0.19
-1.08
-1.44
-2.17
-0.17
-0.43
0.02
-1.60

-0.38
0.33
-0.11
0.50
3.88
4.39
5.11
-0.21
0.23
-0.21
3.87

.70
.64
.67
.64
.74
.76
.85
.68
.72
.70
.79

149
149
149

17
35
12

77.25
67.97
4.69

11.55
13.67
0.85

-0.79
-0.30
-0.50

1.12
0.08
0.43

.88
.94
.79

149

12

3.86

1.10

-0.03

0.06

.87

144

4

4.28

0.93

-0.39

-0.16

.91

144

4

2.65

0.95

0.47

-0.10

.89

144
144
144
144
144

5
5
4
4
3

3.89
3.74
2.08
3.46
4.05

0.80
0.73
0.78
1.17
0.72

-0.63
-0.29
0.50
-0.51
-0.82

-0.26
-0.26
-0.46
-0.82
0.85

.84
.79
.73
.89
.56

SPOCK – least favorite
course
Knowledge Building
144
5
3.00
0.94
-0.30
-0.50
.86
Self-regulation
144
5
3.35
0.84
-0.41
0.15
.85
Lack of Regulation
144
4
3.13
0.90
0.04
-0.51
.72
Cooperative Learning
144
4
2.92
1.16
-0.04
-1.11
.88
Teacher Directedness
144
3
2.91
1.00
-0.28
-0.81
.79
Note. The kurtosis statistic is adjusted so that 0 indicates normality. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK =
Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, FS = Favorite Studying, FC = Favorite In Class, FA
= Favorite Assignment, FT = Favorite Taking a Test, LS = Least Favorite Studying, LC = Least Favorite In
Class, LA = Least Favorite Assignment, LT = Least Favorite Taking a Test.
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MIPSS Subscales
In order to test whether participants’ metacognitive regulation varied across
courses and academic activities, a two-factor repeated-measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was conducted on MIPSS metacognitive regulation subscale scores. Subscale
scores were calculated as the mean of the subscale items that were used in the CBFAs.
Partial eta2 (𝜂𝑝2 ) was used to interpret the magnitude of effects. The two factors were
course (two levels) and activity (four levels). The course factor functioned as a true
repeated measure because the same items were used across the favorite and least favorite
course factors. The activity factor did not function as a true repeated measure because
although the same components of metacognitive regulation and experiences were
represented in each scale, the exact item content varied across activities. As a result, a
significant main effect of activity could be due to differences in item content, an actual
difference in metacognitive regulation, or a combination of the two. The interaction
between course and activity was used to gain indirect insight into the influence of activity
on metacognitive regulation by determining whether any differences between courses
were consistent across the different activities.
Because the activity factor had more than two levels, the assumption of sphericity
was tested. Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated the assumption of sphericity was
violated both for activity (Mauchly’s W [5] = .830, p < .001) and the interaction between
course and activity (Mauchly’s W [5] = .767, p < .001). As a result, the GreenhouseGeisser correction was used to adjust the degrees of freedom used in judging the
significance of the effect of activity and the interaction between course and activity.
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Sample means for all levels of course and activity are shown in Table 4.24. The
main effect of course was significant (F(1, 289) = 116.86, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .288), as was
the main effect of activity (F(2.662, 769.287) = 37.03, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .114), and the
interaction between course and activity (F(2.547, 736.197) = 17.40, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .057).
According to Cohen’s (1988) conventions, the effect of course was large, and the effect
of activity was medium to large, and the effect of the interaction was small. As is noted
above, because the activity factor was not a true repeated measure, the main effect of
activity should not be interpreted as indicating an actual difference in metacognitive
regulation.
Because the interaction between course and activity was significant, simple main
effects were analyzed. The assumption of sphericity was violated for both the test of
activity within favorite course (Mauchly’s W [5] = .749, p < .001) and within least
favorite course (Mauchly’s W [5] = .894, p < .001), so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction
was again used to adjust degrees of freedom for the tests. Within the “favorite” level of
course, activity had a significant, medium-sized effect (F(2.479, 718.770) = 19.93, p <
.001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .064), indicating metacognitive regulation varied across activities completed
for participants’ favorite courses. Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that scores
for studying were lower (ps < .001) than scores for the other three activities. Within the
“least favorite” level of course, the effect of activity was significant and close to the
Table 4.24
Means and standard deviations for courses and activities
Favorite course
Least favorite course
Cohen’s d
Studying
2.77 (0.59)
2.55 (0.66)
0.35
In class
3.10 (0.59)
2.68 (0.67)
0.67
Assignment
3.05 (0.64)
2.48 (0.64)
0.90
Test
3.08 (0.87)
2.90 (0.75)
0.22
Note. Cohen’s d effect size is for the difference between courses for the activity.
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conventional cutoff for being categorized as large (F(2.806, 816.584) = 39.95, p < .001,
𝜂𝑝2 = .121), indicating metacognitive regulation also varied across activities completed for
participants’ least favorite courses. The larger effect size within the least favorite course
level indicates there were more differences in the means of least favorite course scales
than favorite course scales. This difference was also detected in the follow-up pairwise
comparisons. All differences were significant (ps < .001) except for that between
studying and completing an assignment.
Within the “studying” level of activity, the effect of course was significant (F(1,
292) = 27.84, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .087), indicating participants reported significantly more
metacognitive regulation while studying for their favorite courses than their least favorite
courses. Within the “in class” level of activity, the effect of course was significant (F(1,
292) = 83.47, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .222), indicating participants reported significantly more
metacognitive regulation while in their favorite courses than their least favorite courses.
Within the “assignment” level of activity, the effect of course was significant (F(1, 292)
= 148.30, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .337), indicating participants reported significantly more
metacognitive regulation while completing assignments for their favorite courses than
their least favorite courses. And, within the “test” level of activity, the effect of course
was significant (F(1, 289) = 9.00, p = .003, 𝜂𝑝2 = .030), indicating participants reported
significantly more metacognitive regulation while taking tests in their favorite courses
than their least favorite courses. The range of effect sizes across these four
comparisons—two being small-to-medium and two being well above the conventional
cutoff for large—suggest that although students regulate more during activities completed
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for favorite courses, the magnitude of the difference varies depending on the activity
being completed.
MSLQ Metacognitive Self-Regulation Scale
A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to determine whether participants
also reported differences in metacognitive self-regulation as measured by the MSLQ. The
effect of course was significant and large (F(1, 148) = 99.46, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .402), further
indicating participants engage in more metacognitive regulation in their favorite courses
(M = 4.69, SD = 0.85) than their least favorite courses (M = 3.86, SD = 1.10). According
to Cohen’s (1988) conventions, the difference between means also indicates the effect of
course was large (d = 0.85).
SPOCK Scales
Repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether participants
also reported course-related differences in self-regulation, knowledge building, and lack
of regulation, as measured by the SPOCK. There was a significant difference in selfregulation (F(1, 143) = 32.89, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .187), with participants reporting more selfregulation in favorite courses (M = 3.74, SD = 0.73) than least favorite courses (M = 3.35,
SD = 0.84). According to Cohen’s conventions, the difference between means indicates
the effect of course was moderate (d = 0.50). There was also a large and significant
difference in knowledge building (F(1, 143) = 106.22, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 = .426), with
participants reporting more knowledge building in favorite courses (M = 3.89, SD = 0.80)
than least favorite courses (M = 3.00, SD = 0.94). The mean difference of the Knowledge
Building scales also indicates the effect of course was large (d = 1.02). And, there was a
large and significant difference in lack of regulation (F(1, 143) = 121.82, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝2 =
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.460), with participants reporting fewer problems self-regulating in favorite courses (M =
2.08, SD = 0.78) than least favorite courses (M = 3.13, SD = 0.90). The mean difference
of the Lack of Regulation scales also indicates the effect of course was large (d = -1.25).
Question 3: The Association Question
The Association Question was tested by regressing achievement measures on
metacognition and self-regulated learning scales and by correlating scores of the various
metacognition and self-regulated learning scales. By design, not all participants
completed all scales, and therefore not all possible pairs of scales could be correlated.
Results of regression analyses related to achievement measures are reported first,
followed by results of correlation analyses for the various scales.
Metacognition, Self-Regulated Learning, and Achievement
Measures of metacognition and self-regulated learning were associated with
measures of achievement via regression analysis. Each metacognition and self-regulated
learning measure—the MIPSS, MSLQ, and SPOCK scales for favorite and least favorite
courses and the MAI—were used in regressions for two general measures of achievement
(i.e., cumulative GPA and composite ACT score) and one specific measure of
achievement (i.e., course grade). Participants self-reported all achievement measures,
including SAT scores for those participants who took the SAT but not the ACT. Seven
SAT scores were converted to ACT equivalents using the concordance tables provided by
The College Board (“SAT Concordance Tables for Higher Education,” 2016). Twentysix other students did not provide ACT or SAT scores and were excluded from the ACT
scores analyses. One SAT score was not converted because the number provided was not
a valid score. Self-reported letter grades (e.g., A-) were converted to a 12-point scale,
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with “A+” = 1 and “F” = 12, and as a result all analyses of grades are such that lower
values reflect higher letter grades. Participants who reported a grade of “pass” or “no
pass” were excluded from course grade analyses. No participants reported “pass” or “no
pass” for favorite courses, and 15 participants reported “pass” or “no pass” for least
favorite courses.
Collinearity diagnostics and residual plots for each analysis were inspected, and
no issues were detected. For each measure, results for the prediction of GPA are
presented first, followed by results for ACT scores, and then results for course grades.
And for each course-specific measure, results are grouped by achievement variable with
favorite course block presented first, followed by results for the least favorite course
block. For course-specific measures, course grades were only predicted from measures
related to that course (e.g., favorite course metacognition scales were used with favorite
course grades and not least favorite course grades).
MIPSS. Statistics for all scales and all analyses are shown in Table 4.25. The set
of knowledge and favorite course scales accounted for a significant proportion of
variance in cumulative GPA (R2 = .079, F(7, 283) = 3.48, p = .001). The Procedural
Knowledge scale was the only individually significant variable (b = 0.195, t = 3.178, p =
.002). The set of knowledge and least favorite course scales also accounted for a
significant proportion of variance in cumulative GPA (R2 = .091, F(7, 284) = 4.05, p <
.001). Again, the Procedural Knowledge scale was the only individually significant
variable (b = 0.192, t = 3.172, p = .002). Both sets of variables accounted for a medium
amount of variance in GPA, and greater knowledge of how to regulate cognition was
associated with higher cumulative GPAs in both models.
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Table 4.25
Coefficients for all MIPSS regression analyses
GPA
Favorite course
Declarative knowledge
Procedural knowledge
Conditional knowledge
Study
In class
Assignment
Taking a test
Least favorite course
Declarative knowledge
Procedural knowledge
Conditional knowledge
Study
In class
Assignment
Taking a test
ACT scores
Favorite course
Declarative knowledge
Procedural knowledge
Conditional knowledge
Study
In class
Assignment
Taking a test
Least favorite course
Declarative knowledge
Procedural knowledge
Conditional knowledge
Study
In class
Assignment
Taking a test
Course grade
Favorite course
Declarative knowledge
Procedural knowledge
Conditional knowledge
Study
In class
Assignment
Taking a test
Least favorite course
Declarative knowledge
Procedural knowledge
Conditional knowledge
Study
In class
Assignment
Taking a test

b

bSE

β

t

p

0.013
0.195
0.001
0.009
0.001
0.047
0.035

.080
.061
.067
.060
.056
.051
.035

.012
.226
.002
.010
.001
.060
.061

0.167
3.178
0.021
0.143
0.013
0.917
0.994

.868
.002
.983
.887
.990
.360
.321

0.023
0.192
0.013
-0.049
-0.015
0.072
0.071

.079
.061
.064
.056
.058
.055
.044

.019
.222
.015
-.064
.020
.091
.107

0.288
3.172
0.208
-0.889
-0.258
1.317
1.618

.773
.002
.836
.375
.797
.189
.107

0.798
0.763
-0.005
-0.899
0.452
-0.525
0.583

.672
.535
.587
.511
.474
.429
.294

.087
.109
-.001
-.132
.066
-.085
.129

1.186
1.426
-.009
-1.760
0.955
-1.223
1.988

.237
.155
.993
.080
.340
.223
.048

0.577
0.598
-0.225
-0.766
1.227
-0.049
-0.199

.661
.528
.559
.467
.497
.460
.368

.063
.085
-.031
-.127
.203
-.008
-.038

0.872
1.133
-0.402
-1.638
2.466
-0.106
-0.542

.384
.258
.688
.103
.014
.916
.588

-0.104
-0.333
0.027
0.266
-0.060
-0.403
-0.107

.245
.187
.205
.183
.172
.156
.108

-.030
-.128
.010
.102
-.023
-.171
-.061

-0.423
-1.780
0.133
1.451
-0.347
-2.582
-0.984

.672
.076
.894
.148
.729
.010
.326

0.071
-1.123
0.186
0.953
-0.103
-0.981
-0.553

.455
.343
.365
.312
.335
.313
.248

.011
-.227
.036
.219
-.024
-.216
-.146

0.156
-3.271
0.510
3.055
-0.307
-3.131
-2.231

.876
.001
.610
.002
.759
.002
.026

123
In the prediction of ACT scores, the set of knowledge and favorite course scales
did not account for a significant proportion of variance (R2 = .044, F(7, 256) = 1.70, p =
.109). The knowledge and least favorite course scales also did not account for a
significant proportion of variance in ACT scores (R2 = .042, F(7, 257) = 1.63, p = .127).
In the prediction of course grades, the set of knowledge and favorite course scales
accounted for a significant proportion of variance (R2 = .064, F(7, 283) = 2.77, p = .008)
that fell between the small and medium conventions for interpretation. The Assignment
scale was the only individually significant variable (b = -0.403, t = -2.582, p = .010).
(Grades were coded with “A+” = 1, so lower values reflect higher letter grades.) More
frequent metacognitive regulation while completing assignments was associated with
higher course grades. The set of knowledge and least favorite course scales also scales
accounted for a significant proportion of variance in course grades (R2 = .145, F(7, 269)
= 6.53, p < .001) that fell between the medium and large conventions for interpretation.
The Procedural Knowledge scale (b = -1.123, t = -3.271, p = .001), Study scale (b =
0.953, t = 3.055, p = .002), the Assignment scale (b = -0.981, t = -3.131, p = .002), and
the Taking a Test scale (b = -0.553, t = -2.231, p = .026) all made significant
contributions to the prediction of course grades. Greater knowledge of how to regulate
cognition and more frequent metacognitive regulation while completing assignments and
taking tests was associated with higher course grades, as was less frequent metacognitive
regulation while studying. Though unexpected, the negative relationship between
regulation while studying and grades appears to be the result of a suppression effect. The
zero-order correlation between the Studying scale and grades was .02 (non-significant, p
= .352), but the partial correlation was .183.
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MSLQ Metacognitive Self-regulation scale. Statistics for all scales and all
analyses are shown in Table 4.26. The favorite course scale did not account for a
significant proportion of variance in cumulative GPA (R2 = .016, F(1, 147) = 2.41, p =
.123). The least favorite course scale accounted for a significant and small-to-medium
proportion of variance in cumulative GPA (R2 = .060, F(1, 147) = 9.34, p = .003). Greater
metacognitive self-regulation was associated with higher cumulative GPAs.
In the prediction of ACT scores, the favorite course scale accounted for a
significant and small-to-medium proportion of variance (R2 = .047, F(1, 132) = 6.55, p =
.012). The least favorite course scale also accounted for a significant and small-tomedium proportion of variance in ACT scores (R2 = .061, F(1, 132) = 8.51, p = .004). In
both cases, greater metacognitive self-regulation was associated with higher ACT scores.
In the prediction of course grades, the favorite course scale did not account for a
significant proportion of variance (R2 = .000, F(1, 147) = 0.004, p = .947). The least
favorite course scale accounted for a significant and small proportion of variance in
course grades (R2 = .033, F(1, 142) = 4.86, p = .029). Greater metacognitive selfregulation was associated with higher grades in least favorite courses.
Table 4.26
Coefficients for all MSLQ Metacognitive Self-regulation scale regression analyses
b

bSE

β

t

p

GPA
Favorite course
Least favorite course

0.079
0.118

.051
.039

.127
0244

1.551
3.056

.123
.003

ACT scores
Favorite course
Least favorite course

1.084
0.957

.423
.328

.217
.246

2.559
2.918

.012
.004

Course grade
Favorite course
Least favorite course

-0.010
-0.480

.150
.218

-.005
-.182

-0.067
-2.21

.947
.029
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SPOCK scales. Statistics for all scales and all analyses are shown in Table 4.27.
The set of favorite course scales did not account for a significant proportion of variance
in cumulative GPA (R2 = .046, F(3, 140) = 2.27, p = .083). The set of least favorite
course scales accounted for a significant and small-to-medium proportion of variance in
cumulative GPA (R2 = .060, F(3, 140) = 2.98, p = .034). The Lack of Regulation scale
was the only individually significant variable (b = -0.111, t = -2.58, p = .011). Having
fewer struggles self-regulating was associated with higher cumulative GPAs.
In the prediction of ACT scores, the set of favorite course scales accounted for a
significant and medium proportion of variance (R2 = .073, F(3, 128) = 3.37, p = .021).
The Self-regulation scale made a significant contribution to the prediction of ACT scores
Table 4.27
Coefficients for all SPOCK regression analyses
GPA
Favorite course
Knowledge Building
Self-regulation
Lack of Regulation
Least favorite course
Knowledge Building
Self-regulation
Lack of Regulation
ACT scores
Favorite course
Knowledge Building
Self-regulation
Lack of Regulation
Least favorite course
Knowledge Building
Self-regulation
Lack of Regulation
Course grade
Favorite course
Knowledge Building
Self-regulation
Lack of Regulation
Least favorite course
Knowledge Building
Self-regulation
Lack of Regulation

b

bSE

β

t

p

0.137
-0.020
0.013

.059
.065
.050

.234
-.031
.022

2.312
-0.307
0.258

.022
.759
.797

-0.012
0.066
-0.111

.049
.054
.043

-.025
.119
-.214

-0.255
1.223
-2.582

.799
.224
.011

0.057
-1.357
-0.565

.511
.540
.438

.012
-.262
-.111

0.111
-2.513
-1.290

.911
.013
.199

-0.503
0.231
0.494

.416
.463
.374

-.126
.051
.117

-1.210
0.498
1.320

.229
.619
.189

-0.554
0.248
0.397

.180
.196
.152

-.298
.122
.209

-3.077
1.266
2.612

.003
.208
.010

-0.120
0.226
0.937

.316
.357
.270

-.039
.065
.293

-0.379
0.634
3.464

.705
.527
.001
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(b = -1.357, t = -2.513, p = .013). Less frequent self-regulation in favorite courses was
associated with higher ACT scores. The set of least favorite course scales did not account
for a significant proportion of variance in ACT scores (R2 = .030, F(3, 128) = 1.30, p =
.277).
In the prediction of course grades, the set of favorite course scales accounted for a
significant and medium proportion of variance (R2 = .122, F(3, 140) = 6.49, p < .001).
The Knowledge Building (b = -0.554, t = -3.077, p = .003) and Lack of Regulation (b =
0.397, t = 2.612, p = .010) scales made significant contributions to the prediction of
course grades. Greater use of knowledge building strategies and fewer struggles selfregulating were associated with higher course grades. The set of least favorite course
scales also accounted for a significant and medium proportion of variance in course
grades (R2 = .088, F(3, 130) = 4.16, p = .008). The Lack of Regulation scale made a
significant contribution to the prediction of course grades (b = 0.937, t = 3.464, p = .001).
Fewer struggles self-regulating were associated with higher course grades.
MAI scales. Statistics for all scales and all analyses are shown in Table 4.28. The
Knowledge of Cognition and Regulation of Cognition scales accounted for a significant
proportion of variance in cumulative GPA (R2 = .068, F(2, 146) = 5.31, p = .006) that fell
between the small and medium conventions for interpretation. The Knowledge of
Cognition scale (b = 0.014, t = 2.321, p = .022) made a significant contribution to the
prediction of cumulative GPA, but the Regulation of Cognition scale did not. In the
prediction of ACT scores, the MAI scales again accounted for a significant proportion of
variance (R2 = .053, F(2, 131) = 3.67, p = .028) that fell between the small and medium
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Table 4.28
Coefficients for all MAI Regression Analyses
b

bSE

β

t

p

GPA
Knowledge of Cognition
Regulation of Cognition

0.014
-0.002

.006
.005

.297
-.049

2.321
-0.380

.022
.704

ACT scores
Knowledge of Cognition
Regulation of Cognition

0.086
-0.003

.051
.044

.237
-.008

1.688
-0.058

.094
.954

Favorite course grade
Knowledge of Cognition
Regulation of Cognition

-0.036
0.010

.017
.015

-.273
.092

-2.112
0.711

.036
.478

Least favorite course grade
Knowledge of Cognition
Regulation of Cognition

-0.096
0.040

.032
.027

-.389
.191

-3.002
1.477

.003
.142

conventions for interpretation. However, neither scale was an independently significant
predictor.
In the prediction of favorite course grades, the MAI scales accounted for a
significant and small proportion of variance (R2 = .044, F(2, 146) = 3.35, p = .038). The
Knowledge of Cognition scale (b = -0.036, t = -2.112, p = .036) made a significant
contribution to the prediction of favorite course grades, but the Regulation of Cognition
scale did not. And in the prediction of least favorite course grades, the MAI scales
accounted for a significant and medium proportion of variance (R2 = .072, F(2, 141) =
5.46, p = .005). Again, the Knowledge of Cognition scale (b = -0.096, t = -3.002, p =
.003) made a significant contribution to the prediction of favorite course grades, but the
Regulation of Cognition scale did not.
Correlations among Constructs
Correlations among scales from the MIPSS, MAI, and SPOCK, the MSLQ
Metacognitive Self-regulation scale, and the Implicit Theories of Intelligence scales are
shown in Tables 4.29 through 4.32.
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Table 4.29
Correlations among MIPSS scales
DK
PK
CK
FS
FC
FA
FT
LS
LC
LA
DK
PK
.430*
CK
.489*
.525*
FS
.323*
.308*
.417*
FC
.316*
.189*
.302*
.386*
FA
.315*
.338*
.275*
.339*
.382*
FT
.122
.159*
.110
.331*
.227*
.167*
LS
.229*
.208*
.193*
.331*
.191*
.297*
.027
LC
.273*
.286*
.232*
.200*
.239*
.269*
.112
.590*
LA
.237*
.319*
.213*
.229*
.143
.220*
.222*
.380*
.499*
LT
.215*
.191*
.160*
.247*
.159*
.265*
.206*
.426*
.422*
.402*
Note. N = 293, * p < .01. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional
Knowledge, FS = Favorite Studying, FC = Favorite In Class, FA = Favorite Assignment, FT = Favorite
Taking a Test, LS = Least Favorite Studying, LC = Least Favorite In Class, LA = Least Favorite
Assignment, LT = Least Favorite Taking a Test.

Inspection of Table 4.29 reveals the following relationships among MIPSS scales
that are discussed further in Chapter 5: a) knowledge subscales were more highly
correlated with each other than with regulation subscales, b) regulation subscales tended
to be more strongly related to other regulation subscales for the same course than to
subscales for a different course, and c) correlations among the least-favorite regulation
subscales (rs from .380 to .590) tended to be stronger than correlations among the
favorite regulation subscales (rs from .167 to .386). Also of note, same-activity
correlations (between the two courses) ranged from .206 to .331, suggesting that even for
similar academic activities, individuals exhibit considerable variability across courses.
The first two columns of Table 4.30 show that, as expected, the MIPSS
knowledge scales were more strongly correlated with the MAI knowledge scale than the
MAI regulation scale. However, MIPSS regulation scales were not consistently more
correlated with MAI regulation scales; in fact, five MIPSS regulation scales had higher
correlations with the MAI knowledge scale than the MAI regulation scale. The last two
columns of Table 4.30 show that as expected, same-course correlations among the MSLQ
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Table 4.30
Correlations between MIPSS scales and MAI and MSLQ Metacognitive
Self-regulation scales
DK
PK
CK

MAI Knowledge
of Cognition
.490*
.530*
.474*

MAI Regulation
of Cognition
.300*
.356*
.393*

MSLQ favorite
course
.332*
.347*
.387*

MSLQ least
favorite course
.053
.252*
.190

FS
FC
FA
FT

.513*
.364*
.346*
.267*

.435*
.339*
.273*
.269*

.485*
.526*
.507*
.345*

.228*
.126
.179
.122

LS
.319*
.383*
.350*
.578*
LC
.267*
.272*
.330*
.488*
LA
.370*
.300*
.261*
.408*
LT
.302*
.217*
.113
.261*
Note. N = 149, * p < .01. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional
Knowledge, FS = Favorite Studying, FC = Favorite In Class, FA = Favorite Assignment, FT = Favorite
Taking a Test, LS = Least Favorite Studying, LC = Least Favorite In Class, LA = Least Favorite
Assignment, LT = Least Favorite Taking a Test.

Metacognitive Self-regulation scale and the MIPSS regulation scales were stronger than
opposite-course correlations.
Correlations among MIPSS scales and SPOCK scales also revealed stronger
correlations for scales pertaining to the same course. As is shown in Table 4.31, the
favorite-course Knowledge Building scale correlated with only three of the MIPSS
scales, but the least-favorite-course Knowledge Building scale correlated with seven of
the MIPSS scales, including all four least-favorite-course regulation scales and one
favorite-course scale. All eight same-course correlations between the SPOCK Selfregulation scales and MIPSS were significant, and two of the eight opposite-course
correlations were significant. The SPOCK Lack of Regulation scales showed little
relationship with MIPSS scales.
Finally, Table 4.32 shows correlations among MIPSS scales and constructs that
were expected to be unrelated to metacognition. These results followed expectations with
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Table 4.31
Correlations between MIPSS and SPOCK scales

DK
PK
CK

Knowledge
Building –
favorite
course
.165
.225*
.110

Knowledge
Building –
least favorite
course
.217*
.134
.244*

Selfregulation –
favorite
course
.184
.213
.324*

Selfregulation –
least favorite
course
.275*
.190
.284*

Lack of
Regulation –
favorite
course
-.263*
-.186
-.083

Lack of
Regulation –
least favorite
course
-.094
-.173
-.086

FS
FC
FA
FT

.202
.367*
.265*
.087

.267*
.129
.164
.117

.549*
.341*
.217*
.285*

.475*
.187
.321*
.174

.053
-.097
-.048
-.001

.071
.006
-.048
-.220*

LS
.028
.346*
.214
.693*
-.095
-.095
LC
.072
.498*
.084
.494*
-.175
-.161
LA
.153
.357*
.209
.404*
-.053
-.435*
LT
.133
.246*
.189
.426*
-.080
-.191
Note. N = 144, * p < .01. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional
Knowledge, FS = Favorite Studying, FC = Favorite In Class, FA = Favorite Assignment, FT = Favorite
Taking a Test, LS = Least Favorite Studying, LC = Least Favorite In Class, LA = Least Favorite
Assignment, LT = Least Favorite Taking a Test.

only a small number of these correlations achieving statistical significance. Overall, the
observed correlations supported the hypotheses. MIPSS knowledge scales were more
correlated with the MAI Knowledge of Cognition scale than the MAI Regulation of
Cognition scale, same-course scales were more correlated than opposite-course scales,
and scales measuring classroom perceptions and theories of intelligence mostly were
unrelated to the MIPSS scales.
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Table 4.32
Correlations between MIPSS Scales and scales measuring other constructs
Cooperative
Learning –
favorite course
DK
PK
CK

.052
.114
.071

Cooperative
Learning –
least favorite
course
.058
.128
.176

FS
FC
FA
FT

.111
.238*
.123
-.005

.231*
.081
.046
.149

LS
LC
LA
LT

Teacher
Directedness –
favorite course

Incremental
theory

Entity
theory

.072
-.116
-.008

Teacher
Directedness –
least favorite
course
.036
-.027
.009

.053
-.001
.126

-.062
-.120
-.141

.147
.214
.008
.178

-.048
.005
.046
.092

.182
.095
.196
.104

-.131
-.081
-.141
-.126

-.074
.047
-.001
.186
.121
-.085
-.054
.153
.018
.116
.107
-.081
-.083
.211
-.063
.309*
.239*
-.162
.035
.051
-.029
.070
.127
-.161
Note. N = 144, * p < .01. The Cooperative Learning and Teacher Directedness scales are part of the
SPOCK. DK = Declarative Knowledge, PK = Procedural Knowledge, CK = Conditional Knowledge, FS =
Favorite Studying, FC = Favorite In Class, FA = Favorite Assignment, FT = Favorite Taking a Test, LS =
Least Favorite Studying, LC = Least Favorite In Class, LA = Least Favorite Assignment, LT = Least
Favorite Taking a Test.

132
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
This chapter contains a discussion of the results of this dissertation. The research
questions and subsequent analyses addressed three identified gaps in the research
literature. The Factor Structure Question and associated bi-factor analyses addressed the
gap in the literature related to the factor structure of self-report questionnaires that
measure metacognition in post-secondary students. The Variability Question and
associated repeated-measures ANOVAs addressed the gap related to within-person
differences in metacognitive regulation: this dissertation is one of only a few empirical
demonstrations of within-person variability in metacognitive regulation and SRL. And,
the Association Question and associated correlation and regression analyses addressed
the gap related to the previously found weak associations of off-line measures of
metacognition with achievement and on-line measures of metacognition by testing the
possibility that differences in the context specificity of measured variables weakens the
observed relationships. In this chapter, results relating to the three research questions are
discussed in order, followed by limitations and future directions for research, and final
conclusions.
Question 1: The Factor Structure Question
Prior research examining the factor structure of metacognition instruments has
often failed to extract the factor structures hypothesized to correspond to the instruments.
Though the hypothesized structure was not produced exactly as expected in all analyses
in this dissertation, results from the bi-factor analyses conducted to test the Factor
Structure Question suggest a bi-factor model approximates the MIPSS data from this
dissertation reasonably well. Considering how rarely factor analyses of metacognition
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instruments, especially EFA, have returned the hypothesized structure (e.g., Hilpert et al.,
2013; McClendon, 1996; Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Sperling et al., 2002; Tock &
Moxley, 2017), the results of the bi-factor analyses in this dissertation are notable.
Consistent with the hypothesis, all MIPSS items loaded on a general metacognition
factor, and groups of items loaded on group factors specific to the activity or the
knowledge type represented in the item. Exploratory bi-factor analyses were conducted to
test alternate models with theoretically plausible numbers of factors. As expected, the
eight-factor solution fit well and was most interpretable for both the favorite course and
least favorite course data. In addition to the general metacognition factor, the group
factors mostly corresponded to the three components of metacognitive knowledge and the
four activities represented in the metacognitive regulation items, though there was not a
clear Assignment factor in either eight-factor solution. This bi-factor structure indicates
responses to the MIPSS were influenced by a general metacognition component, but
there was unique variance associated with the different activities and types of knowledge.
For both the Knowledge + Favorite Course and the Knowledge + Least Favorite
Course eight-factor solutions, most of the items had factor pattern coefficients above 0.40
for the general metacognition factor, and all but one of the items had factor pattern
coefficients above 0.30. Factor pattern coefficients for the group factors were more
variable, and not all items had coefficients > .20 on the expected factor. Most correlations
between MIPSS group factors were < .20 and all were < .30, indicating, that after
accounting for the general metacognition factor, group factors were mostly unassociated
with other group factors.
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The three other solutions that were considered did not show the same level of fit
and interpretability as the eight-factor solution. The expected result of the three-factor
solution was a general metacognition factor, a knowledge factor, and a regulation factor.
This pattern would have shown that after accounting for the metacognition factor
common to all items, there remained unique metacognitive knowledge and regulation
components. Published factor analyses of the MAI (e.g., Schraw & Dennison, 1994)
support the distinction between metacognitive knowledge and regulation in that
instrument, and its scoring yields scores for those two factors. Given the strong
correlations that have been reported for the two MAI factors (e.g., Hammann, 2005;
Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Schraw et al., 1995; Sperling et al., 2004), it is plausible that
a bi-factor model with three factors would fit the MAI or a similarly designed instrument,
such as the MIPSS. However, the three-factor solution for the MIPSS data did not
produce factors as expected. For both sets of items, a mix of knowledge and regulation
items had factor pattern coefficients equal than or greater to 0.20 on each of the two
group factors, and the items that loaded on each factor were different for the two threefactor solutions. Therefore, after accounting for the variability shared by all items, the
knowledge and regulation items sets are not distinct enough to comprise separate group
factors.
The expected result of the six-factor solution was a general metacognition factor,
a single knowledge factor, and one factor for each of the four activities represented in the
MIPSS. This result would have indicated that after accounting for the metacognition
factor common to all items, there was a unique metacognitive knowledge factor that did
not distinguish between the three knowledge components, and the metacognitive
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regulation items captured variability unique to the activity indicated in the item.
However, the Knowledge + Favorite Course six-factor solution returned group factors
that generally corresponded to declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, two of the
activities (i.e., taking a test and completing an assignment), and a combination of
conditional knowledge and regulation items with both positive and negative factor pattern
coefficients. The Knowledge + Least Favorite Course six-factor solution returned group
factors that generally corresponded to declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge,
conditional knowledge, and two different sets of regulation items. Contrary to what was
expected for the six-factor solution, after accounting for the variance common to the
general metacognition factor, the knowledge components had relatively distinct group
factors and factors composed of regulation items did not align with the activities
represented in the items.
The expected result of the nine-factor solution was a general metacognition factor,
one group factor for each of the components of metacognitive knowledge, and one group
factor for each of the five components of metacognitive regulation (i.e., controlling,
evaluating, monitoring, planning, and metacognitive experiences). This result would have
indicated that after accounting for the metacognition factor common to all items, there
was unique variability associated was each of the three metacognitive knowledge
components and the five metacognitive regulation components. This structure is the bifactor equivalent to what was originally hypothesized for the structure of the MAI
(Schraw & Dennison, 1994), but exploratory factor analysis did not yield this structure
for the MAI either. Based on the results of this dissertation and Schraw and Dennison
(1994), it appears that the components of metacognitive regulation are unlikely to emerge
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as distinct factors when factor analyzed. In fact, I am unaware of any studies that have
found factors reflecting components of metacognitive regulation. This repeated failure of
the components of metacognitive regulation to emerge as separate factors suggests at
least two possibilities: (a) during learning, metacognitive regulation processes are
intertwined to the point that using one almost certainly leads to using others, or (b) the
“lines” that have been drawn between processes in theories of metacognition do not
divide up regulatory processes in a way that reflects how learners regulate their cognition.
The Knowledge + Favorite Course nine-factor solution returned a strong general
metacognition factor, three factors mostly aligned with three of the activities represented
in the regulation items, and two factors mostly aligned with two of the knowledge
components. Three of the factors were not interpretable, and none aligned with the
components of metacognitive regulation. Similarly, the Knowledge + Least Favorite
Course nine-factor solution did not reflect the hypothesized structure. There was again a
strong general metacognition factor, but few of the group factors were interpretable, and
several items cross-loaded with factor pattern coefficients > .20 on multiple group
factors.
The bi-factor structure of the MIPSS was replicated by the confirmatory factor
analyses. Both the Knowledge + Favorite Course and Knowledge + Least Favorite
Course models fit the data well, but there were some differences between the two models
in terms of item loadings and factor correlations. Notably, the general metacognition
factor was stronger in the Knowledge + Favorite Course model than the Knowledge +
Least Favorite Course model. All but two items had loadings on the general factor > .20
in the Knowledge + Favorite Course model, but ten items had loadings on the general
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factor < .20 in the Knowledge + Least Favorite Course model. And, both CBFA models
had weaker general metacognition factors than the EBFA models. The strength of the
CBFA group factors was similar for the two models: loadings for individual items
differed in some instances, but overall loadings on the group factors were strong, which
was not the case for the EBFAs.
The largest difference between the results of the exploratory and confirmatory
factor analyses was the strength of the correlations among the group factors. Whereas the
EBFA eight-factor solutions returned factor correlations that were mostly weak, several
of the factor correlations from the CBFA models were strong, with several rs > .50. It is
possible that the differences in factor correlations is related to the differences in the
strength of the general metacognition factor. The general factor captures variance shared
by all the items, and factor correlations capture variance shared by groups of items. If less
shared variance is explained by the general factor, more variance is available to be
captured by factor correlations. However, it is unclear whether this difference is due to
differences between the two samples or the way (co)variance is distributed to factors
through the two analyses.
The strong correlations among the three metacognitive knowledge components
led to the decision to test alternate CBFA models that had a single metacognitive
knowledge factor. These alternate models also fit the data well and should be tested again
in future studies to determine whether this more parsimonious model should be used in
place of the more complex hypothesized model. Regardless of whether the hypothesized
model or the alternate model is ultimately determined to be more appropriate for the
MIPSS, the group factors associated with the four activities indicate that there is
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variability associated with the activity represented in the item that is separate from one’s
general tendency to use metacognition. Although the bi-factor models did not test for
unique variability associated with the course, the results do suggest that individuals’
metacognitive regulation varies across activities. This effect of activity could introduce
multidimensionality into the scores of instruments that include multiple activities. For
example, the MSLQ Metacognitive Self-regulation scale contains items that reference
studying, reading for the course, and being in class. Using a single score for an
instrument that includes multiple activities might force a unidimensional scale onto data
that are inherently multidimensional, and therefore obscure differences among
individuals that are captured by the data. In such cases, separate scores for the various
activities, like those generated from the MIPSS, would be appropriate.
Theoretical frameworks group the subcomponents of metacognitive knowledge,
the processes used to regulate cognition, and experiences related to awareness of
cognition under the same broad label—metacognition—suggesting that although the
components are distinct, they are all part of the same construct. Previously tested factoranalysis models have attempted to capture these relationships among metacognitive
knowledge, metacognitive regulation, and metacognitive experiences through
hierarchical and correlated-factors (oblique) models. These models represent the general
metacognition construct through the relationships among components derived from the
common variability their factors share. The bi-factor model offers an alternate way to the
model the complex nature of metacognition. The bi-factor model represents the general
metacognition construct as common variability at the item-level, not the factor-level, and
the components are derived from common variability that remains after removing the
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variability associated with the general factor. The bi-factor actually shows more clearly
than hierarchical and correlated-factors models that metacognitive knowledge,
metacognitive regulation, and metacognitive experiences are all part of the same
construct.
Additionally, the general metacognition factor and activity-specific group factors
generated from the MIPSS data are consistent with Hong (1998) and Mujagić and Buško
(2013) that suggest there are both trait-like and state-like aspects of metacognition. The
general factor shows commonality across the activities, and therefore captures a more
stable, trait-like component of metacognition. The group factors for the activities show
that there are also differences associated with different activities; that is, there are also
state-like facets that are less stable.
Question 2: The Variability Question
Metacognitive regulation takes place within a specific context that is made up of
multiple interacting factors. Theory predicts that these factors contribute to within-person
differences in metacognitive regulation, but to date there has been little research to test
for within-person differences or their possible causes. The published research on withinperson differences has mostly focused on differences in regulation in different courses
(Ben-Eliyahu & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2015; Coertjens et al., 2016; Vermetten et al.,
1999). In this dissertation, course and activity were isolated as important contextual
factors that are likely to influence metacognitive regulation. Results from the repeatedmeasures ANOVAs used to test the Variability Question support the hypothesis that
metacognitive regulation is influenced by context. As hypothesized and in line with
findings reported by Ben-Eliyahu and Linnenbrink-Garcia (2015), participants
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consistently reported more regulation in their favorite course than their least favorite
course. Most effect sizes were moderate or large, indicating undergraduate students
exhibit appreciable differences in self-regulation across different courses. The MASRL
model (Efklides, 2011) suggests a Motivation Hypothesis might explain this difference:
one’s level of motivation (associated with liking the course) at the person level influences
one’s regulation at the person x task level. Self-regulating requires additional effort, and
it appears that in preferred courses students have the necessary motivation to put forth the
additional effort required for self-regulation. However, the person and person x task
levels are reciprocally influential, and it is possible that courses that require or induce
greater self-regulation come to be viewed as favorite courses. Directionality of influence
cannot be determined by the analyses conducted in this dissertation.
In the analysis of MIPSS subscales, the significant interaction between course and
activity provides some evidence that metacognitive regulation is also influenced by the
activity in which one is engaged. The interaction effect indicates the influence of course
differed across activities; the effect sizes for the mean differences between courses
ranged from d = 0.22 for taking a test to d = 0.90 for completing an assignment. The
variability in effect sizes suggests some activities elicit similar levels of metacognitive
regulation regardless of the course for which they are completed, while other activities do
not. Again, the Motivation Hypothesis provides an explanation. For example, tests tend to
be motivating regardless of the course, so students are likely to put forth the extra effort
required to self-regulate during most tests. As a result, one can expect students to report
that their metacognitive regulation during tests is relatively similar across courses. In
contrast, assignments tend to contribute less to one’s overall grade than tests, and
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assignments are likely to vary widely in their perceived utility. As a result, a student
might attach the label “busy work” to an assignment, especially if the assignment is for a
course that is not well liked. If an assignment is not valued as a learning experience or as
a grade, it is unlikely a student will invest the effort required to regulate while completing
the assignment.
Taken together, these results indicate metacognitive regulation varies across
contexts to a meaningful degree. This finding has implications for researchers who study
metacognitive regulation and SRL. First, context-general measures of regulation
completely mask within-person variability in regulation that is introduced by differences
in context. Requiring participants to indicate what they “usually” do, by mentally
averaging their behavior across a large number of contexts might not be appropriate
because there is evidence that regulatory behaviors are substantially influenced by
context. This is especially true when other variables (e.g., motivation, achievement) being
studied are context-specific. Although a measure of one’s “average” metacognitive
regulation might be useful in some situations, it is unclear whether participants are able to
provide a true average of regulation over all contexts or if, for example, they rely on a
small number of recent experiences to generate responses to context-general measures.
Second, multiple components of the context have the potential to influence
metacognitive regulation. When designing studies, researchers should be mindful of the
degree to which contextual features of the study align with the instruments used to
measure metacognitive regulation. For example, when using self-report instruments to
study the relationship between metacognitive regulation and study strategies, researchers
should select an instrument that primarily measures regulation during studying.
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Instruments that cover a wide range of activities or an activity other than studying will
not measure metacognitive regulation in a way that is most relevant for that study.
Finally, findings from this study support and extend previous research (BenEliyahu & Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2015; Coertjens et al., 2016; Vermetten et al., 1999) that
indicates metacognitive regulation is influenced by context. However, little is known
about which specific contextual factors (e.g., prompts to regulate, student-centered
instruction) influence regulation or what can be done by educators to encourage
regulation. The finding that students regulate more for their favorite courses than their
least favorite courses suggests general preference or motivation for the course plays a
role. And, the finding that the effect of course varies across activities suggests other
general contextual factors can influence regulation. Future research should explore other
contextual factors that might influence regulation, such as whether a course is “live” or
online. Additionally, research that identifies and targets fine-grained contextual factors
(e.g., working independently vs. collaboratively) could lead to principled
recommendations for fostering metacognitive regulation through instructional design.
Question 3: The Association Question
Off-line, self-report measures of metacognition have been criticized for failing to
correlate with achievement and other measures of metacognition. However, this criticism
has been based mostly on research that compares self-report instruments with measures
of metacognition and achievement with different levels of specificity, such as comparing
a context-general questionnaire and a think-aloud protocol, which is inherently taskspecific. In this dissertation, self-report measures of metacognitive regulation and SRL
with different levels of specificity were compared and used to predict multiple indictors
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of academic achievement in order to determine how the context specificity of the
variables impacted the observed relationships.
Regression Analyses
Empirical evidence (e.g., Dent & Koenka, 2015; Shell & Soh, 2013) supports
theoretical frameworks that indicate metacognition and SRL are related to learning and
achievement (e.g., Efklides, 2011). However, the degree to which research has detected
the relationship with achievement varies according to how metacognition or SRL and
achievement are measured. In this dissertation, metacognition and SRL were measured
by self-report instruments with varying levels of context specificity, and achievement was
measured by ACT scores, cumulative GPA, and grades in two different courses. Results
of the regression analyses partially supported the hypotheses. As hypothesized, the
MIPSS and SPOCK scales tended to predict variance in course grades better (in terms of
effect size, R2) than the general measures of achievement—GPA and ACT scores. Also
consistent with the hypothesis, the course-specific MIPSS and SPOCK scales predicted
course grades better than the context-general MAI. Contrary to the hypothesis, the MSLQ
Metacognitive Self-regulation scale predicted variance in general measures of
achievement better than grades and was worse than the MAI at predicting grades. The
MAI scales predicted all achievement measures comparably, with R2 ranging from .044
for favorite course grades to .072 for least favorite course grades.
Most predictions of achievement were small or medium in terms of effect size
(R2), and the best predictions fell between medium and large. These results are consistent
with prior research that has also found weak to moderate associations between measures
of metacognition and achievement (e.g., Kitsantas et al., 2008; Sperling, Richmond,

144
Ramsay, & Klapp, 2012; Young & Fry, 2008). The SPOCK scales predicted about 12%
of the variance in favorite course grades, and the MIPSS scales predicted about 15% of
the variance in least favorite course grades. Notably, the SPOCK Self-regulation scale,
which is conceptually the most similar to the MIPSS scales, was only a significant
predictor in one model—the prediction of ACT scores from SPOCK scales completed in
reference to a favorite course.
Contrary to the hypothesis, the variance accounted for by the context-general
measure, the MAI, was fairly similar to course- and activity-specific scales. Interestingly,
the MAI Regulation scale was never a significant predictor of achievement, but the MAI
Knowledge scale was significant in three of the four regression models. For the only
other measure with knowledge scales, the MIPSS, the Procedural Knowledge scale was
the most consistently significant predictor variable. From a theoretical perspective, this
finding suggests explicit awareness of how to manage one’s own cognition is particularly
important to academic success at the undergraduate level. From a research perspective,
this finding suggests that metacognitive knowledge scales might be particularly helpful in
predicting achievement.
Though not related to a specific hypothesis, the least favorite scales for the
MIPSS and the MSLQ yielded larger R2 values for grades than their favorite course
counterparts. This might be due to the skew and range restriction of favorite course
grades: the distribution of favorite course grades was higher and less variable (i.e.,
contained mostly “As” and “Bs”) than the distribution of least favorite course grades.
Restriction of range in the criterion variable can reduce the explanatory power of
predictor variables and might have caused the consistently lower R2 values for the
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favorite course analyses. Future research that uses different course achievement variables
that have less range restriction (e.g., final exam scores) might be better able to determine
whether there are meaningful differences in how course-specific measures of regulation
relate to achievement. For the SPOCK scales, the R2 for favorite course grades was larger
than the R2 for least favorite course grades. This difference appears to be due to the
relationship between grades and the use of knowledge building strategies that was
significant in favorite courses but not least favorite courses. For favorite courses, students
who reported using more knowledge building strategies earned higher grades, but this
relationship was not observed in least favorite courses.
Correlation Analyses
Results of correlation analyses supported the hypotheses and followed the
framework shown in the theoretical framework (see Figure 3.1). First, correlations among
the MIPSS and MAI knowledge scales were strong and larger than all but one of the
correlations between a knowledge scale and a regulation scale (i.e., r = .513 for MIPSS
Favorite Studying and MAI Knowledge), suggesting these scales measure a component
of metacognition that is partially distinct from metacognitive regulation. The
convergence of these knowledge scales and the unique contributions knowledge scales
made to the prediction of achievement suggest that metacognitive knowledge is a
conceptually distinct component of metacognition that might provide unique insight into
students’ SRL. For example, metacognitive knowledge might be a key component in
identifying the difference between an availability deficiency and a production deficiency
(Veenman, 2013b). Students who fail to regulate effectively or apply a needed strategy
might do so because they do not know how—an availability deficiency—or because they
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know how but choose not to do so—a production deficiency. Assessing metacognitive
knowledge could be an efficient way to distinguish between the two. Alternately, one
could assess regulation in a variety of contexts to determine whether regulation failures
happen in a limited number of contexts or all contexts. The former would indicate a
production deficiency while the latter would indicate an availability deficiency.
Second, as hypothesized, in all but one instance, course-specific regulation scales
(i.e., MSLQ Metacognitive Self-regulation scale and SPOCK Self-regulation scale) were
more strongly related to MIPSS regulation scales for the same course than to scales for
the opposite course. The same-course correlations were in the moderate-to-strong range
according to Cohen’s guidelines. These relationships indicate participant responses
yielded course-specific variability that was consistent across measures and support the
broader hypothesis that context influences regulation. The SPOCK Lack of Regulation
scale, however, showed little correlation with the MIPSS regulation scales. This is
probably because the Lack of Regulation scale measures a different component of SRL
than most self-regulation scales; whereas most self-regulation scales measure what an
individual does to regulate cognition or behavior, the Lack of Regulation scale measures
struggles in self-regulating and a reliance on others to guide regulation (Shell & Husman,
2008).
Third, the Implicit Theories of Intelligence scale and the SPOCK classroom
perception scales were mostly unrelated to the MIPSS scales, indicating implicit theories
of intelligence and classroom perceptions are distinct from metacognition. Although SRL
theory and the theoretical framework indicate motivation should be related to regulation,
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implicit theories of intelligence are domain- and context-general beliefs and therefore
were not expected to be associated with context-specific measures of regulation.
Somewhat contrary to the hypothesis, the MIPSS regulation scales’ correlations
with the MAI regulation scale were only slightly weaker than the correlations between
the MIPSS regulation scales and the same-course regulation scales. As hypothesized, the
MAI regulation scale – MIPSS regulation scales correlations were generally moderate in
strength, but the correlations between the MIPSS regulation scales and same-course
regulation scales ranged from moderate to strong. This overlap in ranges might be due to
the bi-factor nature of the MIPSS scales: the general metacognition factor is more likely
to correlate with the context-general MAI and context-specific group factors are more
likely to correlate with the context-specific SPOCK and MSLQ. Factor scores that
remove the influence of the general factor from the group factors might be able to tease
apart these sources of influence and clarify the relationships among the different scales.
Two additional findings are of interest but are not related to any specific
hypotheses. First, correlations among the MIPSS least-favorite course regulation scales
(rs from .380 to .590) tended to be stronger than correlations among the MIPSS favorite
regulation scales (rs from .167 to .386). If motivation for the course and activity features
are drivers of regulation, as was proposed in the theoretical framework, this difference in
the strength of correlations suggests general motivation for a course is a bigger influence
than activity features in least favorite courses, and students’ regulation (relative to other
students) varies more across activities completed for favorite courses. Second, sameactivity correlations (between the two courses) were weak to moderate, indicating that
students’ level of metacognitive regulation during a given activity does not uniformly
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increase or decrease based on how well they like a course. It is possible that some
students are more consistent in their use of metacognitive regulation than others. Students
who rely more heavily on external motivators, such as the instructor, to inspire the
additional effort required to self-regulate are more likely to exhibit variability in their
regulation, but students who are self-motivated and can maintain the effort need to selfregulate on their own are less likely to exhibit that variability across courses. A mix of
these two types of students would result in same-activity correlations that are weak.
Limitations and Future Directions
There are several important limitations that must be considered when evaluating
the results of this dissertation. They are discussed next, along with suggestions for
addressing these limitations in future research. Additional possible avenues for future
research are also presented.
First, the decision to use “favorite” and “least favorite” courses might have
affected the results in unknown ways. The decision was based on the desire to capture
maximal differences between courses as well as the practical constraint of students being
enrolled in different courses. If the Motivation Hypothesis is correct, asking participants
about their favorite and least favorite courses likely increased the differences between the
two courses and decreased differences between individuals for a given course, which
would increase the observed effect of course on metacognitive regulation (as tested in
The Variability Question). However, a reduction in variability within a given course
would also impact the factor analyses, regressions, and correlations, likely decreasing
factor loadings and associations between individual items (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007a),
which may explain why Vermetten and colleagues (1999) found much higher
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correlations—most above .60 and several above .80—among students’ scores on three
measures of regulation in four courses. It is therefore important that the factor structure
and psychometric properties of the MIPSS be examined in a future study that does not
specify the course based on the students’ preference for the course. Ideally, participants
in the study would be students in a cohort-style program that prescribes the set of courses
students take so that students in the program take the same courses in a given semester,
similar to the sample in the study conducted by Vermetten and colleagues (1999). Then,
all participants in the study could be asked about the same set of courses and there would
most likely be more variability in responses because students would have a wider range
of feelings about the course.
Second, it was not possible to directly test the effect of activity on metacognitive
regulation because the MIPSS metacognitive regulation items were not the exact same
items repeated for the different activities, and the other instruments did not have activity
specific scales. The activity group factors in the bi-factor analysis and the significant
interaction between course and activity in the repeated-measures ANOVA suggest that
there is a separate effect of activity, but additional research is needed to directly test the
effect of activity. Obtaining parallel measures of metacognitive regulation during
different activities will be challenging. If a self-report instrument like the MIPSS is used,
items must be the same for each activity so that any measured differences are due to
differences in metacognition and not differences in item content. If on-line measures such
as observations or computer logfiles are used, the selected activities must allow for
participants to regulate in a way that can be inferred by the researcher and also be similar
enough that comparable scoring schemes can be used.
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A third limitation has to do with the timing of data collection. Participants in
Study 2 completed the survey in mid-January and were asked to reference courses taken
during the previous (fall 2016) semester when responding to the course-specific items. It
is preferable for participants to provide responses related to courses they are taking at the
time of the survey, as was the case in Study 1, because the time lapse between the events
being queried and the survey administration likely reduced the accuracy of the responses
to course-specific items (Groves et al., 2009). A reduction in accuracy could reduce
reliability by introducing additional error into individuals’ observed scores on the scales.
However, future research is needed to determine the extent to which such delayed
administration impacts the accuracy of responses and the instruments’ properties.
Fourth, the sample size of each of the studies limited the number of items that
could be included in the factor analyses. The final version of the MIPSS contains 26
knowledge items and 45 regulation items (presented twice), but only 15 knowledge items
and 20 regulation items were included in each factor analysis. The samples in these two
studies meet the liberal sample size recommendations of 300 cases (Tabachnick & Fidell,
2007a) or 5 cases for every variable in the factor analysis (Gorsuch, 1983), but a greater
case-to-variable ratio is needed to increase the stability of factors (MacCallum, Widaman,
Zhang, & Hong, 1999). If the full MIPSS scales are to be used in the future, additional
research with enough participants to factor analyze the full instrument is needed.
Fifth, the participants in this dissertation were recruited from courses in the
college of education at a single large, public university. Participants self-identified as
mostly White and female. As a result, the sample is not representative of the population
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of undergraduate students at this university or in the United States. Studies of other, more
diverse populations are needed before generalizations to the population can be made.
Finally, three additional avenues for future research have been encountered
through the completion of this dissertation. First, the notion of availability and production
deficiencies in regulation (Veenman, 2013b) suggests students differ in how consistently
they regulate their cognition. Identifying the type of deficiency being exhibited would
enable educators to better intervene when students fail to regulate effectively. Future
research should test the possibility of identifying the type of deficiency a student is
exhibiting by classifying students based on the consistency of their regulation across
different contexts.
Second, the MIPSS metacognitive regulation response scale (“almost never” to
“almost always”) had an option, “I’m not sure if I do/did this,” that was scored as zero.
This is in line with theory, as knowing one does not use a particular regulation tactic
requires metacognitive awareness, but a lack of awareness of how one regulates (“I’m not
sure”) indicates less metacognition than only failing to regulate. However, the question of
whether this “I’m not sure” option reflects a point on the same latent scale as the
frequency options is an empirical one that ought to be addressed by future research.
Furthermore, with the delay between the courses and survey administration in Study 2,
the “I’m not sure” option might have actually functioned as an “I can’t remember”
option, which would not be expected to fall on the latent metacognition scale.
Finally, bi-factor models only recently have begun to be used in applied research,
and technical recommendations are less readily available for bi-factor analysis than for
traditional factor analysis. One important question that has yet to be answered is how
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reliably EBFA and CBFA will recover the same known model. Gerbing and Hamilton
(1996) demonstrated the effectiveness of using traditional exploratory and confirmatory
factor analysis as complements in determining factor structure, but, to my knowledge,
this has not yet been demonstrated for the bi-factor case. With the increasing popularity
of bi-factor models and the likelihood that researchers will use EBFA as a foundation for
a later CBFA, as was done in this dissertation, it is important to establish the
appropriateness of generalizing this practice from traditional factor analysis to bi-factor
analysis.
Conclusions
Context is important. The ways students self-regulate and engage metacognition
while learning differs across the various contexts in which learning occurs. Although this
statement is intuitively true and backed by theory, there is little empirical evidence to
support it. The results of this dissertation provide initial evidence that the specific activity
being completed and the course for which it is completed are important factors that
influence the degree to which undergraduate students self-regulate their cognition. The
influence of these factors might also influence the relationships between measures of
metacognition and achievement that are observed in research. When these contextual
factors are represented within a self-report measure of metacognition, those factors might
introduce multidimensionality and a need for multiple scales so that the data may be
better reflected by the scores. Overall, it appears that within-person differences in
metacognition should be taken into account in measurement, research, and practice.
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APPENDIX A
Complete List of Instruments and Items from Study 1
Note. Instructions shown to participants are given in italics.
This survey is grouped into four sections. In the first section, you will rate a favorite and
least favorite course on a variety of characteristics. In the next two sections, you will see
a series of statements and then provide a response for that statement. The final section
contains basic demographic questions and appears on a single page.
Please read the directions, statements, and response options carefully. There are not
right and wrong answers: what is important is that you answer truthfully.
Please think of a specific course you consider one of your favorites. You will be asked to
think about this course again later in the survey. Indicate the extent to which you agree
with the following statements.
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 =
agree, 5 = strongly agree
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The course is challenging.
Class meetings are engaging.
I am motivated to learn.
The teacher supports my learning.
Class activities contribute to my learning.
What I am learning will help me in the future.
I am interested in the topics we are learning about.

Please think of a specific course you consider one of your least favorites. You will be
asked to think about this course again later in the survey. Indicate the extent to which you
agree with the following statements.
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 =
agree, 5 = strongly agree
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The course is challenging.
Class meetings are engaging.
I am motivated to learn.
The teacher supports my learning.
Class activities contribute to my learning.
What I am learning will help me in the future.
I am interested in the topics we are learning about.
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Metacognition Inventory for Post-Secondary Students
Metacognitive knowledge.
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.
Please be sure to respond to each item.
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 =
agree, 5 = strongly agree
1. I understand my strengths and weaknesses when it comes to school.
2. I know which subjects are easier for me.
3. I purposefully structure my study area so I can focus on my studying.
4. I know where I rank among my friends when it comes to academic ability.
5. I know when my ideas and perspectives differ from those of my classmates.
6. How much I learn depends on how well I focus on the material.
7. I control how much I learn in class.
8. I know which types of homework assignments require more work than others.
9. I know which types of tests require more studying than others.
10. Some of the study strategies I use are more effective than others.
11. I could describe how I study to someone else.
12. I don’t know how to keep myself from getting distracted while doing school work.
13. I know how to motivate myself to learn when I need to.
14. I try to think about issues from other people’s points of view.
15. I know how to find extra information to clarify topics I don’t understand.
16. I have learned a variety of different strategies that I can use while studying.
17. I know how to create a detailed plan that will help me complete long-term
assignments on time.
18. I know how to keep track of my progress while doing my school work.
19. I don’t know how to organize my thoughts and ideas while writing a paper.
20. I have a specific process I follow when I write papers.
21. I don’t know where to start when I have to put together a presentation.
22. I don’t really understand what I’m supposed to do while studying.
23. I have figured out what time of day I am able to do my best work for school.
24. I know when during the week I am able to do my best work for school.
25. I know where I am able to do my best work for school.
26. I know who I should go to if I need help learning a topic.
27. I think about how my friends influence my motivation for school.
28. I know what influences how much a person learns during a lecture.
29. I can identify the factors that contribute to how much a person learns during a study
session.
30. I don’t really know why I use the strategies that I use. I guess it’s just what I’ve
always done.
31. I can recognize when a strategy won’t work well for a certain assignment.
32. I know how to change my study strategies so that I can be successful in hard classes.
33. I take time to think about what study strategies will work best with the subject I am
studying.
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Metacognitive regulation and experiences.
This scale was presented twice. Each time the directions indicated which class was to be
the target of responses.
This section is divided into eight subsections (across four pages). In each subsection you
will be asked to think about a situation within either the favorite or least favorite course
you rated earlier.
Please indicate how frequently you do each of the following activities in the given
situation. If you are unsure whether you ever do what the statement says, choose “I’m not
sure if I do this.”
Response scale: 0 = I’m not sure if I do this, 1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often,
4 = almost always
While studying for the class I consider one of your [least/favorites] …
1. I set goals for what I will accomplish during the session before I begin studying.
2. I sit down and start studying without much of a plan.
3. I am aware of how well I understand a passage while I am reading it.
4. I am aware of how much I am learning while I study.
5. I look for ways to make my studying more effective.
6. After I complete a reading assignment, I realize I had not been paying attention to
what I was reading.
7. When I realize I didn’t understand what I read, I reread it.
8. I get distracted while studying.
9. I take steps to remove distractions from my study area.
10. I make sure I have time to study for the class.
11. I create a plan to space out my study sessions before a test.
12. I use practice questions (my own or from the text books/study guides) to test my
understanding of the material.
13. I take time to consider whether I am using the best strategies.
14. I can sense what topics will be more challenging to learn.
15. I can determine what I do and do not understand.
16. I can tell how well I understand the material.
17. At the end of the study session I am aware of what information I will need to study
again.
18. I can tell whether or not I need to spend more time studying a topic.
19. I can sense whether or not my study strategies are being effective.
While in the class you consider one of your [least/favorites] …
1. I am prepared to learn when class starts.
2. I intentionally think about what was taught in previous lectures before the instructor
presents new information.
3. I am aware of what I do and do not understand during lectures.
4. After class I add things to my notes that I didn’t get written down during the lecture.
5. I ask myself questions to see how well I understand what is being presented during
the lecture.
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6. I am able to keep myself focused on the lecture.
7. I try to connect new information to things I already know.
8. I can tell how easy or challenging it will be for me to learn a new topic.
9. I sense how well I understand a topic compared to the rest of the class.
10. I am able to identify any topics I need to study on my own later.
While doing an assignment for the class I consider one of my [least/favorites] …
1. I think about the steps I’ll take to complete the assignment before I begin working.
2. I start working without much of a plan.
3. I find myself completing the assignment at the last minute.
4. I make plans so I can get all my work for the class done.
5. I can explain my thought processes to someone else when working on a problem.
6. I catch my errors as I am working.
7. I accurately predict what grade I am going to get on an assignment before I turn it in.
8. I take time to step back and critically assess my own work.
9. I get distracted while working.
10. I am able to maintain my focus on the assignment until I am finished.
11. I can accurately estimate how much effort an assignment will require.
12. I can tell how challenging an assignment is going to be.
13. I can tell when my work on an assignment meets the instructor’s expectations.
14. I am not sure what grade I will get when I turn in an assignment.
While taking a test in the class I consider one of my [least/favorites] ...
1. I am aware of what I am thinking as I recall information during tests.
2. I keep track of how well my test-taking strategies are working.
3. I am able to maintain my focus on the test.
4. I intentionally use specific strategies when taking tests.
5. I go back and check my answers before turning in the test.
6. Before I leave for class, I make sure I have all the materials I need for the test.
7. I have a hard time remembering things that I know I have learned.
8. I read the instructions carefully before starting the test.
9. I am aware of how confident I am in my answers while taking tests.
10. I can tell when I know an answer but can’t think of it right away.
11. I am surprised by the grade I get on tests.
Demographic Items
1. My academic standing is best classified as
a. Freshman
b. Sophomore
c. Junior
d. Senior
e. Other: _____
2. My gender is
a. Male
b. Female
c. Prefer to not answer
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3. I describe myself as (mark all that apply
□ Asian
□ Black
□ Caucasian/White
□ Hispanic/Latino
□ Middle Eastern/Arabic
□ Other: _____
4. My cumulative GPA is ___. (please report one decimal value; e.g., 3.4)
5. Which college entrance exam did you take? (If you took both, please select ACT.)
a. ACT
b. SAT
c. Neither
(The answer to item 9 determined whether item 10 or 11 was shown.)
6. What was your combined SAT score (critical reading and math sections)? (Report
your highest combined score if you took the SAT more than once.)
7. What was your ACT composite score? (Report your highest composite score if you
took the ACT more than once.)
8. Are you a first-generation college student?
a. Yes
b. No
9. Have you ever received training on study skills?
a. Yes
b. No
10. I am participating in this study because I am a student in…
a. EDPS 209
b. EDPS 250
c. EDPS 251
d. EDPS 362
e. EDPS 457
11. My instructor for that course is…
(options not shown for privacy)
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APPENDIX B
Complete List of Instruments and Items from Study 2
Note. Instructions shown to participants are given in italics. MIPSS items that were used
in scale scores are bolded. Reverse scored items are indicated by “(reversed)”. Reverse
scoring instructions and scale headings (underlined) were not shown to participants.
Courses and Ratings
Please name a specific course you consider one of your favorites that you took
during the previous semester (Fall 2016). You will be asked about this course
throughout the survey. If you know the course code (e.g., MATH 100), please use it as
your response here.
Please name a specific course you consider one of your least favorites that you took
during the previous semester (Fall 2016). You will be asked about this course
throughout the survey. If you know the course code (e.g., MATH 100), please use it as
your response here.
With regard to [favorite class], indicate the extent to which you agree with the following
statements.
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 =
agree, 5 = strongly agree
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The course was challenging.
Class meetings were engaging.
I was motivated to learn.
The teacher supported my learning.
Class activities contributed to my learning.
What I learned will help me in the future.
I am interested in the topics we learned about.

With regard to [least favorite class], indicate the extent to which you agree with the
following statements.
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 =
agree, 5 = strongly agree
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The course was challenging.
Class meetings were engaging.
I was motivated to learn.
The teacher supported my learning.
Class activities contributed to my learning.
What I learned will help me in the future.
I am interested in the topics we learned about.
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Metacognition Inventory for Post-Secondary Students
Metacognitive knowledge.
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.
Please be sure to respond to each item.
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 =
agree, 5 = strongly agree
Declarative knowledge
1. I understand my strengths and weaknesses when it comes to school.
2. I know which subjects are easier for me.
3. I know when my ideas and perspectives differ from those of my classmates.
4. How much I learn depends on how well I focus on the material.
5. I control how much I learn in class.
6. I know which types of assignments require more work than others.
7. I know which types of tests require more studying than others.
8. I could describe how I study to someone else.
9. Some of the study strategies I use are more effective than others.
Procedural knowledge
10. I don’t know how to keep myself from getting distracted while doing school
work. (reversed)
11. I know how to motivate myself to learn when I need to.
12. I have learned a variety of different strategies that I can use while studying.
13. I know how to create a detailed plan that will help me complete long-term
assignments on time.
14. I know how to keep track of my progress while doing my school work.
15. I don’t know how to organize my thoughts and ideas while writing a paper. (reversed)
16. I don’t know where to start when I have to put together a presentation.
(reversed)
17. I don’t really understand what I’m supposed to do while studying. (reversed)
Conditional knowledge
18. I have figured out what time of day I am able to do my best work for school.
19. I know when during the week I am able to do my best work for school.
20. I know where I am able to do my best work for school.
21. I know who I should go to if I need help learning a topic.
22. I know what influences how much a person learns during a lecture.
23. I can identify the factors that contribute to how much a person learns during a
study session.
24. I can recognize when a strategy won’t work well for a certain assignment.
25. I know how to change my study strategies so that I can be successful in hard
classes.
26. I take time to think about what study strategies will work best with the subject I
am studying.
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Metacognitive regulation and experiences.
This scale was presented twice. Each time the directions indicated which class was to be
the target of responses.
This subsection is divided across four pages. On each page you will be asked to think
about situations related to either the favorite or least favorite course you rated earlier.
Please indicate how frequently you did each of the following activities in the given
situation. If you are unsure whether you ever did what the statement says, choose “I’m
not sure if I did this.”
Response scale: 0 = I’m not sure if I did this, 1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often,
4 = almost always
Studying
When it came to studying for [least/favorite class] …
1. I set goals for what I wanted to accomplish during the session before I began
studying.
2. I was aware of how well I understood a passage while reading it.
3. I was aware of how much I was learning while studying.
4. I looked for ways to make my studying more effective.
5. I got distracted while studying. (reversed)
6. I took steps to remove distractions from my study area.
7. I made sure I had time to study for the class.
8. I created a plan to space out my study sessions before a test.
9. I used practice questions (my own or from the text books/study guides) to test my
understanding of the material.
10. I took time to consider whether I was using the best strategies.
11. I could sense what topics would be more challenging to learn.
12. I could determine what I did and did not understand.
13. I could tell how well I understood the material.
14. At the end of the study session I was aware of what information I needed to study
again.
15. I could tell whether or not I needed to spend more time studying a topic.
In Class
While in [least/favorite class] (while attending class) …
1. I could tell how easy or challenging it was going to be for me to learn a new
topic.
2. I was prepared to learn when class starts.
3. I intentionally thought about what was taught in previous lectures before the
instructor presented new information.
4. I was aware of what I did and did not understand during lectures.
5. I could sense how well I understood a topic compared to the rest of the class.
6. I added things that I didn’t get written down during the lecture to my notes after class.
7. I asked myself questions to see how well I understood what is being presented during
the lecture.
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8. I was able to keep myself focused on the lecture.
9. I tried to connect new information to things I already know.
10. I was able to identify any topics I needed to study on my own later.
Assignment
While doing assignments for [least/favorite class] …
1. I thought about the steps I’d take to complete the assignment before I began working.
2. I made plans so I could get all my work for the class done.
3. I could explain my thought processes to someone else when working on a
problem.
4. I caught my errors as I was working.
5. I accurately predicted what grade I was going to get on an assignment before
turning it in.
6. I took time to step back and critically assess my own work.
7. I got distracted while working. (reversed)
8. I was able to maintain my focus on the assignment until I was finished.
9. I could accurately estimate how much effort an assignment would require.
10. I could tell how challenging an assignment was going to be.
11. I could tell when my work on an assignment was going to meet the instructor’s
expectations.
Test
When it came to taking tests in [least/favorite class] …
1. I was aware of how confident I was in my answers.
2. I was aware of what I was thinking as I recalled information.
3. I kept track of how well my test-taking strategies were working.
4. I was able to maintain my focus on the test.
5. I went back and checked my answers before turning in the test.
6. I made sure I had all the materials I needed for the test before I left for class.
7. I had a hard time remembering things that I knew I had learned. (reversed)
8. I read the instructions carefully before starting the test.
9. I could tell when I knew an answer but couldn’t think of it right away.
Survey Branch A
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory
Please indicate how true each of the following statements are about you.
Response scale: 0=not at all true, 100=completely true, all middle values were unlabeled
1. I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my goals.
2. I consider several alternatives to a problem before I answer.
3. I try to use strategies that have worked in the past.
4. I pace myself while learning in order to have enough time.
5. I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses.
6. I think about what I really need to learn before I begin a task.
7. I know how well I did once I finish a test.
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8. I set specific goals before I begin a task.
9. I slow down when I encounter important information.
10. I know what kind of information is most important to learn.
11. I ask myself if I have considered all options when solving a problem.
12. I am good at organizing information.
13. I consciously focus my attention on important information.
14. I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use.
15. I learn best when I know something about the topic.
16. I know what the teacher expects me to learn.
17. I am good at remembering information.
18. I use different learning strategies depending on the situation.
19. I ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after I finish a task.
20. I have control over how well I learn.
21. I periodically review to help me understand important relationships.
22. I ask myself questions about the material before I begin.
23. I think of several ways to solve a problem and choose the best one.
24. I summarize what I’ve learned after I finish.
25. I ask others for help when I don’t understand something.
26. I can motivate myself to learn when I need to.
27. I am aware of what strategies I use when I study.
28. I find myself analyzing the usefulness of strategies while I study.
29. I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses.
30. I focus on the meaning and significance of new information.
31. I create my own examples to make information more meaningful.
32. I am a good judge of how well I understand something.
33. I find myself using helpful learning strategies automatically.
34. I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension.
35. I know when each strategy I use will be most effective.
36. I ask myself how well I accomplish my goals once I’m finished.
37. I draw pictures or diagrams to help me understand while learning.
38. I ask myself if I have considered all options after I solve a problem.
39. I try to translate new information into my own words.
40. I change strategies when I fail to understand.
41. I use the organizational structure of the text to help me learn.
42. I read instructions carefully before I begin a task.
43. I ask myself if what I’m reading is related to what I already know.
44. I reevaluate my assumptions when I get confused.
45. I organize my time to best accomplish my goals.
46. I learn more when I am interested in the topic.
47. I try to break studying down into smaller steps.
48. I focus on overall meaning rather than specifics.
49. I ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am learning something
new.
50. I ask myself if I learned as much as I could have once I finish a task.
51. I stop and go back over new information that is not clear.
52. I stop and reread when I get confused.
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Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire – Metacognitive Self-Regulation
scale
This scale was presented twice. Each time the directions indicated which class was to be
the target of responses. E.g., “For the following items, please answer with regard to
[least/favorite class].”
Scale: 1 = not at all true of me, 7 = very true of me, 2-6 were unlabeled
1. During class time I often miss important points because I’m thinking of other things.
(reversed)
2. When reading for this course, I make up questions to help focus my reading.
3. When I become confused about something I’m reading for this class, I go back and
try to figure it out.
4. If course materials are difficult to understand, I change the way I read the material.
5. Before I study new course material thoroughly, I often skim it to see how it is
organized.
6. I ask myself questions to make sure I understand the material I have been studying in
this class.
7. I try to change the way I study in order to fit the course requirements and instructor’s
teaching style.
8. I often find that I have been reading for class but don’t know what it was about.
(reversed)
9. I try to think through a topic and decide what I am supposed to learn from it rather
than just reading it over when studying.
10. When studying for this course I try to determine which concepts I don’t understand
well.
11. When I study for this class, I set goals for myself in order to direct my activities in
each study period.
12. If I get confused taking notes in class, I make sure I sort it out afterwards.
Survey Branch B
Student Perceptions of Classroom Knowledge Building Scale
This scale was presented twice. Each time the directions indicated which class was to be
the target of responses. E.g., “For the following items, please answer with regard to
[least/favorite class].”
Scale items
General Self-Regulation – 4, 7, 9, 11, 20
Knowledge Building – 2, 8, 12, 14, 19
Lack of Regulation – 5, 10, 15, 21,
Cooperative Learning – 1, 6, 16, 18
Teacher Directed Classroom – 3, 13, 17
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For items on this page, use the following scale:
5 - Almost always -- > Usually or always occurred: on a rare occasion, it may not have
occurred.
4 - Often ----------- > Occurred frequently: occurred about ¾ of the time.
3 - Sometimes ----- > Occurred about half of the time.
2 - Seldom --------- > Did not occur often: occurred about ¼ of the time.
1 - Almost never ---- > Occurred on a very rare occasion or not at all.
1. In this class, my classmates and I actively worked together to complete assignments.
2. As I studied the topics in this class, I tried to think about how they related to the
topics I was studying in other classes.
3. In this class, the instructor told us what the important information was.
4. In this class, I set goals for myself which I tried to accomplish.
5. In this class, I couldn’t figure out how I should study the material.
6. In this class, my classmates and I actively worked together to help each other
understand the material.
7. In this class, I tried to determine the best approach for studying each assignment.
8. In this class, I focused on those topics that were personally meaningful to me.
9. In this class, I tried to monitor my progress when I studied.
10. In this class, when I got stuck or confused about my schoolwork, I needed someone
else to figure out what I needed to do.
11. In this class, I made plans for how I would study.
12. In this class, I tried to examine what I was learning in depth.
13. In this class, the instructor focused on getting us to learn the right answers to
questions.
14. As I studied a topic in this class, I tried to consider how the topic related to other
things I know about.
15. In this class, I relied on someone else to tell me what to do.
16. When I did my work in this class, I got helpful comments about my work from other
students.
17. In this class, the instructor gave us specific instructions on what we were to do.
18. In this class, my classmates and I actively shared ideas.
19. In this class, I tried to fully explore the new information I was learning.
20. In this class, I thought about different approaches or strategies I could use for
studying the assignments.
21. In this class, I had difficulty determining how I should be studying the material.
Implicit Theories of Intelligence scale
For each statement below, indicate how much you agree or disagree with it.
Response scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = mostly disagree, 4 = mostly
agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree
Scale items
Incremental – 2, 4, 5, 8
Entity – 1, 3, 6, 7
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can’t really do much to change it.
No matter who you are, you can significantly change your intelligence level.
To be honest, you can’t really change how intelligent you are.
You can change even your basic intelligence level considerably.
No matter how much intelligence you have, you can always change it quite a bit.
Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very much.
You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence.
You can always substantially change how intelligent you are.

Digital Distraction Items
These items were presented twice. Each item indicated which class was to be the target of
responses.
1. Which of the following digital devices did you ever use during [least/favorite class]
for non-class purposes? (Select all that apply.)
□ Smart (cell) phone
□ Laptop
□ Smart watch
□ iPad/tablet
□ iPod/mp3 player
□ Other: _____
2. In [least/favorite class], I used my digital devices for non-class purposes:
a. A lot (13+ times per class)
b. Often (10-12 times per class
c. Sometimes (7-9 times per class)
d. Seldom (4-6 times per class)
e. Rarely (1-3 times per class)
f. Never (0 times per class
3. In [least/favorite class] when I used my digital devices for non-class purposes, I
missed instruction:
a. A lot (13+ times per class)
b. Often (10-12 times per class)
c. Sometimes (7-9 times per class)
d. Seldom (4-6 times per class)
e. Rarely (1-3 times per class)
f. Never (0 times per class)
4. In [least/favorite class], what percentage of the time do you spend using your digital
devices for non-class purposes? (Please enter digits and no percentage sign.)
5. Which of the following most accurately describes the technology policy for
[least/favorite course]?
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a. This course has a policy against using mobile technology for non-class
purposes, but this policy does not deter me because the instructor does
not enforce the policy.
b. This course has a policy against using mobile technology for non-class
purposes, but this policy does not deter me even though the instructor
enforces the policy.
c. This course has a policy against using mobile technology for non-class
purposes and this policy does deter me because the instructor enforces the
policy.
d. This course does not have a policy against using mobile technology for
non-class purposes.
Demographic Items
12. How old are you?
13. What is your major? If you have not declared a major, please type "undeclared".
14. My academic standing is best classified as
a. Freshman
b. Sophomore
c. Junior
d. Senior
e. Other: _____
15. My gender is
a. Male
b. Female
c. Prefer to not answer
16. I describe myself as (mark all that apply)
□ Asian
□ Black
□ Caucasian/White
□ Hispanic/Latino
□ Middle Eastern/Arabic
□ Other: _____
17. What was your final grade in [favorite class]?
18. What was your final grade in [lease favorite class]?
19. My cumulative GPA is ___. (Please report two decimal values, if known; e.g., 3.47)

188
20. Which college entrance exam did you take? (If you took both, please select ACT.)
a. ACT
b. SAT
c. Neither
(The answer to item 20 determined whether item 21 or 22 was shown.)
21. What was your combined SAT score (critical reading and math sections)? (Report
your highest combined score if you took the SAT more than once.)
22. What was your ACT composite score? (Report your highest composite score if you
took the ACT more than once.)
23. I am participating in this study because I am a student in…
a. EDPS 209
b. EDPS 250
c. EDPS 251
d. EDPS 320
e. EDPS 362
f. EDPS 457
g. EDPS 459
Engagement Check Items
(Appearing within the MIPSS, taking tests for [least favorite class] [item 107-116])
I did not care if I passed.
(Appearing within either the MSLQ [item 172] or the SPOCK [item 154])
For quality purposes, please select [2 (MSLQ) or seldom (SPOCK)] for this item.
Face-to-face questions
1. For how much of the survey did you read the items and response options carefully?
a. The whole survey
b. Most of it (about 75%)
c. About half of it
d. A small part of it (about 25%)
e. None of it
2. For how much of the survey did you put effort into answering as honestly as you
could?
a. The whole survey
b. Most of it (about 75%)
c. About half of it
d. A small part of it (about 25%)
e. None of it

